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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
o~F THE STATE OF UTAH 
KIMBALL ELEVATOR 
COMPANY, INC., a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
ELEVATOR SUPPLIES 
COMPANY, INC., a corporation, 
Defendant and Appella;n.t. 
Case 
No. 8066 
Brief of Appellant 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
(a) Preliminary Statement 
Defendant and appellant, Elevator Supplies Com-
pany, Inc., has appealed from the judgment on a verdict 
of $17,085 entered March 17, 1953, in favor of plaintiff 
and respondent, Kimball Elevator Company, in the Dis-
trict Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. (R. 194, 
212). 
Plaintiff, the unsuccessful bidder on the Hotel Utah 
passenger elevator modernization project, sued defend-
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ant, the successful bidder. Plaintiff alleged an express 
oral agreement whereby defendant was to submit to 
Utah Hotel Company a ''supporting bid'' in an amount 
of $18,000 or $19,000 in excess of plaintiff's bid, and 
that in "violation" of the "agreement" defendant made 
a firm bid and accepted an award of the contract in its 
own name. (R. 34-41). The "theory" was changed at 
the trial to ''an implied agreement not to compete'' with 
plaintiff, although the subject of competition 'vas never 
specifically discussed. (R. 632, 651). The trial court 
rejected the contentions of defendant that there 'vas no 
consideration for any such purported "agreement", and 
also held that federal and state statutes interdicting 
agreements in restraint of trade and competition, are 
''inapplicable.'' 
Utah Hotel Company on September 27,1950, awarded 
to defendant two contracts. One 'vas for modernization 
of the passenger elevators, in the sum of $78,774, Exhibit 
'' J''; and the other was for installation of t"ro electric 
dumb-waiter elevators, Exhibit 4. (R. 243-244, 770-771, 
779-782). When plaintiff learned that defendant had 
been awarded the contracts, plaintiff (whose bids on 
both projects had been rejected by Utah Hotel Com-
pany), demanded that defendant (the successful bidder) 
pay plaintiff a ''commission''. (R. 590-591). At the trial, 
plaintiff's manager admitted that defendant never told 
plaintiff at any time that defendant would give plaintiff 
a "cut out of the job" if Utah Hotel Company awarded 
the contracts to defendant; that defendant's manager 
did not promise anything; and that there were no 
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promises. (R. 589-590). Defendant flatly refused to pay 
anything to plaintiff. (R. 893-895). 
Plaintiff then asked Utah Hotel Company, owner 
of the building, for a ''commission'', which was refused. 
(R. 238, 240, 250-251). Plaintiff finally attempted to in-
duce the hotel company to cancel its contract with de-
fendant on the passenger elevators and to issue a contract 
in the name of plaintiff, which the hotel management 
refused to do. ( R. 239-240). 
Of the total verdict, $8,555 was awarded by the jury 
for" Plaintiff's loss of profit in n.ot getting contract with 
Hotel Utah," (R. 194). Plaintiff's only bid on the mod-
ernization of the passenger elevators, dated August 16, 
1950, Exhibit ''I'', was incomplete, vague, and said bid 
was unsatisfactory to Utah Hotel Company. (R. 246-247, 
263-264, 787-788, 813-817, 822, 831-832). Plaintiff's bid 
on two electric dumb-waiters, was also unsatisfactory to 
the hotel management, Exhibit 20. (R. 792-793). Utah 
Hotel Company did not see fit to ask plaintiff if it cared 
to submit another bid. (R. 264). Nor was the hotel com-
pany anxious to do business with plaintiff nor to invite 
plaintiff to submit another bid, as plaintiff had not sub-
mitted a satisfactory bid to begin with. (R. 263-264). 
Defendant did not solicit this particular business 
f'rom the hotel company. (R. 242). Plaintiff's bid was 
never discussed with defendant by the hotel company. 
(R. 237). Defendant did not do nor say anything to dis-
courage the hotel management from dealing with plain-
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tiff. (R. 248). Utah Hotel Company had been a customer 
of defendant since 1948, Exhibit 3. (R. 243-244, 770-771, 
779-782). On August 17, 1950, the management of the 
hotel expressly requested defendant to submit a firm bid 
on the over-all modernization project; and such request 
was repeated on August 30, 1950. Such a bid was sub-
mitted about September 11, 1950, Exhibit "J". (R. 241-
242, 788-792). Said bid was the only one the hotel man-
agement ever obtained for doing the job as- the hotel 
wanted it done. (R. 264). The hotel management also 
requested defendant to submit a firm bid on the dumb-
waiter elevators. Exhibit 4 is defendant's bid with the 
acceptance by Utah Hotel Company. (R. 244). 
The balance of the verdict, $8,530, was awarded for 
"Plaintiff's loss of advertisement value", because plain-
tiff's name-plates were not installed in the thresholds of 
the new passenger elevator cabs. (R. 194). There was 
no evidence that plaintiff could possibly have been 
awarded a contract, as its bid was unsatisfactory to the 
offeree; the hotel management refused to entertain it, 
and did not see fit to invite plaintiff to submit any further 
bid. (R. 264). Plaintiff was not the manufacturer of any 
of the equipment involved in the modernization. The 
subject of name-plates had never been discussed by 
plaintiff with the hotel management. (R. 586-587, 650), 
nor was anything mentioned about it in the only bid 
plaintiff ever submitted on the elevator modernization 
(Exhibit "I"). Utah Hotel Company as owner of the 
building refused to allow any name-plates in the elevator 
cabs, except the name of the cab manufacturer, ''Tyler", 
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in small letters on the capacity plate 1n each elevator 
cab. (R. 249, 259-260, 834~835). 
(b) Pleadings, motions and orders. 
Kimball Elevator Company filed suit against de-
fendant October 22, 1951 (R. 1-7). By its amended com-
plaint, plaintiff demanded 10% of the contract price of 
the passenger elevator modernization contract awarded 
to defendant by Utah Hotel Company (10% of $78,774), 
plus $50,000 ''damages'' for ''breach'' of an alleged 
express oral agreement. Plaintiff alleged that it pro-
cured from defendant a written proposal on a portion 
of the elevator modernization project in June 1950; that 
plaintiff then submitted a firm bid to Utah Hotel Com-
pany in the sum of $59,600 on the entire project on 
August 16, 1950; that plaintiff then obtained a quotation 
on two electric dumb-waiters, and plaintiff in tum quoted 
Utah Hotel Company; that defendant then "agreed" 
with plaintiff to submit to Utah Hotel Company a ''sup-
porting bid'' on the elevator modernization project in 
the amount of $78,000 or $79,000 (which would be $18,400 
or $19,400 in excess of the bid presented by the plain-
tiff) ; that "in violation of the trust and confidence be-
tween the parties and the agreement with plaintiff", 
instead of a ''supporting bid'' the defendant made a 
firm bid to Utah Hotel Company and accepted an award 
of the contract in its own name. (R. 34-41). 
Defendant challenged the validity of the complaint 
and the amended complaint, by motion to dismiss. (R. 
42-43). The district court denied defendant's motion to 
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dismiss, also its alternative motion for a more definite 
statement, and motions to strike. (R. 44). 
By answer defendant expressly denied there was 
any such agreement or any other agreement between 
the parties. Defendant alleged there was no considera-
tion for any such agreement, and also that if such an 
agreement had been made the same would have been 
illegal and void; that such an agreement would have 
been designed to stifle competition and to aid plaintiff 
to monopolize the bidding to the injury and detriment 
of Utah Hotel Company as owner of the property, and 
any such agreement would have b~en against public 
policy and void. Defendant further alleged that plain-
tiff knew that Utah Hotel Company desired a bid from 
defendant; that said hotel company expressly requested 
defendant to submit a bid on the over-all project; that 
defendant thereupon submitted to Utah Hotel Company 
a bona fide bid and defendant was awarded the contract. 
(R. 45-53). 
On motions to strike, the district court struck out 
the affirmative defense of illegality of the alleged agree-
ment, lack of authority of any agents of defendant to 
make any such agreement, and also the allegation that 
Utah Hotel Company as owner of the building did not 
allow name-plates in the elevator cabs. (R. 54-59). 
At pre-trial conferences November 21 and December 
2, 1952, there was advanced on behalf of plaintiff the 
novel "theory" that an unaccepted offer may give rise 
to an "impl~ed agreement not to compete" with the 
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offeree; and that the claimed "issue" was "that when 
the plaintiff requested a bid from the defendant, that 
the defendant agreed to refrain from competitive compe-
tition with the plaintiff for the work on which the bid 
was made, and for the work of the customer for whom 
the work was to be done." (R. 62). Defendant thereupon 
again moved to dismiss the amended complaint on the 
ground that the pre-trial hearing disclosed that plain-
tiff has no cause of action, and that plaintiff cannot show 
any legal consideration. ( R. 62-63). 
The defendant contended that if there had been such 
an agreement as alleged in the amended complaint, the 
same would have been illegal and void, as an unlawful 
agreement in restraint of competition in violation of 
federal and state criminal statutes. The trial judge ruled 
that defendant's claim that the alleged agreement would 
be illegal and void, does not constitute a defense, to which 
defendant excepted. (R. 62-63). 
The various defenses allowed by the pre-trial order 
as amended, included: (a) Denial that any contract was 
ever made, inasmuch as the unaccepted offer had ex-
pired; (b) that such an agreement would have been 
collusive and void; (c) that the bid on a portion of the 
proposed job was obtained by plaintiff from defendant 
on the false representation that plaintiff would be 
awarded the contract by Utah Hotel Company; (d) that 
plaintiff never entered into any agreement with Utah 
Hotel Company, and that the only bid submitted was 
incomplete, indefinite and unsatisfactory; (e) that there 
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was no consideration for any agreement not to compete; 
and (f) that if the plaintiff's name-plates had been placed 
in the elevator cabs, the same would have constituted a 
mislabeling and an unfair trade-practice, since plaintiff 
was not the manufacturer of any of the equipment. (R. 
62-67). 
The trial court on January 19, 1953, denied defend-
ant's motion for a summary judgment. (R. 71-79). 
On March 2, 1953, following plaintiff's opening 
statement, the defendant moved to dismiss the case with 
prejudice. (R. 96). At the conclusion of plaintiff's case 
in chief, defendant orally moved for a verdict in favor 
of defendant. (R. 756-757). The trial judge deferred 
ruling on such motion. (R. 764). At the close of all of 
the evidence, defendant presented and filed its written 
motion for a directed verdict against plaintiff, no cause 
of action. (R. 106-109). Ruling on said motion was .de-
ferred until after the verdict. (R. 963). 
The court submitted the case to the JUry on the 
theory that there were ''exclusive dealings'' between 
the plaintiff and defendant, which the jury might con-
sider in determining whether there was an ''implied 
agreement . . . that the defendant would not compete 
against the plaintiff." (R. 121). During the trial, how-
ever, the court sustained an objection to questions de-
signed to draw admissions from plaintiff that plaintiff 
did not purchase exclusively from the defendant. The 
court ruled that whether .or not the dealings were exclu-
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sive, wa.s wholly immaterial. (R. 501). It was expressly 
stipulated that defendant did not quote exclusively to 
plaintiff, and that defendant uniformly allowed a dis-
count of 10% from list price to all elevator companies 
which purchased from defendant. (R. 858-859). Plaintiff 
admitted that it purchased from other elevator com-
panies, the same type of materials which defendant 
manufactures and sells. (R. 505). Plaintiff also admitted 
that notwithstanding numerous requests from plaintiff 
for bids on dumb-waiters, plaintiff never at any time 
purchased any dumb-waiter from defendant, but plain-
tiff always purchased such equipment from other com-
panies. (R. 503, 874, 948-949, Exhibit 14). Plaintiff's 
manager also admitted that l(imball Elevator Company 
at no time issued any purchase order to defendant for 
synchron control, signal control, nor any other modern 
elevator controls manufactured by defendant, on which 
plaintiff had requested bids. (R. 480-482). 
Mr. Connole, plaintiff's manager, admitted that de-
fendant never at any time told plaintiff in writing that 
defendant would give plaintiff an exclusive bid; and 
when asked whether defendant ever told him orally that 
defendant would give an exclusive bid, Mr. Connole 
answered, "Not specifically." (R. 651). He also admitted 
that defendant did not at any time promise that it would 
refrain from submitting a bid to any competitor, and 
that such matter was never discussed. (R. 632). 
When the court asked counsel for plaintiff if ''part 
of your implied agreement is based on any theory that 
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the defendant had an agreement that they would deal 
exclusively 'vith you'', counsel said: ''We do not claim 
that, your Honor. We do make the claim they never in-
formed the Kimball Elevator Company they were ever 
bidding or making quotations to competitors of Kimball 
Elevator Company." (R. 846). Mr. Connole, however, 
admitted that it is not the practice in the elevator field 
for one elevator company to disclose to another company, 
to whom it is bidding. (R. 520-521). 
The court refused defendant's requests for instruc-
tions whereby the court would construe the written in-
struments, and the court declined to instruct the jury 
that there can be no finding of an ''implied agreement 
not to compete with plaintiff" from unaccepted offers 
and from other past negotiations. 
Numerous exceptions to the charge to the jury were 
taken, and exceptions were also taken to the refusal of 
the court to instruct as requested. (R. 963-971). 
Following entry of verdict and judgment on the 
verdict (R. 193-194), defendant served and filed its 
motion to set aside the verdict and to vacate the judg-
ment, and to enter judgment in favor of defendant in 
accordance with the motion of defendant for a directed 
verdict of no cause of action, and also a motion for new 
trial in the alternative, March 24, 1953. (R. 195-200). On 
June 4, 1953, both motions were denied (R. 202). Notice 
of appeal was filed on July 2, 1953. (R. 212). 
10 
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(c) The evidence. 
Plaintiff, Kimball Elevator Company, is an elevator 
contractor. It does not manufacture the type of elevator 
equipment involved in the modernization of the passen-
ger elevators at Hotel Utah. Daniel W. Connole is the 
manager of plaintiff corporation. Plaintiff has been 
agent for Kimball Brothers Company, of Council Bluffs, 
Iowa. (R. 460). About 1945, plaintiff became agent for 
Murphy Elevator Company, of Louisville, Ky. (R. 301-
302, 460). In 1949 plaintiff also became territorial repre-
sentative of Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company, 
of San Francisco. (R. 328-329, 460, 688, 701). 
Defendant, Elevator Supplies Company, Inc., is an 
elevator equipment manufacturer. It manufactures ele-
vator controls, signal systems, electric door operators, 
relay panels, hangers, various elevator accessories, and 
electric dumb-waiters. Defendant's manufacturing plant 
is in New Jersey. Roy C. Smith, with office in San Fran-
cisco, has been district manager since 1924. (R. 842-843). 
Defendant has issued catalogs, from which its ma-
terials can be ordered by catalog number. Plaintiff has 
ordered some repair parts from defendant by catalog 
number. (R. 415, 461). On jobs of any size, plaintiff has 
asked for bids. (R. 461). Defendant not only sells elevator 
equipment on an F.O.B. basis, but throughout the years 
it has sold materials on contracts to install the equip-
ment. It has been the practice of defendant, which has 
always been engaged in interstate commerce, to submit 
bids to everyone who has asked for quotations. (R. 849-
11 
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850). As illustrated by Exhibits 34, 36, 39 and 42, when 
two or more elevator companies requested defendant to 
give quotations on identical equipment and installation, 
the bids have been identical. It was admitted by plain-
tiff that defendant did not quote and sell exclusively to 
plaintiff. (R. 846, 856-858). 
A trade discount of 10% from list price, has always 
· been allowed by defendant on all purchases by elevator 
companies, whether the sale has been on an F.O.B. basis 
or on an installed basis. (R. 459, 849-850). The only 
way such discount can be obtained is to make the pur-
chase. (R. 519). Defendant has sold not only to plaintiff 
on that basis (R. 438, 459, 519, 743, 850), but defendant 
has sold on the same discount basis to Murphy Elevator 
Company, Otis Elevator Company, Montgomery Elevator 
Company, Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company, 
Elevator Maintenance Co., Ltd., Elevator Service and 
Supply Company, and others, as illustrated by Exhibits 
5, 6, 8, 31, 32, 33, 39, 40, 43. Although the pla.intiff has 
made numerous requests for bids, in more than 20 years, 
the plaintiff has actually awarded to defendant only 7 
contracts, and one of them was canceled. Most of defend-
ant's business has come from other corporations. See 
Exhibit 46. As to the numerous exhibits offered in. evi-
dence over objections of defendant, referred to by Mr. 
Connole as ''business deals'' and ''contracts,'' he ad-
mitted that the bids were never accepted, no purchase 
orders ever issued and no contracts materialized. (R. 
500). 
12 
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Prior to February 1948, Hotel Utah had purchased 
various elevator repair parts from Kimball Elevator 
Company, but the management became dissatisfied with 
the service. Commencing February 1948, Utah Hotel 
Company (owner of Hotel Utah) began to purchase 
replacement parts and equipment from defendant for 
rebuilding the existing equipment. Exhibit 3 consists of 
a number of invoices from defendant to Hotel Utah, with 
attached letter. The hotel company went directly to 
defendant to expedite the repair of the equipment. (R. 
770-771). Most of the elevator parts deal with door 
operating equipment. The hotel rebuilt the door closing 
mechanisms, prior to the time when the Utah Hotel 
Company decided to undertake the modernization pro-
gram. The repair of the passenger elevators was carried 
on in 1948 and 1949. Some of the repair parts were 
ordered by the hotel by catalog number. (R. 779-782). 
At the request of Utah Hotel Company, Mr. Roy C. Smith 
made an investigation of the passenger elevators and 
reported to Mr. Charles W. Lerch and Associates, eleva-
tor consultants employed by the hotel, under date of 
December 28, 1948, Exhibit 26. (R. 770-777). Roy C. 
Smith assisted the hotel in the repair program. (R. 877-
787). 
After Utah Hotel Company began to order equip-
ment from defendant for the repair of the elevators, 
Mr. Connole of plaintiff corporation, asked Mr. Roy C. 
Smith for a "commission". Payment was refused. Mr.· 
Connole was told that defendant did not pay commis-
sions ; that it sold at a discount, and that if plaintiff had 
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ordered such materials it would have purchased at a 
discount. (R. 878). Defendant has never paid any com-
missions. 
Otis Elevator Company wrote a letter to Utah Hotel 
Company on December 1, 1947, Exhibit 25, stating that 
the existing equipment could not successfully be adapted 
to modernization. (R. 772). Some months later, in 1948, 
Mr. Jerry Smith, building superintendent at Hotel Utah, 
began a series of conferences with Roy C. Smith of 
defendant corporation, with respect to the kind of mod-
ernization program which would be most economical to 
the hotel. Jerry Smith had been instructed by manage-
ment to investigate the possibility of bringing up to 
date all of the passenger elevator equipment. H~ had 
been dealing with Roy C. Smith on the repair program 
and he had confidence in the ability of Roy C. Smith. 
The hotel had used Elevator Supplies Company equip-
ment satisfactorily for some years. Roy C. Smith pointed 
out how Elevator Supplies equipment could be used in 
connection with some existing elevator equipment. Jerry 
Smith ultimately made recommendations to the hotel 
management for use of Elevator Supplies equipment in 
modernization. (R. 782-784). 
Jerry Smith discussed modernization of existing 
equipment with Otis Elevator Company, Elevator Service 
and Supply Company, Westinghouse, and Kimball Ele-
vator Company. He also asked for recommendations and 
bids. (R. 784). On May·ll, 1950, after Kimball Elevator 
Company was advised by Jerry Smith that the hotel was 
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interested in recommendations and bids with respect to 
modernization, plaintiff sent a letter to defendant, Ex-
hibit HHH: "Please figure out the necessary Elevator 
Supplies equipment to revamp the three passenger ele-
vators in the Hotel Utah. We would like these figures 
on an installed basis.'' 
Before submitting any quotation to plaintiff, Roy C. 
Smith asked Mr. Connole of plaintiff corporation what 
the bidding procedure would be on the project. Mr. 
Connole admitted that he told Roy C. Smith that Kim-
ball Elevator Company was going to do the job at Hotel 
Utah; that he understood that there would be no other 
bidder on this job, and that he told Roy C. Smith that 
Jerry Smith stated he would not let Otis Elevator Com-
pany bid. (R. 523-524; 883). Defendant, through Roy C. 
Smith, then submitted to plaintiff a bid on a portion of 
the modernization of the passenger elevators, on an 
installed basis, Exhibit KKK, dated June 14, 1950, de-
livered June 30, 1950. (R. 524, 883). 
Jerry Smith never told Mr. Connole that Kimball 
would be awarded the job, nor did he say that Otis would 
not be allowed to bid. (R. 785). Mr. Max C. Carpenter, 
manager of Hotel Utah, called to testify by plaintiff, 
also said that he did not tell Mr. Connole that the Kim-
ball bid would be accepted. (R. 242). Nor did Mr. Car-
penter authorize anybody to make such a statement. (R. 
242). 
Plaintiff obtained a quotation dated July 13, 1950, 
from Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company, Exhibit 
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JJJ, covering a portion of the items not included in the 
bid of defendant to plaintiff. Under date of August 16, 
1950, the plaintiff submitted the only bid it ever pre-
sented to Utah Hotel Company on the passenger elevator 
modernization, Exhibit "l". Said bid was made up by 
copying the proposal obtained from defendant, except 
for the price; and by including the following items with-
out any specifications whatsoever: "Main generator and 
drive control panels. Leveling units, vanes and brackets. 
Three new cahs at a value of $1800 each." (R. 524-526). 
The 15 repair items mentioned in the bid from Pacific 
were entirely omitted. 
Mr. Connole had a conversation with Jerry Smith 
at the time the bid was presented to Utah Hotel Company, 
Exhibit "I". (R. 533). Over the objections of defendant 
that such was hearsay, and not the best evidence, the 
court permitted Mr. Connole to testify as to what Jerry 
Smith allegedly said. (R. 369-370). Mr. Connole said 
that conversation was following August 16, 1950; that 
Jerry Smith said he did not know whether the hotel 
would change the outside lanterns, push buttons and 
things of that type for the present; and that he wanted 
to know what reduction could be obtained if the old ones 
were used; and that Mr. Connole said that as soon as 
they made up their minds "we could give him a firm 
proposal." (R. 371-372). Mr. Connole also said that 
Jerry Smith wanted to know ''if I had any suggestions 
as to who they could get another bid from. I suggested 
the Westinghouse Elevator Co.'' Mr. Connole further tes-
tified that Jerry Smith asked him ''if Elevator Supplies 
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would give a bid on the total job, and I told him that I 
did not know; that I would telephone San Francisco and 
ask them if they would bid on the total job, as an esti-
mate." (R. 371-373). He further testified: "I told him 
that the bid would be by identically the same people; 
ana I could not see what justification there would be for 
having two people bid on identically the same equip-
ment." (R. 575). 
Jerry Smith denied that there was any discussion 
about re-using the lanterns, push buttons or other equip-
ment, after the Kimball bid was presented. (R. 788). 
He testified that in the conversation with Mr. Connole 
about getting other bids, ''I told him it was necessary 
to get additional bids, and that I was going to ask Ele-
vator Supplies for a bid . ... He told me that he did not 
feel it would be of any value, because it would be the 
same bid that he had received from them or would get 
from them; it would be identical." (R. 786-787). 
Jerry Smith further testified that when plaintiff's 
bid dated August 16, 1950, Exhibit "I", was presented, 
Mr. Connole told him that the bid covered a portion of 
the necessary work; and that there was some additional 
work not included in the bid which would be discussed 
later; and that Mr. Connole said "we could come to 
some kind of an understanding as to how it was to be 
executed, whether we would do it at the hotel, which was 
his recommendation, or just how the balance of the work 
would be done." (R. 787, 815). Upon examination of 
said bid, Jerry Smith determined that it was not a sa tis-
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factory bid; that the bid was not complete; that it did 
not cover the entire scope of the work that was necessary 
to have the job done as the hotel wanted it; and that 
he recommended to the management of the hotel that 
said bid be rejected. (R. 787 -788). 
When Max C. Carpenter, manager of Hotel Utah, 
examined the bid, Exhibit "I", he did not regard the 
bid as satisfactory. (R. 246). He testified that he could 
not tell from reading it, just what ""\\7ork would actually 
be done. It was too vague. (R. 247). As to certain items 
there were no specifications nor detail. (R. 235-236). 
Mr. Carpenter did not discuss the matter with Mr. Con-
nole. ( R. 236). There was a small service elevator ·in-
stalled by Kimball Elevator Company which did not 
work satisfactorily, and the job of repairs by Kimball 
had also been unsatisfactory, and the elevator had to 
be replaced. (R. 258). Mr. Carpenter did not even submit 
the l{imball bid to the executive committee. (R. 264). 
The hotel management was not very anxious to do busi-
ness, or invite l{imball to come back and submit another 
bid, as Kimball had not submitted a satisfactory bid to 
begin with. (R. 263). Mr. Connole was never asked if 
l{imball cared to submit a new bid, after the hotel was 
informed by him that there ""\\ras going to be a price in-
crease. ( R. 264). 
After examining the Kimball bid, l\fr. Carpenter 
instructed Jerry Smith, building superintendent, to call 
Elevator Supplies Company, Inc., at San Francisco, Cali-
fornia, and ask defendant to submit a bid on the r ove-
18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
all job. (R. 241). There were Elevator Supplies equip-
ment in the passenger elevators, and parts had been 
replaced by defendant from time to time. The hotel had 
been dealing directly with defendant, and had a course 
of business dealings with defendant for a period of time. 
(R. 243-244). Exhibit 3 consists of a number of invoices 
representing purchases by the hotel from defendant after 
February 1948. (R. 242-243). When Roy C. Smith of 
defendant company came to the hotel, Mr. Carpenter 
told him he wanted him to present a straight-forward 
bid to the hotel, which could be accepted by the hotel. 
(R. 248). Defendant did not solicit this business. (R. 
242). 
On August 17, 1950, Jerry Smith of Hotel Utah 
called Roy C. Smith of defendant corporation, at San 
Francisco. Exhibit 28 is the record of the teleph<>ne call 
to defendant's telephone number on that date. (R. 788-
790). Jerry Smith asked Roy C. Smith if Elevator Sup-
plies Company would be interested in submitting a quo-
tation with recommendations to the Hotel Utah covering 
the modernization and general rebuilding of the elevators. 
He did not ask for anything other than a firm bid. (R. 
788-790). Roy C. Smith said it would be necessary for 
him to give it some consideration, and to contact his 
home office. (R. 789-790). About three days later, when 
Roy C. Smith was in Seattle, he called and said he felt 
his company would be interested, and that he would be 
in Salt Lake City about the latter part of the month and 
would go into detail. (R. 790-791). 
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On ..~..L\.ugust 18, 1950, Mr. Daniel W. Connole of plain-
tiff corporation called Roy C. Smith, by telephone. There 
is a conflict in the evidence as to what was said in such 
conversation. Roy C. Smith testified that Mr. Connole 
called for a quotation on two dumb-waiters, which de-
fendant furnished by telegram dated August 22, 1950, 
Exhibit 19, both on an F.O.B. basis and on an installed 
basis. ( R. 885). Plaintiff offered no evidence that the 
request for bids on the dumb-waiters was made in writing. 
Mr. Connole testified : ''I told him that the Hotel 
Utah would like to have a proposal on the .over-all job 
to verify our bid and justification of the amount quoted 
in our proposal and asked him if he could prepare the 
same and he said he would ... he said he would have to 
get in touch with the Pacific people." (R. 374). On cross-
examination, when asked to state what was said by Roy 
C. Smith, he testified: ''I don't remember just what he 
said.'' (R. 578). 
Mrs. Alice Connole, mother of Daniel W. Connole, 
and secretary of Kimball Elevator Company, testified 
that she listened in on the conversation her son had with 
Roy C. Smith .over the telephone on August 18, 1950: 
''That was when he asked for a bid, another estimate ... 
He called them and told them that the hotel company 
wanted a supporting bid; that Otis was not going to bid, 
and that Westinghouse had too much on the coast, they 
would not come into the Salt Lake territory with the 
elevator business .... He said he would look it up and 
let us know.'' She could not remember if there was 
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anything else discussed. (R. 940). On cross-examination 
she admitted that her son had called up Roy C. Smith 
for a quotation on dumb-waiters, and it may have been 
in the telephone conversation of August 18, 1950. (R. 
942). 
Both Roy C. Smith and Jerry Smith denied that 
Mr. Connole ever said anything about a ''supporting 
bid'', and denied that such a term was ever used. (R. 
786, 885). Roy C. Smith never heard of that term prior 
to this lawsuit, and he would not know what was meant. 
( R. 884-885). 
By letter dated August 28, 1950, Exhibit 20, plain-
tiff submitted a proposal on two electric dumb-waiters 
to Utah Hotel Company, on a non-installed basis. Such 
bid was unsatisfactory to Utah Hotel Company as it 
'vas only interested in bids on an installed basis. (R. 
249}. Furthermore, the bid was incomplete, and it con-
tained no specifications whatsoever. (R. 793). 
Mr. Roy C. Smith and Mr. Charles Maynard Henker 
came to Salt Lake City on August 29, 1950. Mr. Henker 
was one of the partners in Pacific Elevator and Equip-
ment Company. (R. 695-696). Prior to coming, Roy C. 
Smith asked Mr. Henker if Pacific would submit a bid 
to defendant on a portion of the project on an installed 
basis (R. 673). At that time defendant was not manu-
facturing the power controls. Mr. Henker said it would 
be all right if ''it is all right with Kimball Elevator Com-
pany'', as Pacific had already submitted a bid to Kim-
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ball. (R. 673-674). Kimball was then representative of 
Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company in Utah. (R. 
688). Mr. Henker said he would not make a bid to de-
fendant without clearance from Kimball. (R. 674). He 
also told Mr. Roy C. Smith that he thought it would be 
absolutely necessary to make a complete survey of the 
job at the job site. (R. 716). There had been business 
dealings for many years between defendant and Pacific, 
always on the basis of a request for bid, submission of 
a quotation or bid, and a purchase order. That had been 
true both ways. (R. 725). Contracts have always been 
in writing. (R. 727). 
There was a conference on August 30, 1950, between 
Max C. Carpenter, manager of Hotel Utah, Jerry Smith, 
building superintendent, and Roy C. Smith of defendant 
corporation. Mr. Carpenter testified that he had asked 
Jerry Smith to call Roy C. Smith for a bid from de-
fendant on the over-all elevator modernization. On this 
occasion Mr. Carpenter asked Roy C. Smith to submit 
a bid to the hotel on modernization of the three pas-
senger elevators. Defendant did not solicit the business. 
(R. 242). Mr. Carpenter told Roy C. Smith that he ex-
pected Roy C. Smith to present a straight-forward bid 
to the hotel-one that could be accepted by the hotel. 
(R. 248). There was no discussion about the Kimball 
bid. Roy C. Smith did not say or do anything to dis-
courage Mr. Carpenter from dealing with Kimball. (R. 
248). Mr. Carpenter at that time also asked Roy C. Smith 
to submit a bid on two electric dumb-waiters. (R. 244). 
They went over the elevator openings and made a 
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thorough inspection and examination, and Mr. Carpenter 
told Roy C. Smith the things he wanted done. (R. 250). 
Mr. Henker testified that after he and Roy C. Smith 
arrived in Salt Lake City, they talked to some of the 
hotel people, ''Then we made a very thorough survey 
of the equipment down to the last detail, preparatory 
to making up a firm bid to Elevator Supplies Company.'' 
(R. 676). Nir. Jerry Smith told Mr. Henker that the 
management had invited Elevator Supplies Company 
to submit a bid on the over-all job, and that the hotel 
wanted Elevator Supplies equipment used as far as 
possible. (R. 716-717). Mr. Henker spent whatever time 
he thought was necessary to determine just how much 
this job should cost for Pacific equipment and supplies, 
plus installation charges, before submitting a bid to 
defendant. The purpose of his visit to Salt Lake City 
was to determine what to bid to defendant. (R. 717-718). 
There was a conversation that day between Roy C. 
Smith, Daniel W. Connole and Charles Maynard Henker, 
on the way to the Park Building at the University. Roy 
C. Smith testified that he told Mr. Connole that he 
wanted him to know that Hotel Utah had asked defendant 
for a bid on the entire job, and that defendant was going 
to submit a bid; and that Mr. Henker came here to make 
a survey of the job to quote on an installed basis. Mr. 
Henker asked Nlr. Connole if it was all right to give 
defendant a bid, and Mr. Connole told Mr. Henker, yes, 
as long as they were bidding list price. (R. 886-887). 
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Mr. Henker testified that he told M1'. Connole that 
he had been requested by defendant to bid on the Hotel 
Utah job on an installed basis, and he wanted to be sure 
that Mr. Connole had no objections to subxnitting a bid 
to Elevator Supplies Company. Mr. Connole made some 
\ 
statement to the effect that he knew that the hotel man-
agement had requested additional bids on the over-all 
job. (R. 718). Mr. Henker said that he had already bid 
to Kimball so he asked Mr. Smith and Mr. Connole 
whether they were in agreement, as he wanted to clear 
himself of any wrongdoing as far as Kimball Elevator 
Company was concerned. (R. 676-677). He said they 
indicated they were in agreement, but that was all that 
was said. (R. 677). 
On direct examination Mr. Connole testified that 
Mr. Henker said: "While I have the two of you together, 
you understand Mr. Smith is going to place a proposal 
to the Utah Hotel. Am I to give him your figures~'' Mr. 
Connole told him "Yes." He did not recall whether any-
thing else was said. (R. 37 4-375). On cross-examination 
Mr. Connole admitted that he told Mr. Henker it was all 
right to submit a bid to Roy C. Smith, but he did not 
know if that was the exact language. (R. 572). He ad-
mitted that on deposition he testified: ''The Elevator 
Supplies Company requested the information from Mr. 
Henker, and Mr. Henker refused to give it to them, until 
he had my permission and that it was finally understood 
that I knew they were bidding it." (R. 572). "He told 
me that he could not give them a quotation, because we 
were figuring the job and representing them-unless it 
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)11 
was with our permission .... I told him it was all right.'' 
(R. 573). 
Eight days later, Pacific presented a firm bid to 
defendant dated September 7, 1950, Exhibit 18. (R. 717). 
The bid was on an installed basis. By letter dated Sep-
tember 15, 1950, addressed to plaintiff, Exhibit '' F' ', 
Pacific increased its original bid of July 13, 1950, from 
$3050 per car to $3715 per car (R. 714), or nearly 22%. 
There was a 30% increase in price of electrical equip-
ment alone that year. (R. 734-735). In the letter of 
Pacific to plaintiff, Pacific advised of the price increase 
and stated: "l\1r. Henker made an extensive survey of 
the present installation and we wish to add the following 
items of repair work which you would have to figure 
locally:'' ( 8 items including new hoist cables, governor 
cables, etc.). Mr. Henker said that Pacific called atten-
tion to those additional items so that if Kimball had an 
opportunity to revise its bid, it could take those items 
into consideration. (R. 714-715). Pacific intended that 
Kimball should rely on its new quotation. (R. 736). A 
quotation from Pacific is only good for 30 days. (R. 734-
735). 
As of September 11, 1950, defendant submitted two 
bids to Utah Hotel Company, Exhibit "J" on the over-
all passenger elevator modernization, and Exhibit 4 on 
two electric dumb-waiter elevators on an installed basis. 
On the same day, defendant also submitted to plaintiff 
two new bids, both dated September 11, 1950, Exhibit 
LLL. One was a new proposal on the passenger elevators 
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with the elimination of the provision for night attendant 
in one elevator, and a price increase from $30,126 quoted 
as of June 14, 1950, Exhibit KKK, to $32,020. A new 
proposal was also made on the dumb-waiters. Defendant 
quoted plaintiff, list price less 10%, but quoted Utah 
Hotel Company list price. 
Plaintiff admitted that after rece1v1ng new quota-
tions from both defendant and Pacific, plaintiff did not 
present any new bid to the Utah Hotel Company. (R. 
542). There was a discussion between plaintiff and Utah 
Hotel Company about price increase, but there is a 
dispute as to what was said. (R. 534-535, 794-796, 816-
817). 
On September 2·7, 1950, Utah Hotel Company ac-
cepted both proposals of defendant, and signed the con-
tracts, Exhibit "J" and Exhibit 4. 
Mr. Connole was asked if he was trying to keep Hotel 
Utah from getting a bid on the over-all job from Elevator 
Supplies Company. He testified: ''I wasn't trying to 
keep them from it.'' (R. 579). He further testified that 
prior to the award of the contract he did not tell anyone 
at the hotel not to award the contract to defendant. Then 
he added, "I never knew they would consider it." (R. 
596). Mr. Connole also testified that Roy C. Smith did 
not say that he would not submit a firm bid to Utah Hotel 
Company. (R. 589). Also, Roy C. Smith did not at any 
time tell Mr. Connole that if the Hotel Utah awarded 
the contract to defendant, defendant would give plaintiff 
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any cut out of the job. Mr. Connole admitted there was 
no cu.t, and there were no promises. (R. 589-590). 
When Mr. Connole learned that the contract had 
been awarded to defendant, he said he told Roy C. Smith, 
''I expected my regular commission on this job, as I had 
estimated in my figure." (R. 590). Defendant never at 
any time paid any commissions. It merely sold to ele-
vator companies at a discount of 10% from list price. 
( R. 895). When 1\tlr. Connole demanded a ''commission'', 
Roy C. Smith told him defendant absolutely would not 
pay any commission; and that defendant merely allowed 
a discount to elevator companies on the materials which 
they purchased from defendant. (R. 893-895). 
Mr. Connole then went to Hotel Utah and asked Mr. 
Carpenter for a "commission" on the job awarded to 
defendant. (R. 238, 240). Mr. Carpenter said he would 
not pay any commission because there was no commission 
to pay; that Hotef Utah was dealing with Elevator Sup-
plies Company; that Hotel Utah had put the job out on 
bid, and Kimball had not been the successful bidder. (R. 
250). Ivir. Connole then attempted to induce Utah Hotel 
Company to change the contract from defendant to Kim-
ball, on the assurance that it would not cost any more. 
Mr. Carpenter refused to do anything to change the 
contract in any way, shape or form. (R. 239-240). 
~ Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company received 
k a purchase order from defendant, October 4, 1950, Ex-
~ hibit 2. After the job got under way, Pacific employed 
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defendant's men to do its part of the work. (R. 722-723). 
The two jobs, on elevator modernization, and on the 
dumb-waiter elevators, were successfully and satisfac-
torily performed. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS ON WHICH APPELLANT 
RELIES FOR REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT 
1. The motions to dismiss should have been granted 
for the reason plaintiff's pleadings show that plaintiff 
was not entitled to any judicial relief. 
2. The pre-trial order recites as the "issue" a pur-
ported ''agreement not to compete'' which would be 
utterly void if proved: (a) For want of consideration, 
(b) as a restraint of trade illegal at common law, and 
(c) as a violation of federal and state criminal statutes. 
3. No agreement to refrain from competing with 
plaintiff could be implied from numerous unaccepted 
written offers nor from other negotiations which had 
terminated. 
4. Defendant 'vas entitled to a directed verdict, for 
the evidence not only fails to show any agreement to 
refrain from competition, but the evidence requires a 
finding that plaintiff recognized the right of defendant 
to submit bona fide bids to Utah Hotel Company as well 
as the right of the hotel company to obtain firm bids 
from defendant. 
5. Plaintiff was the only wrongdoer, (a) by prac-
tice of deceit in an effort to prevent competition, and 
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(b) by attempting to exact a spurious "commission" 
from defendant as successful bidder, and by wrongfully 
attempting to deprive defendant of its contract. 
6. There was no competent evidence that plaintiff 
would have obtained the modernization contract, and no 
competent proof of any damages. 
7. There was no proof of legal consideration. 
8. The trial court deprived defendant of basic 
rights, by injecting fictitious issues into the case, by 
prejudicial comments on evidence, by receiving inadmis-
sible evidence of plaintiff, by excluding competent evi-
dence of defendant, and by rejecting a number of 
defenses. 
9. The court misdirected the jury prejudicially both 
as to the law and as to the evidence, and the court also 
withheld from the jury various theories of defense by 
refusing to give appropriate instructions. 
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ARGUMENT 
PoiNT 1. 
THE MOTIONS TO DISMISS SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN GRANTED FOR THE REASON PLAIN-
TIFF'S PLEADINGS SHOW THAT PLAINTIFF 
WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY JUDICIAL RELIEF. 
The complaint and the amended complaint both 
show on their face that plaintiff as unsuccessful bidder 
on the Hotel Utah elevator modernization projects, 
sought to exact ''damages'' from defendant, the suc-
cessful bidder. Claim was not made that defendant 
unlawfully interfered with presentation of a proper bid 
by plaintiff. Plaintiff sued because of frustration of its 
scheme to deprive Utah Hotel Company of its right to 
obtain a firm bid from dependant. Plaintiff alleged an 
express collusive agreement. 
Stripped of its verbiage and diversionary allega-
tions, the amended complaint, like the original complaint 
in substance states: That plaintiff is a Utah corporation 
engaged in general elevator construction, repair and 
supply business; that defendant is a New Jersey cor-
poration; that under date of June 14, 1950, plaintiff 
procured from defendant a written proposal to furnish 
the plaintiff on an jnstalled basis in connection with 
modernization of the passenger elevators at Hotel Utah, 
the signal control system, and other equipment at a 
price of $30,126 ; that prices were list and subject to 
discount of 10%; that on August 16, 1950, plaintiff made 
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: !': 
a written offer to Utah Hotel Company to perform the 
passenger elevator modernization at a firm price of 
$59,600; that on August 22, 1950, plaintiff obtained from 
defendant a proposal to furnish and install two dumb 
waiters at Hotel Utah, and on August 28, 1950, plaintiff 
made a written offer to furnish such dumb waiters to 
the hotel; that it was "then agreed between the plaintiff 
and the defendant companies that a supporting bid 
would be made by the defendant company to the Hotel 
Utah Company on the over-all job", and after a con-
ference between officers of the two companies, "it was 
thereafter agreed that a bid would be made by the de-
fendant company to the Hotel Utah Company on the 
same modernization job in the amount of $78,000.00 or 
$79,000.00''; that thereafter a representative of defend-
ant conferred with a representative of Utah Hotel Com-
pany and agreed upon new and additional specifications; 
that ''in violation of the trust and confidence between 
the parties and the agreement with the plaintiff com-
pany to merely submit a supporting bid, the defendant 
company ... made a ne,v, separate and firm bid upon 
the changed and altered project''; and that defendant 
''made its independent bid and accepted a contract to 
perform and complete the entire and altered project in 
its own name and right." The plaintiff demanded 10% 
of the contract price and $50,000 ''damages''. (R. 34-41). 
By answer to interrogatory No. 8 plaintiff stated 
under oath: "It is a fact that the Utah Hotel Company 
stated it wanted more than one firm to bid on the job." 
(R. 23). Any bid which the defendant submitted to Utah 
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Hotel Company was expected by the hotel company to 
be a genuine bid, or in other words, a bona fide offer to 
perform. The dictionary definition of "bid" is "an act 
of one who bids something; an offer, as of a price at an 
auction; a statement of what one will give or do for 
something to be received, or will take for something to 
be done, or furnished; also that which is offered." 
The pleadings of plaintiff state a collusive agree-
ment, but fail to state any consideration whatsoever. 
There is no allegation that plaintiff agreed to give de-
fendant anything. No valid agreement is alleged. Any 
agreement of such a character would have been void, 
with or without consideration. If there had been con-
siaeration, it would have been clearly a conspiracy to 
commit a fraud on Utah Hotel Company. Plaintiff could 
not possibly be entitled to any judicial relief, for plain-
tiff shows that it was frustrated from doing that which 
it never had a legal right to do, either at common law 
or under statute. 
In Pittsburgh Dredging &; Construction Co. v. Mo·-
nongahela &; Western Dredging Co., 139 F. 780, both 
plaintiff and defendant were bidders for removal of slag 
from the bed of a stream, for a private steel company. 
Defendant in that case agreed to bid $1.60 per yard and 
plaintiff agreed to bid $1.70 per yard, with the under-
standing that whichever party was awarded the con-
tract, the other was to be given half the work. After a 
change in requirements, both bids were rejected; and 
defendant put in a bid for $1.25. Plaintiff tendered half 
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of the work of performance, which defendant refused. 
Plaintiff sued for breach of the agreement. It was held 
that such an agreement constituted a conspiracy to 
defraud the owner awarding the contract, and that such 
agreement was void as against public policy, so that 
recovery was precluded. The court further held that 
the rule which is applicable to bids on public works is 
also applicable to private contracts. The court said that 
a party calling for bids is entitled to have bona fide 
bids based upon actual competitive bidding, not collusive 
bids designed to make it appear that one party has sub-
mitted a good faith bid when in fact he has not. 
The court said: ''In all cases where contracts are 
claimed to be void as against public policy, it matters 
not that any particular contract is free from any taint 
of actual fraud, oppression, or corruption. The law 
looks to the general tendency of such contracts. The 
vice is in the very nature of the contract, and it is con-
demned as belonging to a class which the law will not 
tolerate." Richardson v. Crandall, 48 N. Y. 348, cited 
with approval in McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U. S. 654, 
19 S. Ct. 845, 43 L. Ed. 1117. Finally, the court stated: 
''. . . Viewed from the standpoint of morals, 
square dealing, and commercial integrity, combi-
nations for collusive, misleading biddings, wher-
ever made, cannot be approved; yet to enforce 
rights based on an agreement to make such bids 
is to make the law an active agent to accomplish 
such deceptive purposes. In view of this result, 
we think the law should adjudge such agreements 
void on the broad ground of public policy ... '' 
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In Daily v. Hollis,. 27 Tex. Civ. App. 570, 66 S. W~ 
586, a private corporation called for bids for the erection 
of a gas plant. One .of the bidders agreed with the other 
that one of them should make a higher bid, and upon 
the award of the contract, there should be a sharing of 
profits. The court held that such an agreement was void 
as against public policy, and denied recovery. To the 
same effect is Ray v. lf!l ackin, 100 Ill. 246. 
The allegations of plaintiff's pleadings sho'v au 
intent on the part of plaintiff to prevent Utah Hotel 
Company from obtaining from defendant a bona fide 
firm bid, and that the design of plaintiff was to prevent 
competition. The owner of real estate who calls for bids 
is entitled to obtain bona fide bids. Any scheme to 
circumvent the efforts of Utah Hotel Company to obtain 
firm bids, by having defendant submit a bid which would 
not be intended as a firm bid, would have been fraudu-
lent, not merely on the part of defendant, but on the 
part of plaintiff. The rule is well-stated in Corbin on 
Contracts, (1951), Sec. 1468: 
'' A11 agreement for the suppression of compe-
tition is a matter of restraint of trade and com-
merce, and if the bidding relates to the making 
of a contract with a private individual it is a 
fraud upon such person and is unenforceable, for 
it is in the public interest to prevent a fraud upon 
such person. ' ' 
It is true that the plaintiff did not allege any con-
sideration for such an agreement; but that merely shows 
that the agreement, if made, would be unenforceable for 
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want of consideration if it had been legal; but the lack 
of consideration could not make it any less fraudulent 
as to Utah Hotel Company, as the intended victim of 
such collusive agreement. Not having a right to make 
such an agreement, the plaintiff could not have been 
damaged by the breach of it; and it could not be dam-
aged when it gave no legal consideration anyway. 
PoiNT 2. 
THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER RECITES AS THE 
"ISSUE" A PURPORTED "AGREEMENT NOT TO 
COMPETE'' WHICH WOULD BE UTTERLY VOID 
IF PROVED: (A) FOR WANT OF CONSIDERA-
TION, (B) AS A RESTRAINT OF TRADE ILLEGAL 
AT COMMON LAW, AND (C) AS A VIOLATION OF 
FEDERAL AND STATE CRIMINAL STATUTES. 
The defendant renewed its motion to dismiss at the 
pre-trial conference. It was improper for the court to 
allow plaintiff to go to trial on some nebulous claim of 
an "implied agreement not to compete with plaintiff" 
when such claim is in defiance of law just as much as 
an express agreement to that effect. The law cannot 
be circumvented by doing indirectly, that which a per-
son cannot do directly. 
The following statement was made as the "issue" 
at the pre-trial conference, whereupon the defendant 
again moved to dismiss the case : 
"The court finds that plaintiff's cause of 
action is based on an alleged contract between the 
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plaintiff and the defendant that when the plain 
tiff requested a bid from the defendant, that the 
defendant agreed to refrain from competitive 
competition with the plaintiff for the work on 
which the bid was made, and for the work of the 
customer for whom the work was to be done.'' 
(R. 62). 
(A) Any "agreement" of such a character would 
have been void for want of consideration. 
Both the plaintiff and the trial judge refused to 
make any statement as to what consideration there would 
be for such purported "agreement". The recital of an 
agreement not to compete, does not show any considera-
tion, legal or illegal. The statement of the "issue" sug-
g~sts that a separate agreement arose each time the 
plaintiff procured a bid from defendant. .l\. request for 
a bid does not constitute consideration, and it is not 
even an offer. 
An analysis of the ''issue'' shows that there is no 
consideration. An offeree is under no duty to accept a 
bid, even if the offeree solicits the bid. By failure of 
plaintiff as offeree to accept any bid of defendant, under 
such a theory as stated in the pre-trial order, defendant 
could be prevented from getting any business, whether 
plaintiff's failure to accept were due to acceptance of 
the bid of defendant's competitor or due to plaintiff's 
inability to obtain the award of a. contract. 
In 1 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 31, page.74, it is 
pointed out that a request for bids is not an offer : ''That 
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:~~ 
is, an ordinary advertisement for bids or tenders is not 
itself an offer, but the bid or tender is an offer which 
creates no right until accepted." 
Inasmuch as an offer creates no right until accepted, 
it is palpably absurd to say that while failure to accept 
an offer cannot give rise to an express contract, it will 
nevertheless give rise to an implied contract to refrain 
from competing with the offeree. Until there is accept-
_ance of an offer,. there is no contract, and that means 
there is no consideration. 
Consideration has been defined as a benefit to the 
promisor or a loss or detriment to the promisee. 17 C. J. 
S., s~c. 70, page 420. The statement of ''issue'' does not 
suggest that plaintiff promised to accept the offer of 
defendant which plaintiff procured, so there could be 
no consideration and no contract, express or implied. 
A contract must be supported by consideration to be 
valid and legally enforceable. 17 C. J. S., sec. 71, page 
421. Plaintiff· did not claim at the pre-trial conference 
that it suffered any detriment or gave any promise in 
return for the pretended implied promise of defendant 
to refrain from competing. The pre-trial order shows a 
scheme to get something for nothing, since plaintiff 
promised nothing nor suffered any detriment for the 
''implied promise'' not to compete. 
The so-called ''agreement'' is fictitious on its face, 
involving a naked promise on the part of defendant to 
refrain from doing that which defendant had a right 
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to do, without any obligation on the part of plaintiff to 
do anything or to give anything. 
As will be illustrated later, the rule is that agree-
ments in restraint of trade are illegal and void. Among 
the few exceptions to the rule are agreements involving 
the sale of an established business with the good will of 
the business, by the terms of which sale the seller may 
agree to refrain from competing with the buyer within 
a limited area or territory for a specified period of time. 
Such agreements are permitted as exceptions to the 
general rule on the theory that refraining from compe-
tition with the vendee is incident to sale of the business. 
Failure to enforce the express agreement to refrain 
from competing 'vith the vendee might operate to deprive 
the purchaser of his newly acquired business. 
Inasmuch as the law discourages restraints of trade, 
even agreements for the sale of a business with a cov-
enant to refrain from competition, will be strictly con-
strued, and will not be extended beyond the express 
terms by implication. Rapalee v. John Malmquist & Son, 
165 Iowa 249, 145 N. W. 279. 
Such. a restrictive coven.an.t must be ancillary to a 
lawful agreement, and such restrictive covenant must 
be supported by. a valuable consi(leration". As pointed 
out in 5 Williston on C ontra.cts, Sec. 1636, page 4580 : 
' ' . . . A rule of the early decisions, still opera-
tive, that consideration must be given for a re-
strictive promise, even though it is under seal 
accords with the broader principle that the re: 
38 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ui: 
strictive promise must be ancillary to some per-
missible transaction.'' 
Inasmuch as the purported ''agreement not to com-
pete'' could not be ancillary to a valid contract, inasmuch 
as the procurement of an unaccepted bid does not con-
stitute a contract, there could be no valid basis for an 
agreement not to compete. Furthermore, there is :q.oth-
ing which even resembles consideration. 
The pre-trial order stated no cause of action, but 
a scheme to get something without consideration, which 
the law cannot condone. 
(B) Such a purported "agreement not to compete'' 
would have been illegal and void a.t common law. 
The pre-trial order clearly shows that the purpose 
of the plaintiff was to prevent a prospective customer 
or owner of property from obtaining a competitive bid 
from defendant. Such purpose would have been illegal 
because it would operate to deprive the prospective cus-
tomer or the owner of property of his legal right to 
obtain competitive bids. Such agreements have never 
been countenanced in America. As codified in The Re-
statement of the Law, Contracts, Sections 513, 516, 517, 
577, inter alia, specify: 
''Sec. 513 : A bargain is in restraint of trade 
when its performance would limit competition in 
any business or restrict a promisor in the exer-
cise of a gainful occupation.'' 
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"Sec. 516: Comment on Clause (e). 
''g. An agreement providing for exclusive 
dealing between the parties, while not in itself 
necessarily illegal is not unlikely to involve an 
attempt to obtain a monopoly. In such a case the 
agreement is illegal ... '' 
''Sec. 517: A bargain not to bid at an auction, 
or any public competition for a sale or contract, 
having as its primary object to stifle competition, 
is illegal. 
"Comment: 
''a. The common case of the application of 
the rule stated in the Section is in bargains not 
to bid at auction sales or at other competitive 
sales. Competition may also be stifled, however, 
by an agreement so to bid as to affect injuriously 
the final result of the competition even though the 
number of bidders is not diminished. (See illus-
tration 6). 
. * * :1(:. * 
'' 4. A, advertises for bids for the construc-
tion of a building. B, a contractor, promises 
$1,000 each to C and D if they will refrain from 
bidding. They do so. The bargains are illegal. 
* * * * 
"6. A, B, C and D, building contractors 
agree with one another to form the X association 
and that in future bids for the award of building 
contracts the successful bidder shall pay the X 
association 2 percent of the gross amount of the 
price fixed in the contract awarded. The agree-
ment between A, B, C and D is illegal.'' 
''Sec. 577. A bargain, performance of which 
would tend to harm third parties by deceiving 
the~ as to ~at.erial.facts, or by defrauding them, 
or Without Justrficat1on by other means, is illegal.'' 
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As previously pointed out, an agreement for the 
suppression of competition whereby a person agrees to 
refrain from bidding to a private person, it is a. fraud 
upon such person and such agreement is unenforceable. 
In each of the situations where the plaintiff would have 
had defendant refrain from submitting a bid to the 
prospective customer or owner of property, the pros-
pective customer or owner would have been the victim. 
The plaintiff had no right to make any agreement to 
defraud Hotel Utah or anyone else. Yet, such was the 
purpose of the purported agreement not to compete. 
Such a scheme was especially reprehensible in this type 
of case where Hotel Utah had been a customer of de-
fendant for over two years. 
In 5 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 1663, page 4691, 
under "Bargains to stifle competitive bidding", the rule 
is stated: 
''A bargain not to bid at an auction or other 
competitive sale, or on the competitive award of 
a contract, is illegal a.nd unenforceable by either 
party if the primary purpose was to stifle compe-
tition and secure an unfair advantage over the 
vendor or the person awarding the contract. Bar-
gains directly tending ·to chill competition, such 
as one that the successful bidder shall pay a per-
centage to his competitors, or employ a possible 
competitor to perform the c·ontract at a pre-agreed 
price, constitute illegal stifling of competition. 
Competition may also be stifled by a bargain so 
to bid as to affect injuriously the :final result of 
the competition though the number of bidders is 
not lessened .... It may probably be assumed 
that if the contract is against public policy, so 
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far as the parties to it are concerned, it is also 
fraudulent as regards the seller or one awarding 
the contract, and the converse of this proposition 
is undoubtedly true. ' ' 
Obviously, under the amended complaint the theory 
of plaintiff was that defendant agreed to submit a ''sup-
porting bid'' to Utah Hotel Company in an amount of 
$18,000 or $19,000 in excess of the bid presented by 
plaintiff. In view of the written answer to interrogatory 
that Utah Hotel Company "stated that it wanted more 
th ... n one firm to bid on the job", (R. 23), the plaintiff 
alJ~ged an illegal agreement, one which would have been 
a rjalpable fraud on Hotel Utah. The pre-trial order 
chEtaged the theory to allege an agreement not to com-
pete with plaintiff, equally reprehensible and fraudulent, 
( 
whether the design was to prevent defendant from sub-
mitting a firm bid to Utah Hotel Company or any other 
person desiring to obtain from defendant a bona fide bid. 
In the cases above cited, where a party to an illegal 
agreement promised to pay the other party a sum of 
money or give part of the profit for not submitting a 
bid or for making a higher bid, the agreement was pro-
nounced illegal and void. Even if no promise had been 
made to give consideration for such an illegal agree-
ment, the agreement of such character would not be 
valid or enforceable, for either illegal consideration or 
lack of any consideration would render the agreement 
void. Furthermore, it is the nature of the agreement, 
the purpose of which is _to deprive an owner of property 
of his right to obtain fair and honest bids and thereby 
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circumvent his freedom of contract, which makes the 
agreement fraudulent and void. 
The purported ''implied agreement not to compete 
with plaintiff", could not possibly come within the ex-
ception to the rule prohibiting agreements in restraint 
of competition, since the so-called ''agreement'' could 
not be arncillary to some lawful agreement. An unac-
cepted offer is not a contract, so it would be utterly 
impossible for such pretended agreement to be ancillary 
to a lawful agreement. The pre-trial order utterly f?1ils 
to state a valid contract to which an agreement not to 
compete with plaintiff, could possibly be ancillary, Zor 
the order fails to show anything other than an unaccetted 
bid, which cannot be a contract. There is nothing·· to 
exempt the ''agreement'' from obvious illegality. 
(C) Any such ''agreement'' ~vould have violated 
federal and state criminal statutes, and would have 
been void. 
The trial court entertained the idea that the plain-
tiff could avoid the inexorable prohibitions of the federal 
and state statutes, by abandoning the idea. of an express 
agreement such as alleged in the amended complaint, 
and by adopting a theory of an ''implied agreement not 
to compete''. Neither the federal nor state statutes 
exempt ''implied agreements in restraint of compe-
tition.'' 
Even if such an agreement to refrain from bidding 
did not affect the movement of goods in interstate com-
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merce, the "agreement" recited in the pre-trial order, 
even if it were not void for "~ant of consideration, would 
be void as a violation of the statutes of this state. Sec-
tion 50-1-3, U. C. A. 1953, declares: 
"It shall not be lawful for any corporation 
. . ., or an agent, officer, employee, director or 
stockholder of any corporation, to enter into any 
combination, contract or agreement with any per-
son or persons, the purpose or effect of which 
shall be . . . to monopolize any part of the trade 
or commerce within this state." 
Section 50-1-6, U. C. A. 1953, d.eclares that "Any 
contract or agreement in violation of any provision of 
this chapter shall be absolutely void.'' In Endicott v. 
Rosenthal, 216 Cal. 721, 16 P. 2d 673, under similar Cali-
fornia statutes, it was held that contracts entered into 
for the purpose of preventing competition are void as 
in restraint of trade and as tending to,vard monopoly. 
Such contracts need not actually result in monopoly to 
be void. The criminal penalties provided by our statutes 
are severe, to say the least. 
Inasmuch as plaintiff pleaded by amended complaint 
that defendant expressly agreed to submit a bid to Utah 
Hotel Company in an amount $18,000 or $19,000 in excess 
of the bid submitted by plaintiff, it is well to point out 
that the Legislature in enacting the Unfair Practices 
Act, Sec. 13-5-3, U. C. A. 1953, did not distinguish be-
tween activities done either directly or indirectly: 
''That it shall be unlawful for any person en-
gaged in commerce, in the course of such com-
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merce, either directly or indirectly, to discrimi-
nate in price between purchasers of commodities 
of like grade and quality, ... or to injure, destroy 
or prevent competition with any person who either 
grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such 
discrimination, or with customers of either of 
them; ... " 
Section 13-5-13, U. C. A. 1953, makes ''Any contract 
express or implied ... in violation of any of the provi-
sions of this act ... an illegal contract and no recovery 
thereon shall be had. ' ' 
Our state statutes are patterned after the federal 
statutes, and the federal courts have left no room for 
doubt that contracts of the character stated in the pre-
trial order would be criminal and void. 
The pleadings show that defendant Is engaged in 
interstate commerce. As indicated by 15 · U. S. C. A., 
sec. 1: 
''Every contract, combination in the form of 
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce among the several states, ... 
is declared to be illegal. . . . '' 
Inasmuch ·as the defendant was and is engaged in 
interstate commerce, defendant could not have done any 
differently than it did throughout the years, which was 
to quote and offer to sell to all persons who sought to 
purchase, without discriminating against any person. As 
stated in 15 U. S. C. A., sec. 13 : 
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged 
In commerce, in the course of such commerce, 
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either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in 
price between different purchasers of commodities 
of like grade and quality, where either or any of 
the purchases involved in such discrimination are 
in commerce, where such commodities are sold for 
use, consumption, or resale within the United 
States ... , and where the effect of such discrimi-
nation may be substantially to lessen competition 
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of com-
merce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competi-
tion with any person who either grants or know-
ingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, 
or with customers of either of them; ... '' 
The federal statutes interdict monopolies and re-
straints of trade. Criminal penalties are imposed, but 
in addition to criminal penalties for entering into agree-
ments in restraint of trade or to create a monopoly in 
interstate commerce, Congress provided that the injured 
party may recover treble damages, 15 U. S. C. A., sec. 
15. Thus, Utah Hotel Company would have had a cause 
of action for treble damages against plaintiff and de-
fendant if any such agreement had been entered into 
as contended by plaintiff. The United States Supreme 
Court in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 500, 
60 S. Ct. 982, 996, 84 L. Ed. 1311, 128 A. L·. R. 1044, said 
that ''this court has not departed from the conception 
of the Sherman Act as affording a remedy, public and 
private, for the public wrongs which flow from restraints 
of trade in the common law sense of restriction or sup-
pression of commercial competition.'' 
In Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc.,. 263 U. S. 291, 
311, 312, 44 S. Ct. 96, 100, 68 L. Ed. 308, the Supreme 
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Court declared illegal under the Sherman Act any agree·-
ment to refrain from selling to a particttlar person or 
class of persons: 
''The alleged purpose and direct effect of the 
combination and conspiracy was to put an end to 
these contracts and future business of the same 
character and 'restricts, in that regard, the liberty 
of a trader to engage in business' (Loewe v. Law-
lor, 208 U. S. 27 4, 293, 28 S. Ct. 301, 303, 52 L. Ed. 
488, 13 Ann. Cas. 815) and, as a necessary corol-
lary, to restrain interstate trade and commerce 
in violation of the Anti-Trust Act." 
As stated in United States v. Southern Wholesale 
Grocers' Ass'n., 207 Fed. 434, at 439, on the subject of 
monopolies interdicted by the Sherman Act: 
''It may be conceded, as contended by the 
plaintiff, that a contract between many engaged 
in the same business to refrain from selling to 
an individual, or a class would be an illegal re-
straint of trade under the Sherman Act, unen-
forceable at law and subjecting the participants 
to a criminal prosecution thereunder. Such a con-
tract might be express or implied, or consist of a 
mere combination or conspiracy to accomplish 
that end. No definite form of agreement is re-
quired .... " (Italics added.) 
The foregoing case disposes of the contention that 
the plaintiff could get around the statute by an implied 
agreement instead of an express agreement. In United 
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 174, 31 S. 
Ct. 632, 55 L. Ed. 663, the court pointed out that the 
term "restraint of trade" used in the statute is the 
common law definition; that the statute was designed to 
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protect the individual right to contract, and to preserve 
the fundamental right of freedom of trade. It is obvious 
that the "agreement not to compete with plaintiff" was 
designed to circumvent the fundamental right of Utah 
Hotel Company to make a contract with defendant, and 
to interfere with the individual right to contract. 
In United States v. Griffith, 334 U. S. 100, 68 S. Ct. 
941, it was held that it is not always necessary to find a 
specific intent to restrain trade or to create a monopoly. 
Furthermore, that 
''It is indeed 'unreasonable, per se, to fore-
close competitors from any substantial market.' 
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 
392, 396, 68 S. Ct. 12. The anti-trust laws are as 
much violated by the prevention of competition 
as by its destruction. * * * '' 
In a footnote to United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil 
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 60S. Ct. 811, 84 L. Ed. 1129, it is stated 
that ''the amount of interstate or foreign trade involved 
is not material (Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38, 
24 S. Ct. 307, 48 L. Ed~ 608), since §1 of the Act brands 
as illegal the character of the restraint, not the amount 
of commerce affected. Steers v. United States, 6 Cir., 
192 F. 1, 5; Patterson v. United States, 6 Cir., 222 F. 
599, 618, 619. '' Furthermore in the main opinion in 
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., supra, the 
court held that pretended good intentions on the part 
of the person who seeks to prevent competition on the 
ground that ''competition is ruinous to the industry'', 
cannot be used as a defense to either criminal prosecu-
tion or injunction proceedings : 
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'' * * * Congress has not left with us the deter-
mination of whether or not particular price-fixing 
schemes are wise or unwise, healthy or destruc-
tive. It has not permitted the age-old cry of 
ruinous competition and competitive evils to be 
a defense to price-fixing agreements. It has no 
more allowed genuine or fancied competitive 
abuses as a legal justification for such schemes 
than it has the good intentions of the members 
of the combination. If such a shift is to be made, 
it must be done by the Congress. Certainly Con-
gress has not left us with any such choice.'' 
It 'vas not within the discretion of the trial court to 
say that the purported ''agreement not to compete 'vith 
plaintiff", whereby defendant would be required to 
abstain from bidding, should be sanctioned when the law 
prohibits the purpose and the effect of such an agree-
ment as well a.s the agreement itself, whether with or 
'vithout consideration. 
Even agreements to divide territory, whereby one 
party promises not to compete within the area, are also 
void. Pennsylvania W. & P. Co. v. Consolida.ted G., E. 
L. & P. Co., 184 F. 2d 552. (Certiorari denied). 
In 5 Williston on Con tracts, Sec. 1658, page 4664, in 
referring to the Sherman Act, it is stated that "Agree-
ments to fix prices, . . . to refrain from selling to an 
individual or a class, are all within the statute.'' 
If the plaintiff could have proved the agreement 
stated in the pre-trial order, (assuming that considera-
tion could have been established), plaintiff would have 
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proved only a criminal offense, and a fraud on Utah 
Hotel Company 'vith a right of the hotel to recover 
treble damages. 
The court erred in denying each of the motions to 
dismiss the action. 
PoiNT 3. 
NO AGREEl\fENT TO REFRAIN FROl\f COM-
PETING WITH PLAINTIFF COULD BE IMPLIED 
FROM NUMEROUS UNACCEPTED WRITTEN 
OFFERS NOR FROM OTHER NEGOTIATIONS 
WHICH HAD TERMINATED.· 
Plaintiff was only an occasional purchaser of some 
of defendant's equipment. Notwithstanding numerous 
requests for bids, and the submission of numerous 
written bids to plaintiff, in more than 20 years the plain-
tiff awarded defendant only 6 contracts (except for one 
other which was later cancelled). On ·some types of 
equipment, such as dumb-waiters, plaintiff requested 
bids from defendant on numerous occasions, but invari-
ably purchased from competitors of defendant. Plaintiff 
ordered some replacement parts from defendant by 
catalog number, on occasions. It is undisputed that de-
fendant did not sell nor offer to sell to plaintiff on terms 
more favorable than terms granted by defendant to other 
elevator companies. Defendant sold its equipment to 
all elevator companies at a discount of 10% from list 
price, whether F. 0. B. or on an installed basis. Most 
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of defendant's business in Utah came from elevator 
companies other than plaintiff. 
By Instruction No. 6 in the charge to the jury, the 
court authorized the jury to find in favor of plaintiff 
either on the basis of "an implied agreement not to 
compete'' generally, or ''an implied agreement not to 
compete for the Hotel Utah job." (R. 124). There was 
no competent evidence of any ''implied agreement'' in 
either category, and the admissions of the plaintiff nega-
tived the possibility of any agreement. No express agree-
ment was claimed, and no written agreement was claimed. 
There "\Vas no competent evidence offered from which 
reasonable minds could find any ''implied agreement.'' 
The court should have granted the motion for directed 
verdict in favor of defendant (R. 106-109), for the evi-
dence manifested a wrongful attempt of plaintiff as the 
unsuccessful bidder to get something for nothing by a 
resort to fictitious claims. 
Over the objections of defendant (R. 268, 276), the 
trial court permitted plaintiff to introduce ''as evidence 
of the past dealings which show the close relationship 
of the parties", negotiations relating to numerous pro-
posed elevator projects during a period of more than 
20 years. (R. 229-231, 267 -357). Those negotiations in-
volved: (a) Requests for defendant to submit bids, 
either to plaintiff or to Murphy Elevator Company (of 
which plaintiff became territorial representative in 1945), 
such requests being in writing with few exceptions. (b) 
Submission of bids by defendant in specific detail, either 
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to plaintiff, or to Murphy Elevator Company, the bids 
invariably being in writing. (c) Written notice of ac-
ceptance and issuance of purchase order, in the few cases 
where the bids were accepted. (d) Oral discussions and 
written communications with respect to how defendant's 
eqUipment would be co-ordinated with other materials 
and equipment. 
During a period of 5 years, of the various bids sub-
mitted by defendant. to Murphy Elevator Company, only 
one contract 'vas awarded, which was for installation of 
synchron control and electric door operators by contract 
dated November 20, 1947, in the Medical Arts Building, 
Exhibits "T", 8, 46. During a period of more than 20 
years in which plaintiff made numerous requests for 
bids, plaintiff awarded the defendant only 7 contracts, 
and the one on the W a.lker Bank Building in 1948 was 
subsequently canceled. See Exhibit 46. The 6 instances 
where plaintiff accepted bids procured from defendant, 
and the contracts were performed, with the date of the 
contract and the equipment involved, are as follows: 
February 1, 1930, Hotel Utah, flashlight annuncia-
tor, waiting passenger lanterns, electric door 
operators, ground floor position indicators. 
September 22, 1931, Kiesel Building, Ogden, door 
closers, interlocks, and hangers. 
December 5, 1945, Hotel Utah, electric door opera-
tor and hangers. 
January 26, 1950, Logan Temple, door operator 
and hangers. 
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June 3, 1950, John R. Park Building, electric door 
operator, hangers, position indicators. 
August 8, 1950, Z. C. M. I., electric door operator 
and hangers. 
Each of the six contracts was fully performed. Each 
of them will be searched in vain for any suggestion that 
defendant will refrain from competing with plaintiff. 
Plaintiff had every opportunity in its requests for bids 
to make any statement it saw fit to make, but it did not 
ask nor even hint that defendant should refrain from 
competing with plaintiff. It is true that in addition to 
the 6 contracts in 20 years, plaintiff ordered repair parts 
from defendant by catalog number, as indicated by a 
group of invoices, Exhibit "L". However, neither plain-
tiff nor defendant could have stayed in business on the 
amount of business which they transacted between them 
in 20 years. 
Plaintiff exhausted the alphabet nearly 3% times 
with exhibits which were supposed to show a course of 
"past dealings" from which an "implied agreement not 
to compete'' allegedly arose. With the few exceptions 
noted, those exhibits consisted only of negotiations which 
had terminated long prior to the Hotel Utah moderniza-
tion project. The evidence pertaining thereto was in-
competent, irrelevant and immaterial, unless to demon-
strate that the claims of plaintiff were outrageous. Mr. 
Connole, manager for plaintiff, repeatedly referred to 
such exhibits as ''business deals'' and as ''contracts'', 
notwithstanding they were unaccepted proposals which 
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had expired. The court finally directed him to use the 
word "proposal" instead of "contract". (R. 370-371). 
In each instance, if the bid procured from defendant had 
been accepted, a. separate and distinct contract would 
have come into being, unrelated to any other bid on some 
other project. Mr. Connole admitted that the prospec-
tive jobs did not materialize. (R. 500). When defendant 
sought to bring out admissions from Mr. Connole that 
those negotiations did not result in any contract, and 
that the instruments were requests for bids and unac-
cepted o If ers which had expired, the trial judge inter--
jected (R. 503) : 
''THE COURT: It doesn't make any differ-
ence. The complaint is, the contract breached was 
not a contract to install, but a preliminary contract 
of negotiations." (Italics added.) 
The "preliminary contract of negotiations" concept, 
is alien to American jurisprudence. Negotiations do not 
constitute a contract. Liability cannot be fastened upon 
a person by mere negotiations, where the essential ele-
ments of a valid contract are lacking, such as a meeting 
of the minds, a good and valuable consideration, and 
agreed terms. With respect to the numerous exhibits 
involving negotiations short of acceptance of bid, no 
contract came into being. Nevertheless, the trial court 
permitted evidence of negotiations which came to naught, 
as proof of an "implied contract not to compete with 
plaintiff.'' 
In each instance, the written proposal submitted by 
defendant, whether to plaintiff Kimball Elevator Com-
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pa.ny or to Murphy Elevator Company, contemplated a 
written contract, which could come into being only by 
acceptance of the proposal. Failure to accept such offer 
precluded the creation of the particular contract pro-
posed; but the effect of the court's ruling amounts to 
saying that although plaintiff's failure to accept such 
proposal prevented the creation of an express written 
contract, such failure on the part of plaintiff (or Mur-
phy) to do the very thing essential to bring into exist-
ence a valid written contract could give rise to an 
implied-in-fact contract not to compete with the offeree. 
The idea that failure of the offeree to accept, would 
merely defeat the creation of an express written contract, 
but might bring about an "implied contract of negotia-
tions" on matters not even discussed, is patently absurd. 
The attempt to read into those simple requests for bids 
and into the detailed and explicit proposals in response 
thereto, some undiscussed and unmentioned ''promise 
not to compete'', amounts to an effort to force down the 
throat of defendant a fictitious contract to which de-
fendant never assented, in derrogation of fundamental 
constitutional rights. 
T'here can never be an implied agreement a.rtstng 
out of an. unaccepted offer or a group of unaccepted 
offers, for there is no contract without acceptance. Nor 
could there be any consideration for ''an implied agree-
ment" when there is no acceptance to create a contract. 
The court not only overruled objections of defendant 
to such incompetent evidence of negotiations which had 
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faded into oblivion, but the trial judge refused to con-
strue those written instruments in accordance with their 
tenor as negotiations involving requests for bids and 
unaccepted offers. The court delegated to the jury the 
judicial function of interpreting written instruments, 
a.nd allowed the jurors to find from negotiations which 
had terminated and from expired unaccepted written 
offers, an implied agreement not to compete with platin-
ti jj'. ( R. 120-122, 124, 157, 159-160). 
The trial court had the duty to construe the written 
instruments; but in construing written instruments the 
court is limited by principles which govern construction 
of written instruments. Courts cannot manufacture con-
tracts out of unaccepted offers, nor can courts read 
implied terms into written instruments which are not 
reasonably required by the provisions of such instru-
ments. As to the vast majority of the exhibits which 
involved unaccepted offers, there was no contract and 
hence no contractual terms either express or implied. 
The written instruments in each exhibit are clear and 
explicit, and there is no room for implication. There is 
no hint of refraining from competition. This is true 
both as to proposals which were neyer accepted and also 
to the few which resulted in written contracts. As to the 
few ~nstruments which did result in contracts, the rule 
is well-stated in 17 C. J. S., Contracts, Implied Terms, 
pages 779-780, which rule is approved by this Court in 
Donovan v. McGurrin, 69 Utah 1, 251 P. 1067: 
''However, in order that an unexpressed term 
may be implied, the implication must arise from 
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the language employed in the instrument or be 
indispensible to effectuate the intention of the 
parties. So there can be no implication as against 
the express terms of the con tract, and the courts 
will be careful not to imply a term, where the 
subject thereof is completely covered by the con-
tract, or as to which the contract is intentionally 
silent, or which is against the intention of the 
parties as gathered from the whole of the instru-
ment. Also, a term which the parties have not ex-
pressed is not to be implied merely because the 
court thinks it is a reasonable term, or because the 
contract is advantageous to one party, and. a per-
son may not be required to do what he did not 
promise merely because what he did promise was 
not sufficient to meet the requirements of some 
real or supposed public policy. Terms of another 
agreement cannot become a part of the contract 
except by express stipulation or necessary impli-
cation that the parties contract with reference 
to it." (Italics added.) 
As to the numerous instances where there was no 
acceptance of offer, there could have been no contract, 
and hence no room for any implication of some undis-
closed promise. To read into any of the written instru-
ments an implied promise not to compete 'vith plaintiff 
on some other project would do violence to the instru-
ments. As to the six isolated cases where plaintiff 
awarded contracts, four of them had been fully per-
formed before the Utah Hotel Company announced any 
intention to proceed with a modernization program. The 
consideration in each of the six contracts is limited to 
the particular job expressly mentioned. There is ·no 
reference to any other project. There is nothing in any 
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of the instruments \Yhich could possibly be construed to 
restrict or limit the conduct of defendant in the future, 
nor \Yith respect to some other job. There is a total 
absence of language from which the court could imply 
any agreement to refrain from competing with plaintiff. 
There is no promise, express or implied, that either 
party would do business with the other in the future. 
Inasmuch as the court could not imply a promise from 
any one of them, it could not imply a promise from the 
'vhole group of them collectively. The "issue" of an 
''implied contract not to compete with plaintiff'' was 
utterly fictitious. 
Inasmuch as the court cannot make a ne\v agree-
ment for the parties, the court cannot imply some 
promise which would give the other party something 
more than he bargained for, nor read into the instru-
ment some implied covenant not essential to make the 
agreement effective. As illustrated in Johnson v. Igle-
hart Bros., 95 F. 2d 4, "\vhere .it was contended that an 
agreement to refund the processing tax should be im-
plied, although the written agreement was silent as to 
refund: 
"It is urged upon us, however, that notwith-
standing the want of express language to cover 
the situation presented, the court should construe 
the contracts as containing an implied promise 
to refund to the plaintiff that part of the pur-
chase price which went to make up the processing 
tax. In other words, we are asked, by construc-
tion, to afford the plaintiff protection against a 
contingency other than that \vhich the parties 
themselves provided.'' 
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After citing a number of cases, the court said: 
'' ... It seems clear to us that the law is well 
settled that \Yhere parties expressly contract, 
under \vhat circumstances an obligation may arise 
"rith reference to a certain subject-matter, "\\7here 
the same is entered into without fraud or mutual 
mistake, it excludes the possibility of an implied 
covenant of a contradictory or different nature. 
In the instant case, the alleged implied covenant, 
of course, is not contradictory to those expressly 
made, but it certainly is different and in addition 
thereto ... '' 
The la~v will never permit an implied contract where 
from the nature of the case the parties could not legally 
make an express contract. Simpson v. Bowden, 33 Maine 
549. ''An implied contract is one which the law infers 
from the facts and circumstances of a case, but it will 
not be inferred in any case where an express contract 
'vould for any reason be invalid." Case v. Second .Ave. 
R. Co., 97 N. Y. 384, 388, 49 Am. Rep. 531. Inasmuch as 
an express agreement not to compete would have been 
illegal, it would have been impossible to have implied 
an agreement not to compete \vhich could have been 
lawful. 
The subject of competition was never disc~tssed. 
Apart from the fact that the comments and conclusions 
of Mr. Connole concerning the written instruments were 
contradictions of their express contents, any oral testi-
mony at variance with those instruments was incompe-
tent under the parol evidence rule anyway, and the 
objections to such conversations should have been sus-
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tained. On cross-examination, Mr. Connole admitted 
that defendant never at any time told plaintiff in writing 
that defendant 'vould give plaintiff an exclusive bid. (R. 
651). Nor did he even testify as to any conversation in 
which defendant promised to give an exclusive bid or 
to refrain from competition. Mr. Connole was evasive, 
to say the least. When forced to answer the question 
''whether the defendant ever told Kimball Elevator 
Company the defendant was giving l(imball Elevator Co. 
an exclusive bid", he said, "Not specifically." (R. 651}. 
There was no competent evidence that 0/Yirything was 
ever said from which a reasonable 1nind cou.ld arrive 
at the conclusion that defendant impliedly promised to 
refrain from competition. The subject was never dis-
cussed. Although Mr. Connole made a number of gratui-
tous remarks to the effect that he never knew that de-
fendant "'as dealing with any competitors of plaintiff, 
he admitted that he testified on deposition (R. 631-632): 
'' Q. But there was no agreement entered into 
between your company and the Elevator Supplies 
Company whereby the Elevator Supplies Com-
pany stated that it would not submit a bid to any 
competitor~ 
"A. No." 
"Q. But you have admitted, have you not, 
that at no time did the defendant corporation ever 
promise that it 'vould refrain from submitting a 
bid to any competitor' . 
''A. That was never discussed. 
''Q. Never discussed? 
"A. No." 
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There wa.s no evidence whatsoever, that defendant 
ever dealt ~vith plaintiff on any basis different from any 
other elevator cornpany. By Request for Admission No. 
5 the plaintiff was asked to admit (R. 10): 
'' 5. All negotiations between plaintiff and 
defendant have been on the basis of requesting 
defendant to submit bids, and defendant has sub-
mitted quotations and proposals to sell or con-
tract on the basis of list price less a discount, 
said discount being made available to plaintiff if 
plaintiff would accept such proposal and pay the 
quoted price.'' 
By answer, plaintiff stated under oath (R. 18) : 
''Plaintiff admits No. 5, except that from time 
to time plaintiff has purchased materials from 
defendant at ·a certain price less plaintiff's dis-
count.'' 
Plaintiff has always been allowed a discount of 10% 
from list price on its purchases from defendant. (R. 438, 
459, 519, 743, 850). Such trade discount has been allowed 
to all elevator companies making purchases from the de-
fendant either on an F. 0. B. basis or on an installed 
basis. (R. 459, 849-850). As shown by Exhibits 34, 36, 
39 and 42, when two or more elevator companies re-
quested defendant to give quotations on identical equip-
ment and installation, the bids were identical. Defendant 
has always been in interstate commerce, and its practice 
has always been to submit bids to everyone who has 
asked for quotations. (R. 849-850). However, as shown 
by stipulation, when quotations were requested by own-
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ers, defendant did not quote subject to the 10% trade 
discount allowed to elevator companies. (R. 858). 
As indicated by Exhibits 5, 6, 8, 31, 32, 33, 39, 40 
and 43, the defendant has contracted to sell at list price 
less the trade discount of 10%, to Otis Elevator Com-
pany, JYiurphy Elevator Company, Montgomery Elevator 
Company, Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company, 
Elevator Maintenance Co., Ltd., Elevator Service and 
Supply Company, and others. The only way the trade 
discount of 10% can be obtained is by making the pur-
chase. (R. 519). 
It costs money for defendant to prepare a proposal 
on any project. (R. 462). If any job did not materialize 
on which plaintiff asked defendant for a bid, plaintiff 
did not reimburse defendant for making such quotation. 
(R. 519). Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company, of 
which plaintiff became territorial agent in 1949, has had 
business dealings 'vith defendant over the years, on the 
basis of a request for bid, submission of a firm bid, and 
issuance of purchase order if the bid was accepted. Such 
practice has been true both ways. (R. 725). 
Defendant's equipment has been quoted on various 
jobs by Murphy Elevator Company. (R. 464). Whenever 
·Murphy bid on defendant's equipment in connection with 
its bids on elevator modernization, it obtained bids from 
defendant with respect to equipment manufactured by 
defendant. (R. 280, 310, 316-317). Exhibit "GG" con· 
tains illustrative material issued by J\1urphy which 
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features certain equipment manufactured by defendant 
corporation. ( R. 312). 
Defendant has issued catalogs, from which its ma-
terials can be ordered by number. Plaintiff has ordered 
repair parts from defendant by catalog number (R. 415, 
461), although on jobs of any size, plaintiff has asked 
for bids. (R. 461). Hotel Utah in 1948 and 1949 also 
ordered repair parts from defendant by catalog. (R. 779-
782). 
11:r. Connole admitted that Montgomery Elevator 
Company is an elevator manufacturer, and that on the 
original bidding on the Park Building job, Montgomery 
bid on defendant's controls. (R. 520). Such admission 
further proved that defendant did not deal exclusively 
with plaintiff. Finally, counsel for plaintiff admitted, 
"We do not claim we had exclusive dealings." (R. 847). 
In disregard of the stipulation of counsel showing 
that defendant dealt with other elevator companies on 
the same basis as plain tiff ( R. 858-859), and the admis-
sions of plaintiff that there were no exclusive dealings, 
the trial judge submitted the case to the jury on the 
false theory that there was evidence of a course of ex·-
clusive dealings between plaintiff and defendant which 
the jury might ''consider'' ''in determining whether or 
not there was an implied agreement to the effect that 
the defendant would not compete against the plaintiff.'' 
Instruction No. 5-a. (R. 121). 
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First· of all, there was no competent evidence that 
defendant either sold exclusively to plaintiff nor con-
tracted exclusively with plaintiff. The evidence required 
a finding that defendant dealt with other elevator com-
panies on the same basis as def~ndant dealt with plain-
tiff. When the court finally asked counsel for plaintiff 
if "part of your implied agreement is based on any 
theory that the defendant had an agreement that they 
would deal exclusively with you'', counsel answered: 
"ff'e do not claim that, yo~tr Honor. We do make the 
claim they never informed the Kimball Elevator· Com-
pany they were ever bidding or making quotations to 
competitors of the J(imball Elevator Company.'' (R. 
846). Obviously, defendant had no duty whatsoever to 
disclose to plaintiff that defendant had negotiations with 
or submitted bids to other persons. That was none of 
plaintiff's business anyway. Ho,vever, Mr. Connole ex-
. pressly admitted that it is not the practice in the elevator 
field for one elevator company to disclose to another com-
pany, t.o whom it is bidding. (R. 520-5.21). 
"Q. As a matter of fact, it is not the practice 
in the elevator field for one elevator company to 
disclose to another company, to whom it is bid-
ding, is it~ 
''A. Why no. 
It is significant that most of defendant's business 
in the State of Utah was awarded by corporations other 
than plaintiff. Of the six contracts awarded to defendant 
by plaintiff in 20 years, (exclusive of the one on the 
Walker Bank Building which was canceled in 1948}, the 
64 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
largest of all was on the Hotel Utah job in 1930. Three 
of the contracts were awarded in 1950, all of which were 
very small jobs as far as the purchase orders to defend-
ant were concerned. The largest was the one on the 
Park Building job, a'varded June 3, 1950, in the amount 
of only $1,502.10. See Exhibit 17. The other two were 
even smaller. Three jobs of comparable size were 
awarded to defendant in 1950 by Elevator Service and 
Supply Company of Salt Lake City, as shown by Exhibit 
46. The one large contract, in the sum of $36,000, was 
on the new Veterans Administration Hospital, Exhibit 
39, June 9, 1950, awarded by Elevator Maintenance Co., 
Ltd. 
Nor was there any competent evidence that plaintiff 
purcha.sed exclusively from defendant, the type of equip-
ment defendant was manufacturing. If defendant had 
been compelled to rely on the business it was awarded 
by the plaintiff, it 'vould have gone bankrupt. Notwith-
standing the trial court's charge to the jury that there 
was evidence of exclusive dealings, such instruction was 
contrary to the written evidence and the admissions of 
plaintiff. There 'vere statements in the testimony of 
Mr. Connole to the effect that plaintiff had always bid 
on defendant's equipment, the evidence requires a find-
ing that such testimony is utterly false, for it contradicts 
the written exhibits introduced by plaintiff and such 
pretenses were destroyed by admissions made on cross-
examination. Although Mr. Connole testified several 
times that plaintiff had "exclusive dealings" with de-
fendant, the court sustained an objection to questions 
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designed to draw admissions from him that plaintiff 
did not purchase exclusiYelv from defendant (R. 501): 
.., 
"THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
Members of the jury, in this case the plaintiff 
through ~Ir. Connole has made two or three state-
ments that they purchased exclusively from the 
defendant, and because that statement has been 
made the defense is trying to rebut it, and that 
was not a proper statement in the first place. They 
had a right to deal 'vith them exclusively or the 
right to deal 'vith a number of people. It does not 
make any difference. The court admonishes the 
jury not to give weight to that statement because 
it is immaterial and with that admonition the 
court restrains eross-examination on that sub-
. t " JeC .... 
Defendant agrees with the statement that plaintiff 
had a right to deal 'vith any number of people; but so 
did the defendant have such right too. And the evidence 
conclusively shows that plaintiff did deal with others, 
for plaintiff expressly admitted at the trial that it pur-
chased from others, the type of materials which defend-
ant manufactures and sells. (R. 505). It was admitted 
by Mr. Connole that on numerous occasions plaintiff 
requested defendant to furnish quotations on dumb-
waiters, but that at no time did plaintiff ever purchase 
a dumb-waiter from defendant. Such equipment was 
invariably purchased from other companies. (R. 503, 
87 4, 948-949). Other elevator companies, however, 
awarded contracts to defendant on dumb-waiters, as 
evidenced by Exhibits 32, 39, 41 and 46. Exhibit 14, a 
letter from plaintiff to defendant dated June 14 1950 
' ' 
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states that plaintiff awarded the contract to another 
company: 
"We wish to inform you that you were high 
on the above job, hence we have awarded this to 
another company .... '' 
Contrary to the testimony of Mr. Connole that l{im-
ball ''bid on'' and ''purchased their controls'' (referring 
to controls manufactured by· defendant), the fact is that 
plaintiff did not at any time ever award to defendant a 
contract nor issue a purchase order for synchron control, 
signal control, directional collective control, or any other 
modern controls of defendant's. Mr. Connole so admitted 
on cross-examination. ( R. 480-482). He tried to claim 
credit on behalf of Kimball for the purchase of synchron 
control in connection with the Medical Arts Building job 
in 1947, because Kimball was the agent of Murphy. 
Plaintiff \vould put in reverse the elementary rule that 
the act of the agent is the act of the principal, by con-
tending that the act of Murphy, the principal, was the 
act of l{imball, the agent. 
The fact is that plaintiff did not even ask defendant 
to bid on a number of jobs in 1950 which would involve 
controls of the type manufactured by defendant. In 1949 
plaintiff became the territorial representative of Pacific 
Elevator and Equipment Company. It was admitted that 
Pacific has manufactured control equipment which per-
forms the same functions as equipment manufactured 
by defendant. (R. 486). 
67 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
On the Park Building job, defendant originally bid 
to M·urphy Elevator Company and Montgomery Elevator 
Company. Montgomery was the low bidder, but the job 
\Yas refigured. On 1\tlarch 21, 1950, Kimball obtained 
from defendant a quotation on directional collective con-
trol, and on various other items, Exhibit 16. l{imball 
then obtained a quotation on the controls from Pacific 
Elevator and Equipment Company, and asked defendant 
to furnish a new quotation which would exclude the con-
trols. Such new proposal was presented by defendant 
May 25, 1950. The purchase order of June 3, 1950, from 
plaintiff to defendant (which 'vas the sixth one in 20 
years), did not cover any of the control equipment for 
the job, but covered only signals, door hangers, electric 
door operators, as shown in Exhibits 16 and 17. The 
gross amount was only $1,502.10, subject to the trade 
discount of 10% allo,ved to elevator companies. Mr. 
Connole, plaintiff's manager, admitted that plaintiff 
purchased the controls from Pacific. (R. 510-518). 
When it came to bidding on the Charleston Apart-
ments, by letter dated April 3, 1950, from plaintiff to 
defendant, Exhibit 12, plaintiff restricted its request for 
a bid to one only on signals, hangers, and door operators. 
In that letter plaintiff said to defendant: "We believe 
it would be well to get in touch with the Pacific Elevator 
Company to find out if they want to use your directional 
collective or their own type control." (Italics added). 
Plaintiff obtained a quotation from its principal, Pacific 
Elevator and Equipment. Company on the entire control 
system, and in submission of bid to general contractors, 
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the plaintiff based its bid on the quotation from Pacific 
for controls manufactured by Pacific, Exhibit 11, dated 
I\Iay 1, 1950. (R. 486). It would have been strange in-
deed, when plaintiff gave Pacific the option of quoting 
on its own controls or on defendant's controls, if Pacific 
had not quoted on controls manufactured by Pacific. 
It was finally stipulated that prior to September 11, 
1950, "With regard to quotations on signal control, col-
lective and duplex collective control, it is further stipu-
lated that the defendant Elevator Supplies Corporation 
(Company) did not quote exclusively to the plaintiff, 
Kimball Elevator Company, but that all. quotations on 
such equipment by defendant Elevator Supplies Com-
pany, were made exclusively to original elevator con-
tractors." (R. 858-859). It was finally admitted that 
neither party dealt exclusively with the other. In fact, 
the evidence demonstrated that the dealings were few 
indeed, and that the only relationship consisted of vendor 
and purchaser with respect to items purchased by catalog 
number, and as subcontractor under an express written 
contract where defendant "\vas awarded contracts by ac-
ceptance of specific proposals, which happened in only 
7 instances in 20 years. 
In the few instances where plaintiff did accept de-
fendant's proposals, and defendant became a subcon-
tractor on those specific projects, that relationship ended 
upon completion of defendant's contract. None of those 
written contracts related to any other project. Owing 
to the fact that the plaintiff awarded defendant a con-
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tract on a small portion of the Park Building elevator 
job on June 3, 1950, which ,vas prior to the time when 
defendant submitted a bid on the Hotel Utah elevator 
modernization, an attempt was made at the trial to infer 
that some agreement not to compete on the Hotel Utah 
projects arose by virtue of the contract on the Park 
Building job, although there was no connection whatso-
ever between the two projects. The trial judge attempted 
to generalize on the subcontractor relationship, and in-
jected a false issue into the case during the cross-exami-· 
nation of plaintiff's manager (R. 506): 
"THE COURT: I am going to limit you, the 
same as I said at noon, to the issue of whether 
the defendant was a subcontractor for the plain-
tiff.'' 
The defendant could not possibly have been a sub-
contractor for plaintiff on the Hotel Utah projects in 
1950, for plaintiff had no contract whatsoever. The sub. 
contract on the Park Building job had nothing to do 
with Hotel Utah. The court nevertheless made a further 
prejudicial comment on the evidence by saying, ''Most 
of the evidence was, they were the original contractor 
and subcontractor." (R. 506). The comment was con-
trary to the undisputed evidence, for there had been no 
acceptance of the bids to which reference was made. The 
jury 'vas told that a contractual relationship existed 
when none had come into being because the offeree had 
failed to accept the offers. Inasmuch as plaintiff did not 
submit bids to the owner in most instances, the plaintiff 
could not have been an original contractor even if there 
70 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
had been a contract awarded to plaintiff by a general 
contractor. 
There was absolutely no competent evidence of any 
''prior dealings'' from which there could have been any 
''implied agreement not to compete.'' The contract 
awarded to defendant June 3, 1950, on the Park Building 
job, could not possibly be construed to imply any promise 
that either of the parties would contract with the other 
in the future. As far as the "course of business dealings" 
were concerned, an examination of the negotiations on 
the Park Building job negative any idea that one party 
intended to deal exclusively with the other i?- any cate-
gory. Plaintiff admitted kno,ving that on the original 
bidding on the job back in 1949, nlontgomery Elevator 
Company had quoted on defendant's control equipment, 
and Montgomery 'vas the lo\v bidder, Exhibit 15. (R. 520). 
Defendant originally had bid to Murphy on the control 
equipment, then on rebidding in 1950, plaintiff obtained 
a bid from defendant on the controls as well as other 
items, but purchased the major items including the con-
trols, from Pacific, and a\varded a contract to defendant 
on only a relatively small portion of the work on which 
defendant originally had been requested to bid. Obvi-
ously, in lVlay and June 1950, it would have been im-
possible to have had any ''implied agreement not to 
compete with plaintiff'' even if there had been no ques-
tion of illegality. 
Plaintiff's own witness, Allen E. Mecham, general 
counsel for the Associated General Contractors, testified 
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on written stipulation that in "the construction industry 
there is free competitive bidding." (R. 667). Free 
competitive bidding precludes any ''implied agreement 
to refrain from competing with the offeree.'' Charles 
Maynard Henker, of Pacific Elevator and Equipment 
Company, when asked by counsel for plaintiff whether 
in the elevator industry there is a trade practice not to 
bid directly to a customer, testified that he had ''seen 
it 'both 'vays, three "rays against the middle. . . . Well, 
in some of these places . they will bid to suppliers, and 
bid to the customer, and with different figures, and · 
everything else.'' (R. 77 4-7 45). 
PoiNT 4. 
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A DIREC-
TED VERDICT, FOR THE EVIDENCE NOT ONLY 
FAILS TO SHOW ANY AGREEMENT TO REFRAIN 
FROM COMPETITION, BUT THE EVIDENCE RE-
QUIRES A FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF RECOG-
NIZED THE RIGHT OF DEFENDANT TO SUBMIT 
BONA FIDE BIDS TO UTAH HOTEL COMPANY 
AS WELL AS THE RIGHT OF THE HOTEL COM-
PANY TO OBTAIN FIRM BIDS FROM DEFEND-
ANT. 
The trial court erred prejudicially in failing to grant 
the motion of defendant for a directed verdict, and by 
submitting the case to the jury with a charge ·that the 
jury might "find" either "an implied agreement not to 
compete with plaintiff'' generally, or ''an implied agree-
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ment not to compete with plaintiff for the Hotel Utah" 
jobs. (R. 124). Plaintiff proved no agreement whatso-
ever with defendant concerning Hotel Utah elevator 
modernization. All that plaintiff could show, was an 
unaccepted offer which plaintiff had obtained by deceit. 
The trial court disregarded the elementary rule of law 
that an ~ttnaccepted written offer creates no rights in the 
offeree, and that an unaccepted offer could not give 
birth to either an express or an implied contract of any 
kind. The court was also inexorably wrong in charging 
the jury that an implied agreement not to compete with 
plaintiff would be legal and valid, in view of both fed-
eral and state statutes to the contrary. 
The federal courts have declared criminal and void 
under the Sherman Act, every contract or agreement, 
express or implied, to refrain from selling to a person 
or to a class of persons. Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 
Inc., 263 U. S. 291, 311, 312, 44 S. Ct. 96, 100, 68 L. Ed. 
308, and United States v. Southern Wholesale Grocers' 
Ass'n., 207 Fed. 434, 439 (certiorari denied). In United 
States v. Grijj'ith, 334 U. S. 100, 68 S. Ct. 941, it was de-
clared that "It is indeed 'unreasonable, per se, to fore-
close competitors from any substantial market.' ... The 
anti-trust laws are as much violated by the prevention 
of competition as by its destruction." 
It is true that the federal cases do not say that a 
person who is in a position to compete, must give a 
competitive bid, but the cases hold that if a person agrees 
with someone that he will not give a competitive bid or 
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not sell to a particular person or to a class of persons, 
such agreement is a criminal offense and renders all 
parties liable to the victim for treble damages. The court 
should have dismissed the action '"ith prejudice, for each 
of the alternates of "implied agreement", general or 
specific, submitted to the jury would constitute a criminal 
offense. The plaintiff was not entitled to have the case 
submitted to the jury anyway, since it had not proved 
any kind of an agreement, for an implied agreement 
cannot be created from an unaccepted offer. There was 
a failure to prove any of the essential elements of a valid 
contract. 
Plaintiff's own witnesses produced evidence which 
required findings against the plaintiff, including the fol-
lowing facts heretofore or hereinafter detailed, which 
precluded any recovery by plaintiff: ( 1) Defendant did 
not transact business with plaintiff on any basis more 
favorable than defendant transacted business with other 
elevator companies, which was on the basis of selling at 
list price less a discount of 10%. (2) In more than 20 
years, of the vast number of bids obtained by plaintiff 
from defendant, only 7 \Yere accepted and resulted in 
contracts, and offers and acceptances in each instance 
were in writing, and there \vas not the slightest intima-
tion that defendant would surrender its right to compete 
with plaintiff. (3) The subject of competition was never 
discussed, and defendant never gave plaintiff any 
promise either orally or in writing. ( 4) Since February 
1948, Utah Hotel Company had been the customer of 
defendant, and the hotel company was well-satisfied with 
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its business dealings with defendant. ( 5) Plaintiff pro-
cured a bid from defendant dated June 14, 1950, on a 
portion of 'the proposed elevator modernization at Hotel 
Utah. Said bid was obtained by deceit, for plaintiff 
falsely represented to defendant that plaintiff was going 
to be awarded the contract. (6) Plaintiff obtained a 
quotation from Pacific Elevator and Equipment Com-
pany on some equipment, dated July 13, 1950. (7) On 
August 16, 1950, plaintiff submitted to Utah Hotel Com-
pany an incomplete bid, which was unsatisfactory and 
unacceptable to the hotel company. (8) Plaintiff knew 
that Utah Hotel Company not only wanted more than 
one firm bid on the over-all project, but plaintiff knew 
that the hotel wanted a firm bid from defendant. (9) On 
August 17 and 30, 1950, the Utah Hotel Company re-
quested defendant to submit a firm bid on the elevator 
modernization. (10) Defendant requested Pacific to give 
a bid on a portion of the job on an installed basis, but 
Pacific refused to give defendant any bid without clear-
ance from plaintiff, inasmuch as plaintiff then was terri-
torial representative of Pacific. (11) On August 30, 1950, 
Mr. Connole, manager of plaintiff corporation, told Mr. 
Henker of Pacific, that it was all right for Pacific to sub-
mit a bid to defendant. (12) Pacific submitted a firm bid 
to defendant on September 7, 1950. (13) On September 
15, 1950, Pacific submitted to plaintiff a new bid, raising 
the price quoted in its letter of July 13, 1950, and also 
calling attention of plaintiff to 8 items of necessary 
repair, in addition to 15 items mentioned in the letter 
of July 13, 1950. All of said items had been omitted from 
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plaintiff's bid to Utah Hotel Company dated August 16, 
1950. (14) On September 11, 1950, defendant submitted 
. two firm bids to Utah Hotel Company in accordance with 
the request of the hotel company, one on the passenger 
elevator modernization, and one on the two electric 
dumb-waiter elevators. (15) On the same day, defendant 
withdrew its original bid to plaintiff, and submitted two 
new bids in the light of information defendant had 
acquired from Utah Hotel Company, defendant quoting 
to plaintiff list price less a discount of 10%. (16) Al-
though plaintiff had definite information from both 
defendant and Pacific as to what Utah Hotel Company 
wanted and what it did not want, which would disclose 
to plaintiff that plaintiff's original bid was abortive, 
plaintiff neither attempted to revise its bid nor to submit 
a new bid. (17) Utah Hotel Company awarded the two 
contracts to defendant on September 27, 1950, the de-
fendant having submitted the only bids for doing the 
work as the hotel 'vanted it done. (18) Defendant never 
paid a commission to plaintiff nor to anyone else, and 
defendant did not at any time promise plaintiff a com-
mission nor any other kind of a ''cut out of the job.'' 
(19) When plaintiff learned that defendant had been 
awarded the contracts, plaintiff demanded a ''commis-
sion" which defendant refused to pay, and plaintiff then 
asked Utah Hotel Company for a ''commission'' which 
was likewise refused. ( 20) Plaintiff then unsuccessfully 
attempted to induce Utah Hotel Company to cancel its 
contract with defendant on elevator modernization, and 
issue a new contract to plaintiff. 
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The first three factual propositions have already 
been discussed. The others likewise demonstrate that 
plaintiff's claims are spurious. Although plaintiff made 
numerous insinuations to the effect that defendant "tried 
to steal plaintiff's prospect", the undisputed fact is that 
plaintiff knew that Utah Hotel Company had been a 
satisfied customer of defendant for over two years, and 
that plaintiff sought to monopolize the bidding on the 
modernization job by the practice of deceit. 
Max C. Carpenter, manager of Hotel Utah, testified 
that there had been satisfactory business relations be-
tween the hotel and defendant since February 1948. Mr. 
Carpenter testified that there were Elevator Supplies 
Company equipment in the passenger elevators prior to 
the time he became manager. Such equipment had oper-
ated satisfactorily. Utah Hotel Company became a cus-
tomer of defendant in February 1948, and began to make 
purchases of repair parts and replacement parts, as 
indicated by Exhibit 3, invoices from 1948 to 1950. (R. 
243-244). 
Jerry Smith, building superintendent of Hotel Utah, 
testified that prior to 1948, various eleva tor replacement 
parts had been purchased from plaintiff, but the service 
had not always been satisfactory. Consequently, the 
hotel began to purchase elevator parts directly from 
defendant in order to expedite the repair of the equip-
ment. (R. 770-771). Mr. Roy C. Smith testified without 
contradiction that after defendant sold materials directly 
to Utah Hotel Company in 1948, Mr. Connole asked for 
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a ''commission'', which was refused. He was told by 
defendant that defendant did not pay any commissions, 
but sold to elevator companies at a discount, and if plain-
tiff had obtained the order for the materials it could 
have purchased them at a discount. (R. 878). Mr. Con-
nole merely said he could not remember the conversa-
tion. (R. 638). Mr. Roy C. Smith assisted the hotel in 
the repair program. (R. 877 -878). Some of the repair 
parts were ordered by the hotel by catalog number. (R. 
779-782). Defendant issued catalogs, and made the same 
available to all who were interested in them. One of such 
catalogs "\Vas given to Utah Hotel Company. (R. 908-
909). The repair program at the hotel "\vas carried on 
principally in 1948 and 1949. The hotel rebuilt the door 
closing mechanisms. ( R. 779-782). 
In 1947 the hotel asked Otis Elevator Company to 
make recommendations with respect to modernization. 
By letter dated December 1, 1947, Exhibit 25, Otis rep-
resented to the hotel that "The present equipment does 
not lend itself to conversion to automatic control of any 
kind,'' and Otis recommended that the hotel discard the 
existing equipment and start all over with "new Otis 
signal control equipment.'' Inasmuch as defendant's 
equipment had operated satisfactorily in the elevators 
for years, Mr. Jerry Smith started to consult with Mr. 
Roy Smith of defendant corporation, not only with re-
spect to necessary repairs, but also in regard to how 
modernization could be accomplished most economically. 
At the request of the Hotel Utah, Roy C. Smith made 
an investigation of the condition of the passenger eleva-
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tors and reported to Mr. Charles W. Lerch and Associ-
ates, elevator consultants, under date of December 28, 
1948, Exhibit 26. (R. 770-777). 
Jerry Smith had been dealing with Roy C. Smith 
in the repair of the elevators, and he had confidence in 
the ability of Roy C. Smith, who pointed out how Ele-
vator Supplies Company equipment could be used in 
connection with some existing equipment in the mod-
ernization program. Jerry Smith ultimately made rec-
ommendations for use of Elevator Supplies equipment 
in the modernization. (R. 782-784). 
In 1950, Jerry Smith had discussions as to moderni-
zation, not only with defendant, but also with Otis Eleva-
tor Company, Elevator Service and Supply Company of 
Salt Lake City, Kimball Elevator Company, and West-
inghouse. Jerry Smith asked for recommendations and 
also for bids. (R. 784). After Kimball was advised that 
the hotel was interested in recommendations and bids, 
plaintiff addressed to defendant a letter dated May 11, 
1950, Exhibit HHH: ''Please figure out the necessary 
Elevator Supplies equipment to revamp the three pas-
senger elevators in the Hotel Utah. We would like these 
figures on an installed basis.'' Plaintiff furnished no 
specifications whatsoever. 
Before submitting any bid to plaintiff, Roy C. Smith 
asked Mr. Connole, plaintiff's manager, what the bid-
ding procedure would be on the project. Mr. Connole 
said that he (Mr. Connole) would be the only bidder. (R. 
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883). Mr. Connole admitted that he told Roy C. Smith 
that Kimball Elevator Company was going to do the 
job at Hotel Utah; that he understood there would be 
no other bidder on this job, and that Jerry Smith had 
told him Otis Elevator Company would not be permitted 
to bid. (R. 523-524). The representation was false, and 
without excuse. Hotel Utah had never even intimated 
that Kimball would be awarded the contract. Mr. Con-
nole did not offer any testimony that anyone at the hotel 
told him that Kimball would get the job. On the con-
trary, Mr. Carpenter testified that he did not tell Mr. 
Connole nor anyone else that Kimball's bid would be 
accepted, nor was anyone authorized to make such a 
statement. (R. 242). Jerry Smith testified that he did 
not tell Mr. Connole that Kimball would be awarded the 
job, nor that Otis would not be allowed to bid. (R. 785). 
The only purpose of the false pretense that Kimball 
was going to be awarded the job, was to discourage 
competition, by making it appear useless for defendant 
to present a bid either to the hotel (defendant's custo-
mer) or to anyone else. The claim that by submitting 
a bid to plaintiff (which was never accepted and which 
could not possibly result in any contract), defendant 
impliedly ''agreed'' to refrain from submitting a bid 
to Utah Hotel Company, the customer of defendant, is 
patently absurd and fictitious on its face. The claim 
of "implied agreement not to compete", wears the 
badge of fraud-fraud on the defendant and fraud on 
Utah Hotel Company, for plaintiff knew that the hotel 
company wanted more than one firm bid on the over-all 
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job: and the hotel had not promised Kimball anything. 
Furthermore, Mr. Connole knew that there had been 
strained relations between Kimball and Hotel Utah for 
several years over the small service elevator which 
l(imball had installed, which never operated satisfac-
torily, and ultimately had to be removed. (R. 258). In 
the light of the hotel's unsatisfactory experiences with 
Kimball, the hotel would scrutinize any proposal from 
Kimball. 
The claim of ''an implied agreement not to compete 
with plaintiff for the Hotel Utah" jobs, amounts to say-
ing that when plaintiff procured a. written offer from 
defendant by false representations, defendant thereby 
impliedly agreed with plaintiff that it would not submit 
a bona fide bid directly to defendant's own customer, 
although Utah Hotel Company requested defendant to 
do so. The claim of plaintiff is utter sham, for there 
could not be any agreement when there was only an 
unaccepted offer-an offer procured by deceit. No rights 
could arise from an unaccepted offer. There was no 
consideration, no meeting of the minds, nor any other 
essentials of a contract. There was not even a discussion 
suggesting that defendant refrain from dealing with its 
own customer. 
After plaintiff obtained the written bid on a portion 
of the passenger elevator modernization, dated June 14, 
1950, Exhibit III (R. 524, 883), plaintiff obtained from 
Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company a quotation 
dated July 13, 1950, Exhibit JJJ, covering the power 
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controls and some other equipment. Plaintiff waiteu 
over a month longer before getting around to submitting 
a bid to Utah Hotel Company. The only bid plaintiff 
ever submitted to the hotel was dated August 16, 1950, 
Exhibit "I". That bid \Vas made up by copying the 
proposal obtained by plaintiff from defendant, except for 
the price; and by listing the following, without any speci-
fications whatsoever: ''Main generator and drive control 
panels. Leveling units, vanes and brackets. Three new 
cabs at a value of $1800 each." (R. 524-526). The 15 
items of necessary repair, mentioned in the letter of 
July 13, 1950, from Pacific to plaintiff (which had to be 
done in connection with the job), were entirely omitted 
from plaintiff's bid. One glance at the bid ought to be 
enough to understand why Mr. Carpenter, manager of 
Hotel Utah, would not even present it to the executive 
committee of Hotel Utah, and \vhy he would not consider 
it any further, but rejected it. (R. 235-236, 246-247, 258, 
263-264). 
Mr. Connole testified, over the objections of de-
fendant that it \Vas hearsay and not the best evidence, 
that at or about the time he presented Exhibit "I" to 
Utah Hotel Company, "Mr. Jerry Smith told me that 
Otis Elevator Company was not going to be invited to 
bid on the job, and wanted to know if I had any sug-
gestions as to who they could get another bid from. I 
suggested the Westinghouse Elevator Company ... At 
the hotel he asked me . . . if Elevator Supplies would 
give a bid on the total job, and I told him that I did not 
know, that I would telephone San Francisco and ask 
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them if they 'vould bid on the total job, as an estimate.'' 
(R. 369-370, 372-373, 533). Plaintiff showed that Utah 
Hotel Company not only "\\7a.nted another bid on the total 
job, but it wanted a "bid on the total job" from defend-
ant. By anS"\\7er to interrogatory No. 8, plaintiff stated 
under oath: "It is a fact that the Utah Hotel Company 
stated that it ""'anted more than one firm to bid on the 
job." (R. 23). 
The term ''bid'' means a proposal or offer to per-
form. There can be no dispute about the fact that Utah 
Hotel Company wanted defendant to submit a bona fide 
offer to perform, which, if accepted, would become a 
contract. The remark of Mr. Connole that he would ask 
defendant to "bid on the total job, as an estimate," is 
presumptuous, to say the least. It suggests an attitude 
of dictating to defendant and to Utah Hotel Company. 
No sane person could expect defendant to go to the 
expense of figuring out how the job should be bid, and 
then turn the figure in to the hotel as an ''estimate.'' 
Plaintiff could not foreclose the hotel of its right to have 
a bona fide bid, nor could plaintiff dictate to defendant 
that defendant restrict its figure to a mere "estimate". 
At that time, Mr. Connole made no pretense that there 
'vas any agreement, express or implied, to prevent de-
fendant from giving the hotel company as its customer, 
a firm bid. 
Mr. Jerry Smith testified concerning the conversa-
tion with Mr. Connole: "I told him it was necessary to 
get additional bids, and that I ~vas going to ask Elevator 
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Supplies for a bid ... He told me that he did not feel it 
\vould be of any value, because it would be the same bid 
that he had received from them or \vould get from them; 
it would be identical." Jerry Smith categorically denied 
that the term "estimate" was mentioned, or that Mr. 
Connole was to contact the defendant. (R. 786-787). On 
cross-examination, Jerry Smith. testified that he told Mr. 
Connole that he (Jerry Smith) was going to get a bid 
from Elevator Supplies Company. "I insisted on a bid 
on Elevator Supplies equipment. That was our decision. 
We wanted to go along with the same equipment we had 
been, in using Elevator Supplies equipment.'' He said 
that :hfr. Connole told him it would do no good to get 
such a bid; that the "bid \vould be identical." (R. 818). 
Thus, .Hotel Utah had specified defendant's equipment. 
The hotel had been a customer since 1948, and the hotel 
was satisfied with defendant's equipment. The hotel had 
a right to obtain a firm bid, not a fictitious bid from de-
fendant. Inasmuch as defendant was engaged in inter-
state commerce, it would have been a criminal offense 
for defendant to have agreed with plaintiff or any one 
else, either expressly or impliedly, that it would refrain 
from selling to Utah Hotel Company or to any group of 
persons. 
On cross-examination, Mr. Connole admitted that 
''I told him that the bid would be by identically the same 
people; and I could not see what justification there would 
be for having two people bid on identically the same 
equipment." (R. 575). Plaintiff made no claim to Utah 
Hotel Company that defendant was precluded from 
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giving the hotel a bona :fide bid, although plaintiff had 
every opportunity to do so, and it had a duty to say so 
if it so claimed. Plaintiff merely used the selfish argu-
ment that it could not see the "justification" for "having 
two people bid on identically the same equipment.'' In 
the :field of trade and commerce, that is the very purpose 
of getting bids, to get the best price on the same kind 
of equipment and materials. 
That was the second occasion when Mr. Connole 
made false representations. He knew that Elevator 
Supplies Company at that time was not manufacturing 
power control equipment (R. 576), so he knew that the 
bid from defendant on the over-all job "\Vould not be an 
identical bid. He also knew that a bid· from Kimball and 
another bid from defendant would not be bids from the 
same people. There was no other purpose for his mis-
representations than to discourage the hotel company 
from getting a bid from defendant. The very argument 
used to attempt to talk Jerry Smith out of getting a bid 
from defendant, constituted a recognition of the right 
of the defendant to submit a bid to the hotel company, 
and it amounted to an acknowledgment of the right of 
the hotel to receive a firm bid. No one had any right to 
interfere with the attempts of the hotel company as 
owner, to obtain :firm bids from defendant. 
An examination of Exhibit "I", dated August 16, 
1950, exclusive of the notations placed thereon by Jerry 
Smith, discloses that said bid was an incomplete and 
abortive bid. Utah Hotel Company did not have to have 
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any reason for rejecting it, and it had no duty to explain 
why it did not accept it. There were substantial reasons 
for rejecting it. The bid states: 
''We propose to modernize the three passenger 
elevators from the present car-s"\\ritch control to 
push button signal control \Yith automatic leveling. 
''The new equipment would consist of the fol-
lowing: 
Relay panel. 
Selectors. 
Door operators, interlocks and hangers. 
Car operators fixture including annuncia-
tor. 
Position indicator and hall lanterns. 
Hall buttons. 
Main generator and drive co'ntrol panels. 
Leveling units, vanes and brackets. 
Three n.e~w cabs at a value of $1800 each. 
"In accordance with the follo,ving specifica-
tions''. 
The only specifications which follow the quoted 
words, are the specifications contained in the proposal 
from dependant to plaintiff. Utah Hotel Company had 
a very definite reason for pronouncing the bid unsatis-
factory, since the plaintiff only actually offered to do 
the work contained in defendant's proposal, inasmuch 
as there were no other specifications. The italicized items 
are those which were not embodied in the proposal from 
defendant dated June 14, 1950, Exhibit l{KK. As to the 
items emphasized with italics, there were no specifica-
tions whatsoever to suggest type of manufacture or 
method of installation. The bid of plaintiff omitted all 
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of the 15 items mentioned in the letter from Pacific 
dated July 13, 1950, as "items you will have to estimate 
locally'', \V hich were necessary repair i terns. Plaintiff 
did not offer to furnish that equipment nor to do the 
necessary work. The proposal of plaintiff was therefore 
incomplete and unsatisfactory on its face, and Utah 
Hotel Company had every reason to reject it, as such 
bid did not show where plaintiff's work \vould end and 
the hotel's would begin or vice versa. 
At the time the bid was presented by plaintiff, ac-
cording to the uncontroverted testimony of Mr. Jerry 
Smith: "Mr. Connole told me that this was a bid on a 
portion of the work that would be involved, and that the 
work that was not included in this bid would be discussed 
between us at a later date, and that we could come to 
some kind of an understanding as to how it was to be 
executed, whether we would do it at the hotel, which was 
his recommendation, or just how the balance of the work 
would be done .... I did not have to ask him in that 
conversation what work was omitted, because we had 
discussed this job previously, and I was as well aware 
of it as he was.'' (R. 815). As to omitted items, there 
was electrical work, new feeders, new end feeders to the 
penthouse, new hoisting hinges on the hoisting sheaves; 
cable rings on the hoisting sheaves, and a number of 
other items. Furthermore, ''There is no mention here 
of who is to do the actual installation of a great portion 
of the work necessary, that had been discussed between 
Mr. Connole and myself." (R. 815). Other than by 
omission of a number of items from the bid, there was 
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nothing in the bid from plaintiff to indicate what work 
was to be done by the hotel. 
When he examined the bid, Exhibit "I", dated Aug-
ust 16, 1950, Mr. Jerry Smith testified that he did not 
regard it as a satisfactory bid: "It was not a satisfac-
tory bid because it was not complete. It had not covered 
the entire scope of the work that was necessary, and the 
work that had been discussed previously. Therefore, I 
could not term it a 'satisfactory bid'." (R. 787-788). 
After he examined the bid he took it up with manage-
ment: ''I told them it was not complete; and that ... my 
recommendation would be that it be rejected on that 
basis." (R. 788). 
Plaintiff's own witness, Mr. Max C. Carpenter, 
manager of Hotel Utah, testified that when he examined 
the bid, Exhibit "I", he did not regard it as a satisfac-
tory bid. (R. 246). He was not able to tell from reading 
the bid, what work would actually be done; that the bid 
"was too vague." (R. 247). At that time, the relation-
ship of Utah Hotel Company with Kimball Elevator 
Company was unsatisfactory to some degree, because 
Kimball had installed a small service elevator which did 
not operate satisfactorily, and it had to be removed. (R. 
246-247). Mr. Carpenter said he never submitted the 
Kimball bid to the executive committee, and he never 
asked Kimball if it cared to make another bid. He said 
the only bid which Utah Hotel Company ever obtained 
as it wanted the job done was the bid later submitted by 
defendant Elevator Supplies Co. (R. 264). 
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Mr. Carpenter testifi~d that any contract of any size 
had to be approved by him. He instructed Jerry Smith 
to call Mr. Roy C. Smith and ask Elevator Supplies Com-
pany to submit a bid to the hotel on the modernization 
of the three passenger eleva tors. ( R. 242). The hotel 
had a course of business dealings with defendant since 
February 1948. (R. 243-244). 
On August 17, 1950, Mr. Jerry Smith called de-
fendant Elevator Supplies Company, Inc., San Francisco, 
and talked to Roy C. Smith: "I asked him if Elevator 
Supplies Company would be interested in submitting a 
quotation, with recommendations, to the Hotel Utah, 
covering the modernization, and the general rebuilding 
of our equipment, and assuming the full responsibility 
for that work." (R. 788-789). Mr. Jerry Smith said he 
did not ask for anything other than a firm bid. (R. 789). 
Mr. Roy C. Smith said it would be necessary for him to 
contact his home office before giving a definite answer. 
Exhibit 28, is the telephone company memorandum show-
ing Jerry Smith called defendant's telephone number, 
Garfield 17799, San Francisco, on August 17, 1950. (R. 
788-789). Roy C. Smith subsequently told Jerry Smith 
he would meet with him in Salt Lake City, the latter 
part of the month. (R. 791). 
The next day, D. W. Connole called Roy C. Smith, 
August 18, 1950. Roy C. Smith testified that Mr. Con-
nole asked for a quotation on two dumb-waiters, which 
quotation defendant furnished by telegram dated August 
22, 1950, Exhibit 19, on an installed basis and also on 
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an F. 0. B. basis. (R. 885). Roy C. Smith denied that 
there was any other discussion. The plaintiff offered 
no evidence of any "\Yritten request for dumb-waiter 
quotations. Mrs. Alice Connole, mother of Mr. Connole, 
and secretary of l{imball Elevator Company, testified 
that she listened in on the telephone conversation. On 
cross-examination Mrs. Connole admitted that her son 
had called Roy C. Smith for a quotation on dumb-waiters, 
and it may have been in the telephone conversation of 
.August 18, 1950. (R. 942). 
Mr. Connole testified as to the conversation with 
Roy C. Smith: "I told him that the Hotel Utah would 
like to have a proposal on the over-all job to verify our 
bid and justification of the amount quoted in our pro-
posal and asked him if he could prepare the same and 
he said he would . . . he said he 'vould have to get in 
touch with the Pacific people." (R. 374). On cross-
examination, when pressed for an answer as to what was 
said by Roy C. Smith, he admitted that he testified on 
deposition: "I don't remember just what he said." (R. 
578). He again admitted that he did not remember what 
Roy C. Smith said. (R. 579). No one could imply a 
promise from Roy C. Smith, when l\Ir. Connole did not 
remember what he said. Roy C. Smith promised nothing. 
~ 
l\Irs. Connole testified that she listened in on the 
conversation which her son had with Roy C. Smith over 
the telephone on August 18, 1950: ''That was when he 
asked for a bid, another estimate. . . . He called them 
and told them that the hotel company 'vanted a support-
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ing bid ; that Otis was not going to bid, and the West-
inghouse had too much on the coast, they would not come 
into the Salt Lake territory with the elevator business . 
. . . He said he would look it up and let us know." She 
could not remember if there was anything else discussed. 
(R. 940). The last remark quoted apparently had refer-
ence to dumb-"\vaiter prices. Inasmuch as Jerry Smith 
had asked for a bid, and did not use the term supporting 
bid, if Mr. Connole intended to convey some idea that 
the hotel wanted something other than a firm bid or a 
bona fide proposal which the hotel could act on, then Mr. 
Connole "\vas practicing deceit for the third time. 
Mr. Connole admitted that Jerry Smith did not ask 
for a supporting bid, but stated that he wanted a bid 
from defendant. (R. 577). Mr. Connole admitted that 
on deposition he testified: ''He asked me if they would 
give him a bid. I told him I would call Elevator Supplies 
and ask them to give a supporting bid." (R. 577). On 
deposition when asked "\Vhether Jerry Smith used the 
words "supporting bid", Mr. Connole said:" I explained 
to Mr. Jerry Smith that it would have to be a supporting 
bid, because it was identically the same manufacturers 
and the same people doing the work .... I told him that 
the bid would be by identically the same people; and I 
could not see what justification there would be for having 
two people bid on identically the same equipment.'' (R. 
575). The falsity of the representations of Mr. Connole 
is demonstrated by comparing Exhibits "I" and "J", 
which proves they are not identical. 
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The version of the conversation, stripped of conclu-
sions, presented by the plaintiff, fails to show that Utah 
Hotel Company wanted any kind of a figure from de-
fendant except a firm bid. By resort to misrepresenta-
tions plaintiff tried to talk Utah Hotel Company out of 
getting a bid from defendant. 
Mr. Allen E. Mecham, general counsel for Associated 
General Contractors, a witness for plaintiff whose testi-
mony was stipulated to, stated: "As far as I have any 
knowledge, the term 'supporting bid' is not used in the 
construction industry.'' On cross-examination he said 
the term might be used as a ''collusive bid'' or it might 
be ttsed to mean a bona fide bid. He further stated that 
in ''the construction industry there is free competitive 
bidding.'' (R. 657). Both Jerry Smith and Roy C. Smith 
denied that such a term or expression was used in any 
conversation, and Roy C. Smith said he never heard of 
such expression prior to this lawsuit. (R. 786, 884-885). 
The testimony of the plaintiff fails to show in any 
particular that Roy C. Smith promised that defendant 
would not give Utah Hotel Company a bona fide firm 
bid. When Mr. Connole was asked whether R. C. Smith 
ever told him (Mr. Connole) that defendant ''would not 
present a firm bid to the Hotel Utah'' on the over-all 
job, Mr. Connole ans,vered, "No." (R. 589). Nor was 
there any testimony that there could have been any pos-
sible consideration, even if Roy C. Smith had promised 
not to submit a firm bid to Utah Hotel Company. The 
fact is, that there was no such promise. Both plaintiff 
92 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and defendant knew Utah Hotel Company wanted a firm 
bid from defendant, and if there had been any agreement 
to refrain from submitting a firm bid such an agreement 
(even if there had been consideration) would have been 
collusive and fraudulent as against the Utah Hotel Com-
pany. Inasmuch as a bid is an offer, any bid submitted 
by the defendant to the hotel company of necessity would 
have had to be one which could be accepted or it would 
not be a bid. Mr. Connole denied that he was trying to 
keep Utah Hotel Company from getting a bid from de-
fendant (R. 579) : 
'' Q. Were you trying to keep the Hotel Utah 
from getting a bid on the over-all job from the 
Elevator Supplies Company~ 
"A. I was never aware that Elevator Sup-
plies would bid the job. I "rasn 't trying to keep 
them from it." 
By letter dated August 28, 1950, Exhibit 20, plaintiff 
submitted a proposal to Utah Hotel Company for the 
sale of two electric dumb-waiters on a. non-installed basis. 
(R. 249). Such bid was unsatisfactory to the manage-
ment of Hotel Utah as the hotel was only interested in 
bids on an installed basis. (R. 249). Furthermore, the 
bid was incomplete, and it contained no specifications 
whatsoever. (R. 793). 
Mr. Roy C. Smith of defendant corporation came to 
Salt Lake City with Mr. Charles Maynard Henker of 
Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company, August 29, 
1950. (R. 695-696). Prior to coming, Roy C. Smith had 
asked Mr. Henker if Pacific would submit a bid to de-
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fendant on a portion of the Hotel Utah elevator moderni-
zation on an installed basis. That would amount to a 
great deal more than Pacific had previously bid to Kim-
ball. (R. 673). Mr. Henker said that it would be all right 
"if it is all right with l{imball Elevator Company", as 
Pacific had submitted a bid previously to Kimball. (R. 
673-674). Kimball was then the representative of Pacific 
Elevator and Equipment Company in Utah. (R. 688). 
Mr. Henker said he would not make a bid to defendant 
without clearance from l{imball. (R. 674). He also told 
Mr. Roy C. Smith that he thought it would be absolutely 
necessary to make a complete survey of the job at the 
job site. (R. 716). There had been business dealings 
between defendant and Pacific for many years, always 
on a basis of a request for a bid, submission of a quota-
tion or firm bid, and a purchase order. That had been 
true both ways. (R. 725). Contracts between them had 
always been in writing. (R. 727). 
There was a conference on August 30, 1950, between 
Max C. Carpenter, manager of Hotel Utah, Jerry Smith, 
building superintendent, and Roy C. Smith of defendant 
corporation. Mr. Carpenter testified that he had asked 
Jerry Smith to call Roy C. Smith for a bid from de-
fendant on the over-all job. On this occasion Mr. Car-
penter asked Roy C. Smith to submit a bid to the Hotel 
Utah on the modernization of the three passenger ele-
vators. Defendant did not solicit the business. (R. 242). 
Mr. Carpenter at that time also asked Roy C. Smith to 
submit a bid on two electric dumb waiter elevators. (R. 
244). Mr. Carpenter also said he told Roy C. Smith that 
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he 'vanted a bid on the over-all job on the passenger 
elevator modernization, and that he expected Roy C. 
Smith to present a straight-forward bid to the hotel-
one that could be accepted by the hotel. ( R. 248). There 
was no discussion of the Kimball bid. Roy C. Smith 
did not say or do anything to discourage Mr. Carpenter 
from dealing with Kimball. (R. 248). Mr. Carpenter had 
Roy C. Smith go over the elevator openings and make 
a thorough inspection and examination, and Mr. Car-
penter told him the things he wanted done. (R. 250). 
Mr. Henker testified that after he and Roy C. Smith 
arrived in Salt Lake City, they talked to some of the 
hotel people, ''Then we made a very thorough survey 
of the equipment down to the last detail, preparatory 
to making up a firm bid to Elevator Supplies Company.'' 
(R. 676). Mr. Jerry Smith told ~fr. Henker that the 
management had invited Elevator Supplies Company to 
submit a bid on the over-all job; and Mr. Smith also 
stated that the hotel wanted Elevator Supplies equip-
ment used as far as possible. (R. 716-717). Before sub-
mitting any bid to defendant, Mr. Henker spent what-
ever time he thought was necessary to determine just 
how much this job should cost for Pacific supplies and 
equipment, plus installation charges. (R. 717). The 
purpose of his visit to Salt Lake City was to determine 
what to bid to defendant. (R. 718). 
On August 30, 1950, there was a conversation be-
tween Roy C. Smith, Daniel W. Connole and Charles 
Maynard Henker on the way to the Park Building at the 
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University of Utah. Roy C. Smith(testified that he told 
Mr. Connole that he wanted him to know that Hotel Utah 
had asked defendant for a bid on the entire job and that 
defendant was going to submit a bid; and that Mr. 
Henker came here to make a survey of the job to quote 
on an installed basis. While he could not hear the entire 
conversation between Mr. Henker and Mr. Connole, both 
of whom were in the front seat of Mr. Connole's car, Mr. 
Henker asked Mr. Connole if it was all right to bid to 
defendant, and Mr. Connole told Mr. Henker, yes, as 
long as they were bidding list price. ( R. 886-887). Mr. 
Connole said it was all right for Pacific to give defendant 
a quotation. (R. 936-937). 
Mr. Henker testified that he told Mr. Connole that 
he had been requested by Elevator Supplies Company 
to give a bid on the Hotel Utah job on an installed basis, 
·and he wanted to be sure that Mr. _Connole had no obpec-
tions to· submitting a bid to Elevator Supplies Company. 
Mr. Connole made some statement to the effect that he 
knew that the hotel management had requested addi-
tional bids on the over-all job. (R. 718). Mr. Henker also 
testified that the purpose of his visit to Salt Lake City 
was to go over the job with the idea of bidding directly 
to defendant; and that required a survey of the job to 
get down to facts and figures which they had to have 
in order to bid the job on that basis. (R. 671-672). He 
further testified that he had already bid to Kimball and 
he asked Mr. Smith and Mr. Connole whether they were 
in agreement, as he wanted to confirm his company's 
position in tendering this bid to defendant, and he wanted 
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to clear himself of any wrongdoing as far as l(imball 
Elevator Company was concerned. (R. 676-677). He said 
they indicated they were in agreement, but that was all 
that was said. (R. 677). In consequence of that discus-
sion, under date of September 7, 1950, Pacific Elevator 
and Equipment Company ''submitted a quotation or a 
firm bid to the Elevator Supplies Company, Inc." (R. 
717). 
On direct examination Mr. Connole testified that 
Mr. Henker said: ''While I have the two of you together, 
you understand Mr. Smith is going to place a proposal 
to the Utah Hotel. Am I to give him your figures~" Mr. 
Connole told him ''Yes. '' He did not recall whether 
anything else was said. (R. 37 4-375). On cross-examina-
tion Mr. Connole admitted that he told Mr. Henker it 
was all right to submit a bid to Roy C. Smith, but he 
did not know if that was the exact language. (R. 572). 
He admitted that on deposition he testified: t' The Ele-
vator Supplies Company requested the information from 
Mr. Benker, and Mr. Henker refused to give it to them, 
until he had my permission and that it was finally under-
stood that I knew they were bidding it.'' (R. 572). 
"Q. At the time that Mr. Henker spoke to 
you he asked you whether it was agreeable for 
him to furnish a quotation to the Elevator Sup-
plies Company on the Hotel Utah job. 
''A. The Elevator Supplies Company re-
quested the information from Mr. Henker, and 
Mr. Henker refused to give it to them, until he 
had my permission and that it was finally under-
stood that I knew they were bidding it. 
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"Q. That is right, and he told you that Ele-
vator Supplies Company was bidding on this job 
and had asked Pacific EleYator and Equipment 
Company to furnish them a quotation. 
''A. That is correct.'' 
The testimony of Mr. Connole shows clearly that 
Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company had express 
permission from Kimball to submit a bid to defendant, 
and tnat it 'vas understood that defendant was bidding 
on the job. Quoting further from the admissions of Mr. 
Connole ( R. 573) : 
'' Q. All he said to you was that the Eleva tor 
Supplies Company 'requested us' to give them a 
quotation on a certain part of this work~ 
''A. He told me that he could not give them 
a quotation, because we were figuring the job and 
representing them-unless it was with our per-
mission. 
'' Q. And you told him it was all right? 
''A. I told him it was all right.'' 
The word ''quotation'' was used as a synonym for 
"bid", as illustrated by the testimony of Mr. Henker. 
(R. 717). There would not have been any occasion for 
Pacific to get clearance from Kimball to merely submit 
an "estimate of cost". Kimball was the territorial agent 
of Pacific, and Pacific was unwilling to give defendant a 
firm bid or quotation until ~fr. Connole consented. Mr. 
Connole expressly told l\fr. Henker "it \Vas all right" 
to give defendant a quotation. The admissions of Mr. 
Connole, as plaintiff's manager, show that he consented 
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unequivocally to presentation of a firm bid by Pacific to 
defendant. The only possible purpose of the detailed 
"rork done by 1\{r. Henker in his survey, was "prepara-
tory to making up a firm bid to Elevator Supplies Com-
pany." (R. 6'76). The testimony of Mr. Henker clearly 
sho"\\rs too, that he relied on the consent of plaintiff to 
present a bona fide bid to defendant, for Pacific gave a 
bid to defendant about one week later, on September 7, 
1950, Exhibit 18, and on October 4, 1950, Pacific accepted 
a purchase order from defendant, Exhibit 2. (R. 717, 
719-721) 0 
In the conversation between Mr. Connole, Mr. Hen-
ker and Mr. Smith, on August 30, 1950, there was a 
definite express discussion of the fact that Utah Hotel 
Company had asked defendant to submit a bid, and that 
defendant had requested a bid from Pacific on a portion 
of the over-all job. Plaintiff did not make any pretense 
in that discussion that there was any ''agreement'' 
whereby defendant would refrain from submitting a 
firm bid to Utah Hotel Company. When the subject of 
submission of a bid by defendant to its customer, Utah 
Hotel Company, was expressly discussed, plaintiff could 
have declined to give Pacific permission and defendant 
\vould have been compelled to get a quotation from some 
other elevator company. Plaintiff did not merely pas-
sively acquiesce in submission of a bid by Pacific to 
defendant, but plaintiff expressly told Mr. Henker "it 
was all right.'' Plaintiff thereby recognized the right 
of defendant to present a firm bid to Utah Hotel Com-
pany, and plaintiff also recognized the right of the hotel 
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company to obtain a firm bid from defendant. The ad-
missions of plaintiff completely shattered plaintiff's 
claim of an ''implied agreement not to compete with 
plaintiff". It was improper to submit the case to the 
jury when plaintiff's own evidence proved there was no 
such ''agreement''. The trial court had no authority to 
permit the jury to speculate that Mr. Connole did not 
mean what he said when he told Mr. Henker it was all 
right to submit a bid to the defendant, when the sole 
purpose of such a bid was to enable defendant to submit 
a bona fide bid to Utah Hotel Company. 
Mr. Connole, as manager of Kimball Elevator Com-
pany, was confronted with a specific inquiry by Mr. 
Henker. In response, Mr. Connole used unequivocal 
words of consent which induced Pacific to submit a firm 
bid to defendant. After Pacific submitted such bid, 
plaintiff could not be heard to say that Mr. Connole did 
not mean what he said. Even if Mr. Connole had not 
expressly consented but plaintiff had merely passively 
acquiesced in the submission of a firm bid by Pacific to 
defendant, plaintiff could not be permitted to complain 
either to Pacific or to defendant after both Pacific and 
defendant had acted thereon. As stated in McSweaney 
v. Equitable Trust Co., 127 N. J. L. 299, 22 A. 2d 282, 
285, 139 A. L. R. 653 : 
"The rule is well recognized that where a 
party, 'vith full knowledge or with sufficient 
notice or means of knowledge of his rights and 
of all the material facts, remains inactive for a 
considerable time or abstains from impeaching 
a contract or transaction, or freely does what 
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amounts to a recognition thereof as existing, or 
acts in a manner inconsistent with its repudiation 
and so as to effect or interfere with the relation 
and situation of the parties, so that the other 
party is induced to suppose that it is recognized, 
this amounts to acquiescence and the transaction, 
although originally impeachable becomes unim-
peachable. ' ' 
Plaintiff has never tried to impeach the conduct of 
Pacific in giving defendant a firm bid. The significant 
fact is, that plaintiff did not remain inactive when de-
fendant disclosed that it had asked Pacific for a bid; 
but plaintiff expressly told Pacific that it was all right 
to give defendant a bid. Obviously, if plaintiff had 
merely registered disapproval, Pacific would have re-
frained from giving defendant a bid, as Pacific did not 
want to offend its agent, Kimball Elevator Company. 
Plaintiff did not just refrain from making an objection. 
P1aintiff gave Pacific the ''green light'', by expressly 
consenting to submission of a bid by Pacific to defendant. 
In Stewart v. Finkelston.e, 208 Mass. 28, 36, 92 N. E. 
37, 39, 28 L. R. A. (n.s.) 634, 18 Am. St. Rep. 370, it was 
said that ''if there has been actual or passive acquies-
cence in the performance of the act complained of, then 
equity will ordinarily refuse her aid for the establish-
ment of an admitted right. * * * It would be contrary 
to equity and good conscience to enforce such rights 
when a defendant has been led to suppose there was no 
objection to his operations.'' Obviously, plaintiff, as 
territorial representative of Pacific, could not have 
maintained an action against Pacific for submitting a 
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firm bid to defendant, since plaintiff expressly consented 
thereto. The action against defendant is not in good 
faith. Plaintiff has not tried to impeach the conduct of 
Pacific, but complains against defendant on a fictitious 
claim after expressly telling Pacific it was all right to 
submit a bid to defendant, knowing that such bid would 
assist defendant in preparation and submission of a firm 
bid to the hotel company on the over-all job. 
In Uccello v. Gold'N Foods, 325 Mass. 319, 90 N. E. 
2d 530, 535, 16 A. L. R. 2d 458, it is said: ''Acquiescence 
is conduct from which may be inferred assent with a 
consequent estoppel or quasi-estoppel." Numerous cases 
are cited. However, in the instant case, there was no 
need to infer assent of plaint~ff, for plaintiff expressly 
consented. Mr. Connole said that Mr. Henker refused 
to give defendant a bid "until he had my permission and 
that it was nnally understood that I knew they were 
bidding it.'' Mr. Connole told Mr. Henker it was all right 
for Pacific_ to give defendant a quotation. There is no 
room for explanation or interpretation. Plaintiff, by 
express language, unequivocally consented to submission 
of a bid by Pacific to defendant, on which consent Pacific 
relied in presenting a firm bid to defendant. Without 
qualification, plaintiff recognized the right and propriety 
of defendant in submitting a firm bid to Utah Hotel 
Company, which had been a customer of defendant for 
over two years. 
Under date of September 7, 1950, Pacific Elevator 
and Equipment Company submitted a firm bid to de-
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fendant, Exhibit 18. (R. 717). Said bid covered the power 
control and certain other equipment not then being 
manufactured by defendant. The bid was on an installed 
basis. (R. 717). 
Eight days later, by letter from Pacific to plaintiff 
dated September 15, 1950, Exhibit "F ", Pacific increased 
its original bid of July 13, 1950, from $3050 per car to 
$3715 per car (R. 714), an increase of nearly 22%. The 
revised quotation was due to a rising market. In that 
letter increasing the price of the quoted equipment, 
Pacific stated: '' lVlr. Henker made an extensive survey 
of the present installation and we wish to add the fol-
lowing items of repair work which you would have to 
figure locally:'' ( 8 items specified, including new hoist 
cables, governor cables, etc.) ''Our revised labor esti-
mate including all of these items would be 139 crew days 
for the entire job, exclusive of Elevator Supplies." 
Pacific called attention to those additional items so that 
if Kimball had an opportunity to revise its bid, it could 
take those items into consideration. (R. 714-715). A 
quotation from Pacific is good for only 30 days. There 
was a price increase of 30% in electrical equipment in 
1950. (R. 734-735). When counsel for plaintiff asked 
whether Pacific intended that Kimball should be able 
to rely on the new quotation, Mr. Henker answered, "Of 
course. Why not~" (R. 735). It was not improper for 
Pacific to submit a bid to defendant and also submit a 
bid to plaintiff, or to anyone else, when acceptance could 
come from only one of them. 
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On September 11, 1950, defendant submitted two 
bids to Utah Hotel Company. Exhibit "J" was on the 
over-all passenger elevator modernization project, and 
Exhibit 4 was on the two electric dumb-waiter elevators, 
on an installed basis. Mr. Carpenter, manager of Utah 
Hotel, testified that Exhibit '' J'' was the only bid which 
the hotel ever received for doing the modernization the 
way the hotel wanted it done. (R. 264). 
On September 11, 1950, ·defendant withdrew the 
original quotations to plaintiff, and in the light of infor-
mation obtained from the hotel, defendant submitted 
two new bids to plaintiff, Exhibit LLL. One was a new 
proposal on the passenger elevators, increasing the price 
from $30,126 quoted as of June 14, 1950, (Exhibit KKK), 
to $32,020. A new proposal was made on the dumb-
waiters to meet new specifications of Hotel Utah. In 
the covering letter dated September 8, 1950, defendant 
stated that it thereby withdrew its original proposal on 
the passenger elevators, and it was thereby submitting 
a new proposal 'vith price increase, stating "we have 
also omitted the provision in one car for operation with-
out an attendant, as we have been definitely informed 
by the building that this feature is not desired." De-
fendant also advised plaintiff that an identical quotation 
on the dumb-waiters had been made to Hotel Utah "as 
per their request.'' Of course, the bid to Utah Hotel 
Company on the passenger elevator modernization was 
not an identical quotation to the one given to plaintiff, 
for the one given to plaintiff covered only a portion of 
the proposed job while the one given to the hotel covered 
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the entire modernization project. In that letter, de-
fendant advised plaintiff that the prices quoted were 
list, subject to a discount of 10%. Suggestion was also 
made that Mr. Connole call Mr. Smith to ''discuss any 
other questions which may be pertinent to this negotia-
tion.'' 
Defendant and Pacific each made it possible for 
plaintiff to make a new bid to Utah Hotel Company 
which would remedy the omissions and uncertainties 
which made the bid dated August 16, 1950, an abortive 
and unsatisfactory bid. Plaintiff was not foreclosed of 
opportunity to present a proper bid as far as the actions 
of defendant and Pacific were concerned. In fact, both 
defendant and Pacific called plaintiff's attention to in-
formation obtained from Hotel Utah, to which plaintiff 
would have to give heed in order to submit a bid satis-
factory in form. The failure of plaintiff to present a 
complete and definite proposal on August 16, 1950, was 
entirely the fault of plaintiff. Defendant did not prevent 
plaintiff from making a satisfactory proposal to the 
hotel company, either on August 16, 1950, or at any time. 
Plaintiff disregarded both the new proposal from de-
fendant dated September 11, 1950, and the new proposal 
from Pacific dated September 15, 1950, and never 
attempted to present a new bid to Utah Hotel Company. 
(R. 542). 
The pretended excuse for failure of plaintiff to 
submit a new or revised bid was the hearsay testimony 
of Mr. Connole (permitted over objections), that he told 
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Jerry Smith that Kimball "\vas anticipating a "slight 
increase in cost of electrical parts''; that Jerry Smith 
said that the hotel had not decided definitely whether it 
"\vould re-use the lanterns and push-buttons; that there 
'vas some discussion about price increase, but that he 
never told Jerry Smith he was raising the bid 26% ; and 
that he told Jerry Smith if he would let plaintiff know 
what the hotel "ranted deleted, "I would give him a new 
bid, and he never let me kno,v." (R. 534, 54~). :\1r. Con-
nole admitted that although plaintiff received new quo-
tations from both defendant and Pacific, plaintiff did 
nothing to present a new bid to Utah Hotel Company. 
(R. 542). 
Jerry Smith denied that anything was said about 
re-use of lanterns and push buttons after plaintiff sub-
mitted its bid. He testified that sometime following sub-
mission of the Kimball bid, Mr. Connole told him the bid 
was no longer in effect due to price increase, and that 
he wrote 26% on the face of the bid as the figure by 
which Mr. Connole had said the bid would be increased. 
(R. 794-796, 816-817). When. Jerry Smith made such 
notation. on the Kimball bid, the hotel management in-
structed him to disregard that bid and that company, 
and not commttnicate further with it. (R. 822). 
Although there is no competent proof that plaintiff 
was misled by anything Jerry Smith supposedly said to 
Mr. Connole, Mr. Connole admitted that Jerry Smith 
never told plaintiff not to revise its bid. Plaintiff could 
not have proffered any excuse of that character anyway, 
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after September 11, 1950, when defendant presented its 
new proposal to plaintiff covering what the hotel 'vanted. 
Plaintiff not only ignored the information it ob-
tained from defendant, but also the information it had 
received from Pacific which clearly showed that plain-
tiff had omitted 23 essential items from its bid of 
August 16, 1950. By letter dated July 13, 1950, Pacific 
advised plaintiff that there were 15 repair items which 
plaintiff wouTd have to figure. Plaintiff omitted all 15 
from its bid. On September 15, 1950, Pacific notified 
plaintiff that Pacific had found 8 additional items to be 
included. Plaintiff continued to do nothing to remedy 
the fatal omissions and uncertainties of its bid of August 
16, 1950. Plaintiff simply would not include all of the 
items the hotel rightfully insisted on having in the 
modernization. Plaintiff foreclosed itself of opportunity 
to have Hotel Utah consider it as a prospective con-
tractor, by its own mismanagement and indisposition to 
offer Hotel Utah what it wanted, as well as by plaintiff's 
previous dealings. 
The Utah Hotel Company did not make an award 
of the two contracts to defendant until 16 days after 
defendant presented the two new bids to the plaintiff. 
The contracts were awarded September 27, 1950. 
The plaintiff did not at any time say to anyone at 
Hotel Utah that defendant had no right to present a 
firm bid. Nor did plaintiff make any such representation 
to defendant. The plaintiff recognized the right of de-
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fendant to deal with Utah Hotel Company which had 
· been a satisfied customer of defendant for over two 
years. In fact, when Mr. Connole was asked if he tried 
to keep Hotel Utah from getting a bid from Elevator 
Supplies Company on the over-all job, he said, ''I wasn't 
trying to keep them from it.'' (R. 579). He further 
testified that he did not tell anyone at the hotel prior 
to tne award of the contracts, not to award a contract 
to defendant. He added gratuitously, "I never knew 
they would consider it. ' ' ( R. 596) . Mr. Connole also 
admitted that Roy C. Smith never said at any time that 
he would not submit a firm bid to Utah Hotel Company. 
(R. 589). Nor did Mr. Connole know of any bid which 
defendant ever submitted to anyone which was not a 
firm bid. It was further admitted by Mr. Connole that 
Roy C. Smith never told Mr. Connole that defendant 
would give plaintiff a "cut out of the job" if the hotel 
company ·awarded the contract to defendant. Mr. Con-
nole stated that there was no promise of a cut, and there 
were no promises. (R. 589-590). 
Appellant will point out later, that the attempt of 
plaintiff to exact a ''commission'' from defendant as 
the successful bidder, was wrongful, for plaintiff knew 
that defendant did not pay any commissions, and plain-
tiff also knew that plaintiff was not instrumental in 
having Utah Hotel Company award the contracts to de-
fendant. Furthermore, the attempt of plaintiff to induce 
Hotel Utah to cancel the elevator modernization contract 
with defendant, and to issue a new contract to plaintiff, 
"ras a 'vrongful act designed to deprive defendant of its 
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contract rights in the effort of plaintiff to get something 
for nothing. 
The trial court should have granted the motion for 
directed verdict, of no cause of action, for plaintiff dem-
onstrated that it had no right of action. 
PoiNT 5. 
PLAINTIFF WAS THE ONLY WRONGDOER, 
(A) BY PRACTICE OF DECEIT IN AN EFFORT 
TO PREVENT COMPETITION, AND (B) BY AT-
TEMPTING TO EXACT A SPURIOUS '' COMMIS-
SION'' FROM DEFENDANT AS SUCCESSFUL BID-
DER, AND BY WRONGFULLY ATTEMPTING TO 
DEPRIVE DEFENDANT OF ITS CONTRACT. 
The claim of plaintiff that it had "excellent business 
relations" with Utah Hotel Company back-fired. Its 
own witness, Max C. Carpenter, manager of Hotel Utah, 
testified that at the time in question the relations be-
tween the hotel and plaintiff were unsatisfactory to some 
degree because Kimball had installed a small service 
elevator which did not operate satisfactorily, and it 
ultimately had to be removed. (R. 246-247). Instead of 
making corrections, plaintiff furnished excuses and argu-
ments. Jerry Smith, building superintendent of Hotel 
Utah, testified that prior to 1948, the hotel had purchased 
various repair parts from Kimball Elevator Company, 
but the service was not always satisfactory, so that in 
1948 the hotel began to purchase directly from defendant 
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to expedite a repair program. (R. 770-771). Mr Carpenter 
also testified that the hotel had business dealings with 
defendant since 1948. (R. 243-244). Utah Hotel Company 
in 1950 was a customer of defendant. 
In 1950 no contract whatsoever existed between 
plaintiff and Utah Hotel Company. Plaintiff did nothing 
to regain the hotel's confidence. The only proposal sub-
mitted by plaintiff to the hotel was dated August 16, 
1950, and it was unsatisfactory and unacceptable to the 
hotel management. (R. 246). Mr. Carpenter could not 
tell from reading the bid, what work would actually be 
done. The bid was incomplete and ''too vague.'' (R. 246-
247). Mr. Carpenter never submitted the Kimball bid 
to the executive committee, and he never asked Kimball 
if it cared to make another bid. (R. 264). Defendant 
did not say or do anything to discourage the hotel com-
pany from dealing with plaintiff, and the Kimball bid 
was never discussed with defendant. (R. 237). 
Defendant did not even solicit the business from the 
hotel, but Utah Hotel Company requested a bid on the 
over-all job from defendant. (R. 241-242). Defendant 
presented the only bid which was acceptable to the hotel 
company. (R. 264). When the hotel management was 
informed that plaintiff was going to increase the price 
of its bid, Jerry Smith, building superintendent, was 
. instructed to disregard the Kimball bid and not to com-
municate further with Kimball Elevator Company. (R. 
822). 
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Plaintiff did not sue in tort on some theory that it 
"' .. as maliciously prevented from entering into contract 
with Utah Hotel Company, for there could have been 
no possible factual basis of recovery on any such theory, 
or any other legal theory. The tort rule is stated in 
Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555: 
''Everyone has a right to enjoy the fruits and 
advantages of his own enterprise, industry, skill 
and credit. He ha.s no right to be protected against 
competition, but he has a right to be free from 
malicious and wanton interference, disturbance, 
or annoyance. If disturbance or loss comes as a 
result of competition or the exercise of like rights 
by others, it is damnum absque injuria, unless 
some superior right by contract, or otherwise, is 
interfered with. But if it comes from the merely 
wanton or malicious acts of others, without the 
justification of competition, or the service of any 
interest or lawful purpose, it then stands upon a 
different footing.'' (Emphasis added.) 
The statement in Skene v. Carayanis, 103 Conn. 708, 
131 A. 497, 498, illustrates the law: 
''The instant case does not fall fully within 
the principle which holds liable him who, know-
ingly and without adequate justification, causes 
another to breach his contract. R and W Hat 
Shop, Inc., v. Sculley, 98 Conn. 1, 119 A. 55, 29 
A. L. R. 551. The law does not, however, restrict 
its protection to rights resting upon completed 
contracts, but it also forbids unjustifiable inter--
ference with any man's right to pursue his lawful 
business or occupation, and to secure to himself 
the earnings of his industry. Full, fair, and free 
competition is necessary to the economic life of 
a community, but under its guise, no man can, by 
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unlawful means, prevent another from obtaining 
the fruits of his labor. 'The weapons used by the 
trader who relies upon this right for justification 
must be those furnished by the laws of trade, or, 
at least, must not be inconsistent with their free 
operation. No man can justify interference with 
another man's business through fraud or misrep-
resentation, nor by intimidation, obstruction, or 
molestation.' Martell v. White, 185 Mass. 255, 
261, 69 N. E. 1085, 1088, 64 L. R. A. 260, 102 Am. 
St. Rep. 341; Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 227 
N.Y. 1, 11, 124 N. E. 97, 6 A. L. R. 901; Virtue v. 
Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 123 Minn. 17, 31, 
142 N. W. 930, 1136, L. R. A. 1915 B, 1179, 1195. '' 
Plaintiff proved no misrepresentations by defendant, 
nor any fraud, molestation or interference. T~e only 
party guilty of any such conduct was the pla;intiff. 
(A) Plai.ntijj practiced deceit in the effort to pre-
vent competition. 
At the time plaintiff requested defendant to ":figure 
out'' the necessary elevator supplies for modernization 
of the passenger elevators, in May 1950, plaintiff knew 
that Utah Hotel Company had been a customer of de-
fendant for over two years. Before submitting any bid, 
defendant asked Mr. Connole what the bidding proce-
dure would be. (R. 883). Mr. Connole admitted that he 
told Roy C. Smith that Kimball Elevator Company was 
going to do the job at Hotel Utah, and that he under-
stood that there would be no other bidder on this job. 
(R. 523-524). The representations were false, and uttered 
without excuse, in an effort to prevent competition with 
plaintiff. 
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It is undisputed that Utah Hotel Company informed 
plaintiff that it wanted a bid from defendant on the total 
job. Mr. Connole falsely represented to Utah Hotel 
Company that it would do no good; that such bid from 
defendant 'vould be identical with plaintiff's bid. (R. 
786-787, 818). Mr. Connole admitted saying, "I told him 
that the bid would be by identically the same people; and 
I could not see what justification there would be for 
having t"~o people bid on identically the same equip-
ment." (R. 575). The representation that the bid from 
defendant would be identical was false, as demonstrated 
by Exhibits "I" and "J". The plaintiff sought to 
discourag·e the hotel from procuring a bid from de-
fendant. 
Although neither defendant nor Utah Hotel Com-
pany entered into agreement with plaintiff by virtue of 
sucli false representations, had either one done so, the 
agreement would have been subject to rescission. As 
pointed out by this Honorable Court in Ogden Valley 
Tt·out & Resort Co. v. Lewis, 41 Utah 183, 125 P. 687, it 
is not necessary in an action for rescission to prove that 
the party "'"ho made the false representations kne"r them 
to be false; but merely that they were false and induced 
the making of the contract. "Why should he who makes 
false representations be permitted to profit by them, 
whether he knew they were false or not~ Upon the other 
hand, why should the party who is deceived be bound by 
a contract based upon false representations, simply be-
cause he cannot prove that the other party to the contract 
knew the statements when made were false~'' Plaintiff 
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sued because it was frustrated in its unlawful scheme 
to perpetrate a frauq. by the practice of dece~t both on 
defendant and on Hotel Utah, and plaintiff seeks to be 
put in a more advantageous position than if it had been 
successful in its 'vrongful designs in the first instance. 
The claim of ''implied agreement'' is fictitious on 
its face in the light of the deception practiced by plain-
tiff, and the deception was of such a material nature that 
if an agreement could have been induced successfully 
by plaintiff, either with defendant or with Utah Hotel 
Company, there would have been a complete bar by 
virtue of the right to rescind. 
(B) Plaintiff was . a wrongdoer by attempting to 
exact a spurious "commission" and by attempting to 
interfere with the contra.ct awarded to defendant. 
l\1r. Connole expressly admitted that defendant did 
not promise the plaintiff a ''cut out of the job.'' (R. 589-
590). He also admitted that there were no promises. 
(R. 590). Mr. Connole also knew very well that de-
fendant had never paid commissions. Defendant sold 
to elevator companies at a discount of 10% from list 
price. That did not constitute a commission, as an 
offeree could not realize such discount or any other 
benefit if it failed to make the purchase. Mr. Connole 
knew that Utah Hotel Company had awarded the con-
tracts to defendant on the basis of acceptable bids. 
Neither he nor his company induced Utah Hotel Com-
pany to award the contracts to defendant. When he 
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said, ''I expected my regular commission on the job'' 
(R. 590), he knew there was no commission due or owing, 
and that he had never been paid a commission, nor had 
JCimball Elevator Company. It was a plain attempt of 
an unsuccessful bidder (if Kimball could be considered 
a bidder when it declined to submit a. new bid), to exact 
a fee from the successful bidder without consideration. 
It was an unconscionable effort to get something for 
nothing, commonly called a ''shake-down''. 
When defendant flatly refused to submit to such 
exaction, plaintiff asked Utah Hotel Company for a 
''commission'' which was likewise refused. Plaintiff 
was told that Hotel Utah had put the job out on bids, 
and that Kimball had not been the successful bidder. 
(R. 238, 240, 250). Plaintiff then wrongfully attempted 
to induce Utah Hotel Company to change the contract 
from defendant to ICimball, on the assurance that it 
'vould not cost any more. Mr. Carpenter refused to do 
anything to change the contract with defendant in any 
way, shape or form. (R. 239-240). The entire conduct 
of plaintiff was reprehensible, in defiance of the rights 
of defendant. 
In answer to defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment, plaintiff made the unwarranted contention that 
acceptance of a contract by defendant from Utah Hotel 
Company on the passenger modernization project, con-
stituted a "piratical taking of the Hotel Utah contract". 
(R. 82). Such false contention was echoed throughout 
the proceedings. Defendant did nothing to prevent plain-
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tiff from submitting a satisfactory bid to U ta.h Hotel 
Company. Plaintiff presented an abortive bid, and when 
plaintiff was furnished the necessary information by 
defendant and by Pacific from which plaintiff could 
have remedied the fatal omissions and uncertainties of 
its unsatisfactory bid, plaintiff neglected to do anything 
about it. When the contracts were awarded to defendant 
because the defendant was the only bidder which offered 
to do the jobs as the hotel 'vanted them done, the plain-
tiff first wrongfully tried to exact a spurious '' commis-
sion". When that contemptible scheme failed, plaintiff 
tried to work on Hotel Utah. 
The testimony of Mr. Connole as to "·hat he said to 
Ivlax C. Carpenter demonstrates that he again resorted 
to deceit in an effort to deprive defendant of its contract: 
''I asked him if it "\vould be possible to transfer the con-
tract that was issued to Elevator Supplies Company 
over into the name of Kimball Elevator Company, that 
it 'vas one and the same people doing the work, that it 
was identical quotations, and it would make no difference 
in price on the job." ( R. 391). The testimony was in-
competent as part of an attempt of plaintiff to impeach 
its ov/n witness, Mr. Carpenter, but Mr. Connole's own 
version shows deceit: (1) The statement that "it was 
one and the same people doing the work", was false, as 
the bid submitted by the defendant contemplated per-
formance by defendant and· by Pacific, and l(imball had 
no part in performance. ( 2) The assertion that ''it was 
identical quotations'', "\Vas false, for the Kimball bid 
omitted 23 essential items "\Vhich were all included in 
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the defendant's bid. Had plaintiff been successful in its 
wrongful attempts to deprive the defendant of the con-
tract, it would have been a case of "piracy of contract", 
and actionable as a tort. 
The only wrongdoer was the plaintiff, first by the 
practice of deceit upon defendant and upon Utah Hotel 
Company, then as unsuccessful bidder by the unconscion-
able attempt to exact a. spurious ''commission'', and 
finally by the attempt to deprive defendant of the con-
tract a'va.rded by Utah Hotel Company. It was apparent 
at every step of the proceedings that plaintiff was 
attempting to use the judicial machinery to accomplish 
its unlawful scheme to get something for nothing. The 
lower court should have dismissed the action with preju-
dice, since it was obvious that the action was in bad faith 
in an effort to perpetrate a fraud. 
PoiNT 6. 
THERE WAS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
THAT PLAINTIFF WOULD HAVE OBTAINED 
THE MODERNIZATION CONTRACT, AND NO 
COMPETENT PROOF OF ANY DAMAGES. 
Obviously, plaintiff could not claim damages for not 
being awarded the Hotel Utah elevator modernization 
contract, when plaintiff failed to prove that it would 
actually have been awarded the contract, except for some 
wrongful act of defendant. There was no claim made 
by plaintiff that defendant committed any tort. De-
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fendant did not mislead the plaintiff, nor in any ~~ay 
induce the plaintiff to submit an improper bid to Utah 
Hotel Company. Nor was the defendant in any way 
responsible for the unsuccessful past business dealings 
between plaintiff and Utah Hotel Company which re-
duced the confidence of the hotel company in plaintiff to 
practically zero. There was no competent evidence that 
the hotel company would have awarded the contract to 
plaintiff even if defendant had refused to give the hotel 
a bid. 
Plaintiff was an unacceptable bidder as far as Utah 
Hotel Company was concerned, not only by reason of 
the indisposition of plaintiff to submit a bid proposing 
the type of performance which the hotel wanted, but 
also because plaintiff had not given the hotel satisfactory 
performance in the past. Plaintiff had ''two strikes 
against it'' before it submitted its incomplete bid on 
August 16, 1950, Exhibit "I". Mr. Carpenter, manager 
of the hotel, testified that at that time, the relationship 
of Utah Hotel Company "\vith Kimball Elevator Com-
pany was unsatisfactory to some degree, because Kim-
ball had installed a small service elevator which did not 
operate satisfactorily. (R. 246-247). Said elevator did 
not work efficiently, and it had to be removed in 1949. 
(R. 258). Its speed was too slow, the cab ''"as too heavy, 
and it operated unsatisfactorily even after Kimball 
changed the gear ratio. (R. 799, 805). Furthermore, 
Kimball had given unsatisfactory service to the hotel on 
repair parts, so that beginning with 1948 the hotel com-
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pany began to purchase the repair parts from de-
fendant. 
When plaintiff submitted its bid on August 16, 1950, 
which omitted 23 essential items, and which was indefi-
nite and otherwise incomplete, if that was not "strike 
three against the plaintiff" it was at least "foul ball." 
Plaintiff acknowledged to the hotel that the bid covered 
only a portion of the project. Plaintiff manifested no 
disposition to present a bid which would be acceptable 
to the hotel management. When plaintiff notified the 
hotel of price increase, there can be no question about 
the fact that the hotel called ''strike three''. At that 
time the management instructed Jerry Smith to disre-
gard the Kimball bid and the Kimball Elevator Com-
pany, and not communica.te further with it. ( R. 822). 
The hotel did not have to offer any reason for its decision 
not to do business with plaintiff; but plaintiff had given 
unsatisfactory performance in the past, and instead of 
doing something to restore confidence, plaintiff made 
such an objectionable proposal that the hotel company 
was unwilling to risk doing business with it. Mr. Car-
penter even declined to submit the Kimball bid to the 
executive committee. (R. 264). He did not see fit to ask 
the Kimball Elevator Company if it cared to make an-
other bid. The hotel "\vas not very anxious to do business, 
or even to invite Kimball to come back and submit 
another bid, since Kimball had not submitted a satis-
factory bid in the first instance. (R. 263-264). 
It would be utterly impossible for reasonable minds 
to reach the conclusion from the evidence, that Hotel 
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Utah would have awarded any contract to any firm which 
took the attitude that Kimball manifested. There was 
no basis for submitting the case to the jury, and sub-
mission was a mere invitation to engage in speculation 
in violation of the rights of def en dan t. 
Nor did plaintiff show that it could have made any 
profit, if it were assumed for purposes of argument that 
such a contract had been awarded to plaintiff. There 
was no competent evidence whatsoever, that plaintiff 
could have made either $8,555 awarded by the jury or 
any other amount in excess of costs of performance. Mr. 
Connole originally testified that the job was bid low 
(R. 416): 
''We took the price of the Elevator Supplies 
equipment, the portion of the work they were to 
do on an installed basis and took the price of the 
Pacific Elevator & Equipment Company-we took 
their estimates of their time or labor, our over-
head and arrived at the price of $59,600. 
"Q. (By Mr. Brennan) Did you consider any 
other element than cost in making this price~ 
"A. Yes we bid the job lower than normal 
because we wanted it as an advertising feature.'' 
Such testimony indicates that plaintiff did not figure 
on any profit. Later, in an attempt to build up a claim 
of ''damages'', plaintiff offered in evidence Exhibit 
SSS, which was an ''estimate sheet'' prepared by plain-
tiff after the suit was started, to show a ''profit'' of 
$12,899.08. Said incompetent instrument was received in 
evidence over objections of defendant, notwithstanding 
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said paper shows on its face tha.t at the time it was 
prepared, plaintiff omitted a number of known items of 
cost. ( R. 607-612) . 
Plaintiff omitted the net increases which plaintiff 
would have had to pay defendant under the new bid of 
September 11, 1950, in the amount of $1,884.60 and the 
net increase in the new bid of Pacific dated September 
15, 1950, amounting to $1,995.00. The 34 additional crew 
days mentioned by Pacific for installation of its equip-
ment and other items, were also omitted from the labor 
computations. Plaintiff used "labor figures" of August 
1950, notwithstanding the costs in 1951 had increased 
when the job would have been performed. Even at 
plaintiff's lo'v labor estimate· of $3.98 per crew hour 
(times 8 for 34 days), would amount to an additional 
$1,082.56 alone, plus 10% for insurance would add 
$108.26. The total of these specific items alone which 
plaintiff conveniently excluded from the ''estimate sheet'' 
specially prepared for trial, aggregate $5,070.42. Those 
items alone reduce plaintiff's "estimated profit" down 
to $7,828.66 or a figure below the $8,555 awarded by the 
jury, before various other omitted items are taken into 
ronsidera tion. 
Mr. Connole admitted that there were additional 
items mentioned in the letter from Pacific to plaintiff 
dated September 15, 1950. He said the new drive sheaves 
would cost about $425 each. Two of them would cost 
~', $850. He said two new hoist cables would each cost from 
,~ $150 to $175, and he was not trying to overstate those 
121 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
costs. Three of them them at $175 would add another 
$525. The governor cables 'vould cost $150 eaeh or $450. 
(R. 386-388). These few additional items would amount 
to $1,825 to reduce the ''estimated profit'' do,vn to 
$6,003.66. There were numerous other items of expense, 
some of which he did not attempt to price, but merely 
stated they were "included" in the original figure. If 
all of the omitted i terns had been candidly disclosed, 
they would not only have completely \Yiped out the 
balance of the ''estimated profit'', but show a loss of 
thousands of dollars. 
Mr. Connole originally testified that he figured over-
head in computing the figure of $59,600; but all overhead 
costs except 10% for payroll insurance, are omitted from 
the "estimate". Later, he testified, "You can't operate 
on 10% in any business.'' (R. 530). There can be no 
doubt that such an admission was not an overstatement. 
He further testified that the 10% discount allowed to 
elevator companies on purchases made by them, only 
''covers part of the cost of operation.'' He admitted 
that he figured nothing for overhead in his computation; 
that he "never" figures it in the job. "You will find 
it under the pro fit colu1nn." ( R. 530). Thus, a new tech-
nique has been devised for showing a ''profit'', by in-
cluding overhead items in the "profit column." Even 
if only 10% were used as the basic figure for overhead 
costs, and the 10% were not figured on the sum which 
plaintiff would have had to pay defendant if plaintiff 
had been awarded the contract, ($28,818 after deducting 
the 10% discount from list price), there would have been 
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at least $30,782 of plaintiff's bid to which overhead 
would apply, or $3,078.20 to reduce the "estimated 
profit'' to $2,925.46. 
There \Vas no figure set up for contingencies. It was 
undisputed, as testified by Mr. Roy C. Smith, that in 
the light of actual experience of doing the job, there 
should have been from 8% to 10% allowed for contingen-
cies. ( R. 914). If only 8% of $30,782 were figured, there 
would be an additional cost of $2,462.56 to reduce the 
''estimated profit'' to $462.90, and the $462.90 would 
not begin to cover the other undisclosed costs, which 
were conveniently omitted from the specially prepared 
''estimate sheet'' written up sometime after this suit 
\Vas initiated. 
Plaintiff omitted the cost of a supervisor. Mr. Con-
nole testified that Pacific was to send a man for super-
vision, and that the figure from Pacific did not include 
the cost of supervision. (R. 549). Mr. Henker testified 
that if l{imball had been awarded the job, Kimball had 
arranged to hire a supervisor from the coast. ( R. 7 41-
7 43). Plaintiff did not see fit to disclose how many 
thousand dollars such supervision with board allowance 
'\vould have cost. The trial court sustained objections 
to questions designed to show what the costs actually 
\vere on the job. Plaintiff did not show what they were, 
so the jury could not make a finding from a lack of 
proof. As stated by counsel for plaintiff: "He knows 
Mr. Henker refused to show the cost sheets. Mr. Reimann 
asked him.'' (R. 898). The best evidence of whether a 
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profit could be made on a job is what the job actually 
cost, when done efficiently. Plaintiff also omitted the 
cost of screening between the elevators, which would 
have resulted in substantial expense in view of the 
height of the building. Plaintiff failed to account for 
the increased labor costs in the year 1951 over the year 
1950, which would have added considerable expense. In-
stead of even a ''profit'' of $462.90, there would have 
been a loss of thousands of dollars. 
There was no competent evidence of any possible 
''profit'', either in the amount of $8,555 or any other 
sum. The court invited the jury to speculate. An ex-
amination of the verdict, which shows that some figures 
were written and then crossed out, demonstrates how 
utterly confused the jury had become. (R. 193-194). 
Reasonable minds could not have concluded that plain-
tiff could have made any profit whatsoever. Proof of 
profit cannot be made by willfully omitting costs or by 
failing to disclose the full amount of the costs. 
As stated in Durfee v. Durfee & Carvning, Inc., 323 
Mass. 187, 80 N. E. 2d 522, 532 : ''To recover, the profits 
in question must be capable of determination as a 
practical matter upon evidence that proves them by a 
f.air degree of certainty and accuracy; they cannot be 
recovered when remote, speculative, hypothetical and 
not within the realm of reasonable certainty.'' Exhibit 
SSS was an incompetent misleading statement devised 
by plaintiff after the suit was started. Damage cannot 
be established for loss of profits, by the art of showing 
124 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a fictitious profit through a deliberate omission of 
essential items of cost or by failure to disclose the actual 
amount of the costs. 
The trial court also erroneously allowed the jury to 
award ''damages'' for loss of advertising value. The 
purported ''loss'' was ·allegedly occasioned by being 
''deprived'' of having its nameplates,'' Kimball Elevator 
Co.'' in the thresholds of the three elevator cabs. The 
$8,530 awarded by the jury was without warrant under 
the facts or under the law. Defendant did not prevent 
plaintiff from making a deal with Utah Hotel Company 
to get plaintiff's nameplates in the cabs. The Utah Hotel 
Company did not allow defendant nor anyone else to 
have any nameplates in the cabs. Kimball was not the 
manufacturer of any of the equipment, but defendant 
was the manufacturer of some of the important parts 
of the equipment in the modernization, and there would 
have been some reason for defendant to have its own 
nameplates there if the hotel had permitted nameplates. 
The old thresholds with the nameplates had to be re-
moved along with the old cabs. The hotel management 
selected thresholds for the new cabs, which were blank. 
The hotel refused to allow any name in the cab except 
the name of the cab manufacturer, ''Tyler'', in small 
letters on the capacity plates in the cabs. (R. 249, 259-
260, 834-"835). 
There is not the slightest competent evidence that 
Utah Hotel Company would have allowed Kimball, which 
manufactured none of the major equipment, to have put 
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its nameplates in the elevator cabs, even if by some 
miracle Kimball could have regained the confidence of 
the hotel management and submitted an acceptable pro-
posal, and have been awarded the contract. The bid 
which plaintiff submitted, Exhibit ''I'', does not men-
tion the subject. Mr. Connole admitted that the subject 
of nameplates had never been discussed by plaintiff with 
the hotel management. (R. 586-587, 650). There was no 
competent evidence from which the jury could ''find'' 
that the hotel would have tolerated plaintiff's name-
plates. 
In submitting the case to the jury, the court utterly 
disregarded the absolute right of Utah Hotel Company 
as owner of the property to refuse anyone permission to 
advertise. Defendant did not make that decision, and 
defendant did not prevent plaintiff from making some 
kind of a deal with the hotel company to have plaintiff's 
nameplates in the cabs. It was a violation of a funda-
mental rule of liability to invite the jury to recover 
damages against the defendant for the decision of Utah 
Hotel Company, when defendant was not responsible 
for that decision. Inasmuch as defendant, as manufac-
turer of some of the important equipment which went 
into the modernization, could not get permission from 
the hotel to install its nameplates, no person of ordinary 
intelligence could arrive at any conclusion rationally 
that plaintiff could have obtained permission when plain-
tiff was not a manufacturer of any of the equipment. 
The Utah Hotel Company, notwithstanding the re-
fusal of the trial court to so instruct, had the absolute 
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right as the owner of the property, to refuse to permit 
installation of nameplates. There is no evidence that 
plaintiff would have been accorded some special privi-
lege. There is a definite reason why the hotel would not 
have allowed Kimball to install its nameplates. The 
nameplate is supposed to be the manufacturer's name-
plate, and Kimball could not possibly qualify. Emerson 
S. Smith, called by plaintiff as an ''advertising expert'' 
who admitted that he was not qualified in the elevator 
field (R. 566), admitted that the purpose of the name-
plate is to identify the manufacturer. (R. 557). Mr. Con-
nole testified that it is a practice of the manufacturer to 
install its nameplate on the machine or on the cabs of 
the elevator. (R. 649). He admitted that Kimball had 
to obtain permission in the cases where it did install its 
nameplates. 
The award of damages was predicated on the loss 
of advertising value of having a manufacturer's name-
plate in the elevator cabs. (R. 560-561, 563). The testi-
mony as to ''damages'' for not having Kimball's name-
plates in the cabs was incompetent, for Kimball's name-
plates could not possibly be manufacturer's nameplates. 
One who has a contract to install manufactured equip-
ment, is not the manufacturer. Mr. Emerson S. Smith 
'vas not qualified to give an opinion. He gave an opinion · 
as to manufacturer's nameplates, which was irrelevant. 
He had been in the elevator cabs on many oc.casions, but 
he never paid any attention to whether there were any 
nameplates in the thresholds of the cabs. (R. 558). Until 
he made the inspection for the purpose of testifying, he 
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was not aware of the absence of nameplates. Although 
he saw a name on the capacity-plate, he had no recollec-
tion as to the particular name. (R. 560). Yet, he tried 
to say that the general public who are. not advertising 
conscious and not "experts", would observe what he 
failed to observe. The court erred in refusing to strike 
such ridiculous testimony of a man who admitted he 
was not qualified in the elevator field. 
Kimball Elevator Company was not the manufac-
turer of any of the equipment constituting th~ elevators. 
The hoisting machines were manufactured by Ideal Elec-
tric Company. The power control relays are General 
Electric, assembled by Pacific Elevator and Equipment 
Company. The oil buffers were made by Pacific. The 
signal controls and door operators and accessories, were 
manufactured by Elevator Supplies Company, Inc., the 
defendant. The cabs were manufactured by Tyler Cab 
Company. The car safeties were manufactured by Kim-
ball Brothers, of Council Bluffs, Iowa. Utah Hotel Com-
pany would not allow any nameplates of defendant or of 
anyone else in the thresholds of the elevator cabs, because 
five manufacturers were involved. (R. 833-834). 
To have placed ''Kimball Elevator Co.'' nameplates 
in the cabs, would have falsely advertised plaintiff as 
the manufacturer of that which it did not and does not 
manufacture. Such nameplates would constitute an un-
lawful mislabeling. Plaintiff could not lawfully advertise 
in any manner without permission of the owner; and 
Utah Hotel Company refused consent to those who asked, 
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and plaintiff did not even presume to ask for a permis-
sion which would be refused. A person who is not the 
manufacturer, cannot rightfully claim to be damaged by 
not having a manufacturer's nameplate on something 
which he has never manufactured. It would have been 
unla;wful, as an unfair trade practice, forK imball to have 
placed its nameplates in the elevator cabs. It was preju-
dicial error for the court to advise the jury that damages 
could be recovered against defendant, when the owner 
did not permit such advertising, and when plaintiff would 
have been guilty of false advertising· by using such 
false labels. 
Section 13-2-11, U. C. A. 1953, declares that "Unfair 
methods of competition or trade are declared unlawful.'' 
The state statute is substantially the same as the federal 
statute. This case involves equipment sold and shipped 
in interstate commerce, so that the federal statute would 
be applicable, 15 U. S. C. A. Sees. 41-45. False and mis-
leading labels constitute unfair methods of competition 
which are declared unlawful. In Federal T·rade Commis·-
sion v. Army & Navy Trading Co., 88 F. 2d 776, it was 
held that false and misleading representations as to the 
origin of a commodity or as to its nature or quality 
constitute an unfair method of competition. In Ditz 
Distributors Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 143 F. 
2d 676, the court declared that the mere fact that an 
expert would not be deceived is immaterial, and that 
the important criterion in determining whether a product 
is falsely mislabeled or advertised is the net impression 
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"'"hich the advertisement 1s likely to make upon the 
general public. 
If Kimball could have had its nameplates in the 
elevators, it would have falsely advertised that it was 
the manufacturer of the equipment which it does not 
manufacture. Inasmuch as such conduct would be un-
lawful, plaintiff cannot claim to be damaged by being 
"prevented" from doing that which it had no legal right 
to do. Obviously, no c.laim could be asserted against 
defendant in any event, for the hotel company as owner 
did not allow any nameplates in the cabs. 
The plaintiff could not have obtained an award of 
the contract. It could not have made a profit, and it 
could not have had any right to put its nameplates in 
the elevator cabs. There could be no basis for any 
"damages". The claims of plaintiff were .unfounded 
Plaintiff was not entitled to recover any sum or amount. 
The court erred in refusing to enter judgment in accord-
ance with the motion of defendant for a directed verdict 
of ''no cause of action.'' 
PoiNT 7. 
THERE WAS NO PROOF OF LEGAL CONSID-
ERATION. 
Plaintiff proved that it devised a scheme to get 
something for nothing. Plaintiff did not merely fail to 
prove legal consideration, but actually produced evidence 
that there was no consideration. When plaintiff learned 
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that defendant was awarded the contracts, plaintiff tried 
to get a "cut out of the job", by demanding a "com-
mission". Plaintiff admitted that defendant had not 
promised plaintiff a "cut out of the job", nor made any 
other promises in the event defendant was awarded the 
contracts. r~rhere can be no question about the fact that 
plaintiff tried to shake down the successful bidder. Plain-
tiff admittedly did not stop there, but tried to induce 
Utah Hotel Company to cancel its contract with de-
fendant on the elevator modernization and to award the 
contract to plaintiff. In such attempt, the plaintiff again 
resorted to false representations. 
The law has never countenanced schemes to get 
something for nothing, either by outright false repre-
sentations, or by agreements induced without considera-
tion. It is elementary that an agreement is invalid if 
not supported by a legal and valuable consideration. 
The trial judge did not require the plaintiff to 
specify what consideration, if any, plaintiff claimed for 
the purported ''agreement not to compete with plain-
tiff." The so-called "issue" recited in the pre-trial 
order, failed to state a cause of action, for want of con-
sideration, as discussed under Point 2 (A), as well as 
for the reason that such an "agreement" would have 
been illegal and void under the Sherman Act, whether 
express or implied. 
No evidence was produced by plaintiff which even 
slightly resembles consideration as that term has been 
defined in the cases and in text-books. The numerous 
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requests for bids could not constitute either offers or 
consideration. As pointed out in 1 Williston. on Con-
tracts, Sec. 31, page 7 4, an advertisement for bids "is 
not itself an offer, but the bid or tender is an offer which 
creates no rights until accepted." Nor could the unac-
cepted offers from defendant in response to requests for 
bids, imply a promise not to compete, for without accept-
ance there could be no contract. 
Neither a promise to refrain from competition, nor 
consideration, could be implied from a group of unac-
cepted offers and other negotiations which terminated 
prior to May 11, 1950. Disregarding (for purposes of 
illustration) the fact that plaintiff obtained the bid dated 
June 14, 1950, from defendant by falsely representing to 
defendant that Hotel Utah was going to award the job 
to plaintiff, that bid was merely an offer which never 
resulted in any contract because it was never accepted. 
Furthermore, defendant withdrew said offer by letter 
dated September 8, 1950. No contract, express or im-
plied, could possibly have resulted from such unaccepted 
withdrawn offer. 
In the light of specifications required by Utah Hotel 
Company, defendant submitted two ne'v bids to plaintiff 
dated September 11, 1950. One was on the elevator 
modernization, and one 'vas on the dumb-waiters. Plain-
tiff did not g~ve any consideration for those two new 
offers. In fact, plaintiff did not even request defendant 
to submit either of those two bids. Those new bids were 
not presented to plaintiff until after defendant had 
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already submitted its two bids to Utah Hotel Company. 
It would have been impossible for defendant in present-
ing the new bids to plaintiff, to have ''impliedly prom-
ised'' plaintiff that it would not give any good faith bids 
to Utah Hotel Company when defendant had already 
given such bids to the hotel company. Plaintiff did not 
and could not show any possible consideration for its 
claim of an ''implied agreement'' for defendant to re-
frain from doing business with its own customer, Utah 
Hotel Company. The authorities cited under Point 2 (A) 
are applicable here. 
The court could not make a contract for the parties. 
Neither could the court law!ully dispense with proof of 
a legal consideration. There was not only a want of 
proof of any consideration, but affirmative evidence that 
there was no consideration. Consequently there was no 
proof of a contract. The court erred prejudicially in 
failing to grant the motion of defendant for a directed 
verdict of no cause of action. Due process of law pro-
hibits entering a judgment on a purported contract when 
there is no evidence that the alleged contract ever existed. 
The law in America requires consideration for agree-
ments. The attempt to recover on a pretended ''implied 
agreement'' for which there could be no conceivable 
consideration, is a scheme to get something for nothing 
which is not countenanced under the law. The courts 
cannot be permitted to be used as instruments to foster 
schemes to get something for nothing. 
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PorNT 8. 
THE TRIAL COURT DEPRIVED DEFENDANT 
OF BASIC RIGHTS, BY INJECTING FICTITIOUS 
ISSUES INTO THE CASE; BY PREJUDICIAL 
COMMENTS ON EVIDENCE; BY RECEIVING IN-
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE; BY EXCLUDING COM-
PETENT EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT; AND BY 
REJECTING A NUMBER OF DEFENSES. 
From the inception of the trial, the court permitted 
plaintiff to present incompetent, irrelevant and imma-
terial evidence· over repeated objections of defendant. 
Some of the objectionable evidence consisted of testi-
mony of purported negotiations on other projects which 
had terminated, transactions not even involving de-
fendant, and requests for bids on other projects and 
numerous unaccepted offers. Mr. Connole was allowed 
to comment on such unsuccessful negotiations which had 
faded into oblivion, as "contracts" and as "business 
association''. Objections of defendant were overruled 
persistently. (R. 268, 269, 271, 276, 279, 283). Finally, 
the court allowed defendant a continuing objection to 
all evidence not relating to the Hotel Utah moderniza-
tion projects. (R. 283). 
Defendant objected to most of the exhibits offered 
by plaintiff, inasmuch as they had nothing whatsoever 
to do with the Hotel Utah projects. l\1ost of them con-
sisted of negotiations on other projects which had ter-
minated, written offers "\vhich had expired, and corres-
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pondence having no bearing on plaintiff's claims. De-
fendant did not object to Exhibits A, F, I, J, L, 2-G, 
2-P, 2-S, 3-D, 3-F to 3-L, 3-N, 3-0, 3-Q, 3-X, 3-Z, 4-A, 
4-C to 4-I. The remainder of the exhibits offered by 
plaintiff were challenged as incompetent, irrelevant and 
immaterial, and they could not serve any purpose other 
than to mislead and confuse the jury. The court even 
allowed Mr. Connole to comment on the instruments. (R. 
295-296). Defendant objected in vain to testimony as 
to negotiations. (R. 297). Defendant also objected to 
evidence of transactions to which defendant was not a 
party. (R. 299). The court opened the gates to a flood 
of hearsay. 
The court repeatedly injected into the case fictitious 
issues. Mr. Connole admitted that the jobs on which 
plaintiff and Murphy Elevator Company had obtained 
bids from defendant, never materialized. (R. 500). When 
defendant sought to bring out admissions that those 
negotiations did not result in any purchase order nor 
any other contract with defendant, and that the exhibits 
which defendant had objected to were unaccepted offers 
which never became contracts, the trial judge cut off 
cross-examination with the declaration: 
''It doesn't make any difference. The com-
plaint is, the contract breached was not a contract 
to install, but a preliminary contract of the nego-
tiations." (R. 503). 
The court opened the door to the wildest specula-
tion that defendant could be liable on some theory of 
''breach of preliminary contract of negotiations.'' 
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Negotiations for a contract never executed are not 
competent evidence. Negotiations do not constitute a 
contract at all. The assertion of the court was utterly 
contrary to the law, and falsely inferred that defendant 
was liable without a valid contract involving the essen-
tials of mutual assent, consideration, and legal subject-
matter. The statement of the court was a prejudicial 
comment on the incompetent evidence, which amounted 
to saying that negotiations which had terminated and 
unaccepted written offers which had expired, might con-
stitute a ''preliminary contract of negotiations.'' 
The trial court also permitted plaintiff to introduce 
evidenc.e that defendant was a subcontractor for plain-
tiff on a limited portion of the Park Building job in 
1950, then repeatedly made unwarranted comments about 
the "relationship of contractor and subcontractor", 
which were highly prejudicial. There was no connection. 
whatsoever between the Park Building job and the Hotel 
Utah projects. The relationship of contractor and sub-
contractor did not extend beyond the Park Building job. 
No such relationship came into existence with respect to 
Hotel Utah projects, for the simple reason that there 
was no ac.ceptance of any proposal made by defendant 
and hence no contract. The court injected another false 
issue into the case in limiting cross-examination by 
counsel for defendant (R. 506): 
''I am going to limit you, the same as I said 
at noon, to the issue of whether the defendant 
was a subcontractor for the plaintiff.'' 
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The so-called ''issue'' was patently false, for with 
respect to the Hotel Utah projects, it was impossible for 
defendant to be a subcontractor for plaintiff when de-
fendant's proposals to plaintiff were never accepted, and 
there was no contract between the plaintiff and defend-
ant. The court also made a highly prejudicial misstate-
ment concerning the incompetent evidence which plaintiff 
had introduced, by saying that ''Most of the evidence 
was, they were the original contractor and subcontrac-
tor." (R. 506). Inasmuch as the bids had not been ac-
cepted, and had expired, no such purported contractual 
relationship ever came into existence. The jury was 
advised by the court, that there was a contractual rela-
tionship when none in fact had come into being. 
Section 38-1-2, U. C. A. 1953, defines ''Contractors 
and Subcontractors'' : 
''Whoever shall do work or furnish materials 
by contract, express or implied, with the owner, 
as in this chapter provided, shall be deemed an 
original contractor, and all other persons doing 
work or furnishing materials shall be deemed 
subcontractors.'' (Italics added.) 
The defendant certainly had a right to show that 
the bids were not accepted, that no contract came into 
existence, and that defendant had not become a sub-
contractor in the numerous cases referred to by plaintiff 
as "contracts". The evidence did not even show that 
the plaintiff had always bid as a proposed original con-
tractor ; and inasmuch as some of the bids were to general 
contractors, plaintiff would have been a subcontractor in 
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those cases if its bids had been accepted. In a number 
of the cases, plaintiff acted as agent for Murphy Elevator 
Company, and plaintiff was not even the bidder. 
The court also erroneously sustained objections to 
questions designed to show that defendant never refused 
to submit bona fide bids to any persons requesting bids. 
The purported ground for such adverse ruling was an-
other invalid "issue" that it was plaintiff's theory that 
defendant had never made any contract as an original 
contractor in Utah prior to submission of two bids by 
defendant to Utah Hotel Company in 1950. (R. 844-845). 
Such ''issue'' echoed the spirit of regimentation which 
characterized the feudalistic age. Such claim was not 
even embodied in the pre-trial order. (R. 62-63). It was 
asserted by plain tiff as a smoke-screen to obscure the 
fact that there was no contract of any kind between 
plaintiff and defendant with respect to Hotel Utah. The 
claim would have been immaterial if it had been true, 
but plaintiff's own evidence proved that such contention 
was false. In 1948, 1949 and the early part of 1950 the 
defendant was an original con.tractor with Utah Hotel 
Company, the owner of Hotel Utah, for defendant sold 
materials to the hotel company for the repair of the 
passenger elevators, Exhibit 3. (R. 243-244, 770-771). 
It was stipulated at the trial, "that prior to Sep-
tember 11, 1950, the defendant corporation, Elevator 
Supplies Company, had not in Utah, Idaho or Montana, 
ever bid as a prospective original contractor, as to any 
elevator supplies or equipment, except on ... the sale 
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of elevator parts and equipment, as manufactured by 
the said Elevator Supplies Company, in case of sale of 
parts a uniform discount of 10% off list or quotations, 
was always allowed to all elevator contractors, but no 
discount was allowed to other purchasers. With regard 
to quotations on signal control, synchron control, col-
lective and duplex collective control, it is further stipu-
lated that the defendant, Elevator Supplies Company 
did not quote exclusively to the plaintiff, Kimball Eleva-
tor Company, but that all quotations on such equipment 
by the defendant, Elevator Supplies Company, were 
made exclusively to original elevator contractors.'' (R. 
858). 
The fact that prior to September 11, 1950, defendant 
had not bid as a prospective original contractor except 
on materials which it manufactured, did not imply a 
promise to plaintiff nor to any other elevator company 
nor to anyone else that defendant would not in the 
future include in its bids any materials manufactured 
by others. Likewise, the fact that prior to September 
11, 1950, defendant had given bids on signal control, 
synchron control, and other types of controls only to 
elevator contractors, did not and could not imply a 
promise to anyone that in the future defendant would 
refrain from quoting to owners of buildings or persons 
other than elevator contractors. 
Plaintiff's evidence shows that defendant was an 
original contractor with Utah Hotel Company in 1948, 
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1949 and the early part of 1950; but even if that had 
not been the case, and even if in 1949 and in the early 
part of 1950 the defendant had restricted its operations 
to that of a subcontractor in Utah, such a policy would 
not have prevented defendant from altering that policy 
later on in 1950 if it sa":r fit to bid as a proposed original 
contractor. Defendant certainly did not have to get 
permission from plaintiff nor any other corporation. 
The right to contract is guaranteed by the Consti-
tution of Utah, Article I, Section 1: "All men have the 
inherent and inalienable right . . . to acquire, possess 
and protect property." Such constitutional right cannot 
be whittled down by implication, or otherwise. Not even 
the Legislature can impose restrictions upon such right, 
except to specify the form in which contracts shall be 
executed in order to be valid. In the case of Golding v. 
Schubach Optical Co., 93 Utah 32, 70 P. 2d 871, this 
Honorable Court held that Article I, Section 1, Consti-
tution of Utah, is infringed when one is deprived of his 
liberty to contract with others respecting the use to 
which he may subject his property or employ his talents. 
If the Legislature cannot deprive an individual of such 
right, neither can plaintiff nor any other corporation 
arrogate to itself the po,ver to dictate to defendant how 
defendant ·shall contract or with whom it shall contract, 
or how defendant shall otherwise run its business. The 
idea that an "implied contract" can be forced onto a 
person ·without his consent is contrary to the Bill of 
Rights. 
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The court allowed Mr. Connole to assume the atti-
tude of a dictator, by permitting him to make a preju-
dicial impudent remark by way of conclusion (R. 949): 
''Q. Did you at any time, authorize Roy Smith 
to make a firm bid to the Hotel Utah? 
"1\IR. REIMANN: Just a moment. I object 
to that, as calling for a conclusion, which is in-
competent, immaterial and irrelevant. He has no 
authority to speak for defendant. 
''MR. BRENNAN: I said, did he authorize' 
''THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
"A. I did not. " 
In the first place, the plaintiff had no legal right to 
dictate to defendant. Plaintiff had no legal authority to 
license defendant to bid as a prospective original con-
tractor nor to prevent defendant from exercising the 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The power to 
license resides in the State, not in some corporation, nor 
in Daniel W. Connole. Section 58-6-3, U. C. A. 1953, 
states that "the term contractor, ... shall include sub-
contract~r.'' Section 58-6-4 provides for issuance of ''a 
license authorizing the applicant to engage in the prac-
tice and business of contracting.'' Application is made 
to the State, not to an individual or a corporation. The 
statute does not regiment a qualified person to the role 
of subcontractor, even if he never previously operated 
as an original contractor. A licensee may start the year 
as a subcontractor and change his methods of business 
anytime during the year to operate as a general con-
tractor. It is strictly his own business. Many contrac-
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tors, by reason of lack of sufficient capital are financially 
unable to operate as original or ''prime'' contractors. 
In the second place, it was pTejudicial error for the 
trial court to permit Mr. Connole by way of an incompe-
tent impudent conclusion, to interpret his express words 
of consent to Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company 
to mean that there was not to be a ''firm bid. ' ' If the 
bid were not a firm bid it would necessarily be a collusive 
or "phoney bid." Mr. Connole admitted that he told 
Mr. Henker that it was all right for Pacific to submit a 
bid to defendant. Having used unequivocal language of 
consent in response to an inquiry of Mr. Henker, Mr. 
Connole could not later be allowed to interpret his re-
marks to state that he did not mean what he said. Even 
if Mr. Connole had not expressly consented, but had 
merely passively acquiesced in the conduct of Pacific in 
submission of a firm bid to defendant, plaintiff could 
not later complain either to Pacific or to defendant. 
However, the evidence required a finding that plaintiff 
expressly consented to a bid by Pacific to defendant. 
Plaintiff's own witness, Allen E. Mecham, general 
·counsel for the Associated General Contractors, said that 
''in the construction industry there is free competitive 
bidding", and he was not aware of any collusive bidding. 
(R. 667). When Mr. Henker of Pacific Elevator and 
Equipment Company, was asked by counsel for plaintiff 
if there is a trade practice in the elevator industry not 
to bid directly to a customer, he testified that he had 
''seen it both ways, three ways against the middle ... 
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Well, in some of these places they will bid to suppliers, 
and bid to a customer, and with different figures, and 
everything else." (R. 774-775). How they bid is a matter 
of company policy. lVIr. Henker was careful to make it 
clear that Pacific did not agree to refrain from selling 
to any person. 
The trial judge made a prejudicial comment by mis-
stating the evidence in sustaining objections of plaintiff 
to interrogation of a defense witness (R. 844) : 
''THE COURT: ... He admits you had a 
right to make proposals to other original bidders, 
and that is embraced in your question, that is the 
question at issue. He does not claim that. The 
objection that it is immaterial is sustained. In 
explanation of the court's ruling on this point, 
the jury may see it this way: The Pacific Elevator 
Company might be invited to bid on two original 
proposals. One might be by the plaintiff and one 
might be by the defendant, which they were in 
this case. Now whether they can ethically bid to 
both is not a problem in this lawsuit, because the 
only question here raised is whether the defend-
ant could make an original bid to the hotel Utah 
after having made a sub-bid-a bid for a sub·-
contract with the pla.intiff. There could be a ques-
tion, but it is not in this case because the de-
fendant did not get involved in any offer with 
any other proposed original contractor." (Italics 
added). 
In substance the court said that there was an issue 
as to whether the defendant had a right to exercise the 
privileges guaranteed by the Constitution. The comment 
"whether they can ethically bid to both", inferred that 
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there might be something unethical about the conduct 
of defendant. The answer to such comment is, that it is 
always ethical to have free competitive bidding, and not 
only unethical but criminal to violate the federal and 
state statutes which prohibit agreements in restraint 
of competition. 
Even if plaintiff did repeatedly assert at the trial 
that defendant could not become an original contractor 
(R. 654), there was no occasion for- the court to keep 
repeating such false contention. Defendant had a con-
stitutional right to contract directly with Utah Hotel 
Company in 1950. Defendant had done so in 1948 and 
1949. The hotel company not only had a right to pur-
chase directly from defendant on catalog, but the hotel 
had a right to request defendant to submit a bid on an 
installed basis. Defendant did not have to obtain the 
consent of plaintiff or of any other corporation in order 
to include in the bid of defendant, materials manufac-
tured by others who were willing to sell to defendant. 
It was a terrific shock to hear the trial judge infer that 
defendant could not exercise its constitutional right to 
contract, unless defendant obtained permission of plain-
tiff. 
Inasmuch as it was conceded that defendant had a 
right to present a bid to some proposed original con-
tractor other than plaintiff, the claims of plaintiff were 
obviously fictitious. How could there be an implied agree-
ment to refrain from competing directly with plaintiff, 
when it is admitted that there was no implied agreement 
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or any other agreement to refrain from competing with 
plaintiff by submission of a bid to a competitor of plain-
tiff who would then bid to the owner~ 
The repeated statement that there was an ''issue'' 
as to whether defendant could bid to Hotel Utah after 
having submitted a bid on a portion of the work to 
plaintiff, 'vas also prejudicial and unwarranted in the 
light of the facts. The original bid obtained by plaintiff 
from defendant through misrepresentation, was with-
drawn by defendant by letter dated September 8, 1950. 
No one can intelligently challenge the right of defendant 
to withdraw that bid, inasmuch as it had never been 
accepted. The situation then was as if no bid had been 
presented to plaintiff, so that even the assertion that 
defendant presented a bid to Utah Hotel Company after 
submitting a bid to plaintiff is misleading as well as 
irrelevant. On September 11, 1950, defendant first pre-
sented bids to Utah Hotel Company, then submitted two 
new bids to plaintiff. The situation at that time was if 
defendant had first submitted bids to Utah Hotel Com-
pany. The argument of ''implied agreement not to 
compete with plaintiff", becomes even more ridiculous; 
for at that time there were already two bids submitted 
to Utah Hotel Company, defendant's customer, and no 
rational person could say that defendant "impliedly 
promised'' to refrain from doing the very thing which 
plaintiff knew defendant had already done. 
The court persistently ignored the fundamental 
reason, independent of the constitutional right to con-
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tract, 'vhy there can be no legal objection to giving a 
bid to several different persons. .1\ bid is merely an 
offer. A request for a bid is not an offer. Until the offer 
is accepted, there is no contract. In 1 Williston on Con-
tracts, Sec. 31, page 74, it is stated: 
''Often tenders or bids are advertised for ... 
by private corporations. The rules governing 
such bidding are analogous to the rules governing 
auction sales. That is, an ordinary advertisement 
for bids or tenders is not itself an offer, but the 
bid or tender is an offer which creates no rights 
until accepted.'' 
In Section 32, at page 77, the rule is stated that it is 
possible to make offers to any one ''or to every one.'' 
If an offer can be made to an unlimited number of 
people, it can a1so be made to specified individuals, and 
different proposals can be made. Neither cases nor texts 
can be found which even hint that it is actionable to 
submit offers to a proposed general contractor and also 
to the owner. On the other hand, an attempt to prevent 
the owner from obtaining competitive bids is a fraud 
on the owner, and a violation of law. 
If plaintiff on September 16, 1950, had submitted a 
new bid to Utah Hotel Company in the light of infor-
mation received from Pacific and from defendant, and 
if such bid had been in acceptable form and content to 
satisfy Utah Hotel Company, and if plaintiff had been 
able to regain the confidence of the hotel company which 
plaintiff had lost, and if Utah Hotel Company had ac-
cepted plaintiff's bids instead of the bids of defendant, 
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Utah Hotel Company would not have accepted the bids 
of defendant. In that situation, defendant would not 
have accepted the bid from Pacific. Plaintiff might have 
accepted the bids from both Pacific and from defendant. 
It was no more possible for both plaintiff and defendant 
to accept the bids from Pacific, than it was for Utah Hotel 
Company to accept the over-all bids from both defendant 
and plaintiff (assuming that plaintiff had submitted a 
new bid which was free from the objections which caused 
rejection of the original bid of August 16, 1950). The 
hotel company having accepted the bids of defendant, 
defendant accepted the bid from Pacific (which was a 
vastly different bid from the one presented by Pacific 
to plaintiff). The plaintiff not being awarded the con-
tract would not in any event accept the bid submitted 
by defendant. There could be no possibility of breach 
of contract by submission of bids to both a proposed 
original contractor and to the owner, for there can be 
no contract until or unless there is acceptance of an 
offer. Only one of the offers submitted by defendant 
could possibly be accepted on one project. 
The trial court erred in restricting cross-examina-
tion. Such cross-examination was obviously designed to 
demonstrate the falsity of the claims and conclusions 
asserted by plaintiff over objections of defendant. 
The court erroneously refused to allow defendant 
to show actual costs of the job, even after the court had 
permitted Mr. Connole to give estimates of what he 
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thought the cost should have been. (R. 897-899). The 
court then made the un,varranted comment (R. 899): 
"The only question there is 'vhat bid could 
have been obtained to determine whether the 
plaintiff had a loss as a result of not getting a 
contract.'' 
The statement of the court inferred that plaintiff 
was entitled to recover because plaintiff did not obtain 
a contract. By such prejudicial comment, the court 
erroneously denied defendant the right to show actual 
costs of doing the job. Actual costs would be competent 
in any event, as an appropriate criterion for determining 
whether plaintiff could possibly have made any profit if 
it had been awarded the job. The idea that plaintiff 
could rely on "estimates" of costs which excluded many 
of the items of expense, is patently absurd. Also, the 
assertion of the court that it 'vould be necessary to show 
bids from someone other than defendant, (which would 
be utterly impossible), ignores the basic rule that profit 
is the margin of return over and above costs. 
The court erred in allowing Mr. Connole to comment 
on, interpret, and contradict the written instruments. 
He was even permitted to call the bid dated August 16, 
1950, Exhibit ''I'', a ''contract'' although the instrument 
was entirely unsatisfactory to Utah Hotel Company and 
was rejected. (R. 385-388). His testimony was also 
objectionable because he tried to vary the instrument 
by parole, by saying that various items not mentioned 
in the proposal ''were figured in our original contract.'' 
(R. 385-386). 
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Mr. Connole '\vas allowed to contradict some of the 
testimony of Mr. Carpenter, who had been called to 
testify by plaintiff. (R. 390-393). Such testimony of Mr. 
Connole was clearly hearsay. He was permitted by the 
court to make prejudicial hearsay remarks as to what 
he allegedly said to Mr. Carpenter, such as "my com-
mission for handling was all in the original contract'', 
knowing very well there was no contract. (R. 392). The 
court also erred prejudicially in allowing Mr. Connole 
to testify as to purported conversations with Mr. Car-
penter and with l\1:r. Jerry Smith, of Hotel Utah. (R. 
369-373). 
The court arbitrarily ruled out a number of defenses. 
One was the defense of illegality of the purported con-
tract alleged in the amended complaint, and the defense 
of illegality to the pretended ''agreement not to compete'' 
recited in the pre-trial order. (R. 63). 
The court ruled out the defense of lack of authority 
of any officer or agent of defendant to enter into any 
agreement to refrain from competition. (R. 25, 58-59). 
The trial judge sustained an objection to questions 
on cross-examination which would demonstrate that Mr. 
Connole acted in bad faith in demanding a "commission" 
on September 27, 1950. Defendant asked whether plain-
tiff had received any money, check or bank draft. (R. 
605). Plaintiff well-knew that the only basis of dealing 
had been purchasing from defendant at a discount, on 
the same basis as other elevator companies. 
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By repeatedly restraining cross-examination which 
demonstrated that the claims of plaintiff constituted 
subterfuge, the defendant was deprived of further ad-
missions from plaintiff. 
If the trial court had ruled correctly, instead of the 
way it did rule on objections of defendant, the case would 
have been dismissed with prejudice. 
PorNT 9. 
THE COURT MISDIRECTED THE JURY 
PREJUDICIALLY BOTH AS TO THE LAW AND 
AS TO THE EVIDENCE, AND THE COURT ALSO 
WITHHELD FROM THE JURY VARIOUS THEO-
RIES OF DEFENSE BY REFUSING TO GIVE AP-
PROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS. 
The trial court should have directed a verdict 
against the plaintiff. The claims of plaintiff are contrary 
to law. Plaintiff failed to prove any agreement or any 
breach of contract. 
In submitting the case to the jury, the court sub-
stantially deprived defendant of its defenses, by contra-
dicting the evidence, by disregarding the express stipu-
lations of the parties, and by ignoring the admissions 
of plaintiff. The court also refused to present to the 
jury by appropriate instruction, the defenses established 
by the evidence. Defendant duly excepted to the errone-
ous instructions given, and also excepted to the refusal 
of the trial judge to give 28 separate instructions which 
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had been timely requested by defendant. (R. 111-131, 
157-189, 966-971). 
Defendant excepted to the last four lines of Instruc-
tion No. 1 inasmuch as there was no evidence of any 
implied contract, nor any circumstantial evidence that 
the parties intended to make a contract such as claimed 
by plaintiff. Defendant excepted to Instruction No. 2 
for the same reason. (R. 112-113). Instruction No. 2-a, 
was vicious, for there was not only a lack of competent 
evidence of any agreement between the parties to prevent 
defendant from submitting a bid to Utah Hotel Company, 
but the instruction was in defiance of the federal and 
state statutes which make any such purported agreements 
illegal (R. 114) : 
'' ... If you shall believe from all the evidence 
in this cause as to the actions, conduct and manner 
of doing business between the parties that both 
the plaintiff and defendant understood and agreed 
that the defendant company could not contract 
directly with a customer to whom plaintiff had 
already submitted a bid for sale or use of de-
fendant's equipment, such agreement, if any, 
although not in writing would be binding between 
the parties.'' 
The instruction disregards the admissions and stipu-
l~tions which show that defendant quoted plaintiff on 
the same basis as other elevator companies. The instruc-
tion is contrary to law for the reason previously indi-
cated, that unaccepted offers cannot impliedly create a 
contract; and even in the few instances where contracts 
were actually made, they were specific, express and in 
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writing, and left no room for any implications. Also, 
the execution and performance of a specific contract in 
the past, does not constitute any implied agreement to 
enter into a similar contract in the future, nor to limit 
activities in the future. The instruction also permitted 
the jury to construe written instruments, which is not 
a function of the jury. The trial court had no authority 
to delegate such function to the jury. The trial judge 
could not have lawfully construed a group of expired 
unaccepted offers and negotiations which had terminated, 
a.s an implied contract not to compete. The instruction 
was in defiance of the Bill of Rights. 
Instruction No. 5 contains the same vices as No. 2 a, 
and more. (R. 120). Among the objectional features of 
said instruction were the following: 
''The plaintiff says that an understanding had 
developed from the nature of their business, their 
locations, their past dealings with each other, and 
all of the facts up to the submission of the de-
fendant's bid to the plaintiff. 
''The plaintiff says that the implied under-
standing was that they were acting as follows: 
When the plaintiff had asked the defendant for a 
bid, and after the defendant had responded with 
a bid, that the defendant would not compete with 
the plaintiff in any way for the original contract.'' 
The instruction fails to show a valid agreement for 
want of consideration, and the statement of the claim is 
void on its face. Furthermore, the court ignored the 
fact that the original bid of June 14, 1950, obtained by 
false representations by plaintiff, was withdrawn Sep-
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tember 8, 1950. The court failed and refused to state 
the defenses of defendant, but merely stated, "The 
defendant says there "\Yas no such understanding.'' The 
statement is false, for defendant denied that there was 
any agree1nent 'vhatsoever, and the court inferred that 
there "Tas some other kind of ''understanding''. Tht 
mere assertion that ''Defendant also says that the de-
fendant was free to bid for an original contract'', was 
not a fair nor an adequate statement of the defendant's 
position, for defendant claimed that plaintiff's conduct 
was not in good faith in that the plaintiff was guilty of 
misrepresentation. 
Instruction No. 5-a disregarded the admissions of 
plaintiff, the undisputed evidence and the stipulations 
of counsel, and authorized the jury to disregard those 
matters (R. 121): 
''Plaintiff has introduced evidence to show 
that the plaintiff did not invite other companies 
to compete with the defendant on certain products, 
and that the plaintiff used said certain products 
of the defendant exclusively.'' 
Such statement was utterly contrary to plaintiff's 
own evidence, which showed that plaintiff never did use 
defendant's products exclusively, and particularly never 
at any time purchased any dumb-waiters, relay controls 
of any of the modern types, and that plaintiff took orders 
on such items from companies other than defendant, 
as previously pointed out in argument of Point 3. 
Counsel for plaintiff stipulated that defendant did not 
deal exclusively with plaintiff, and also that plaintiff 
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purchased from others the type of equipment which 
defendant manufactures, 'vhich completely precluded any 
such instruction. The plaintiff's evidence did not at any 
time sho'v that the dealings 'vere exclusive, and the 
charge to the jury of exclusive dealings was absolutely 
contrary to the evidence. The. court had no right to 
contradict the admissions of plaintiff and the stipula-
tions of counsel which clearly sho,ved that there were 
no exclusive dealings. 
The court further attempted to delegate to the jury 
the privilege of construing the written negotiations as 
amounting to an implied contract, when the court would 
have been compelled by the fundamental rules of law 
to charge that those instruments did not imply any such 
agreement as contended by plaintiff. The instruction 
stated, ''You may consider the conduct of the parties 
'vhatever you find it to have been~ in determining whether 
or not there was an implied agreement to the effect that 
the defendant would not compete against the plaintiff." 
(R. 121). The court told the jury it could find anything, 
as it refused to give the jury instructions in accordance 
'vith the stipulation of the parties or the admissions of 
plaintiff. The court attempted to license the jury to 
construe written neg·otia tions and unaccepted offers 
which had expired as an implied agreement not to com~ 
pete. Neither the court nor the jury had any such right. 
The court's instruction No. 5-b that such an agree~ 
ment would have been legal and valid and not against 
public policy, was contrary to the express provisions of 
the Sherman Act, and also other federal and state legis~ 
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lation discussed under Points 1 and 2. The first line of 
No. 5-c was objectionable for the same reason. 
Instruction No. 6 was wholly unwarranted, and 
prejudicial for the reason that there "\Vas neither evi-
dence of a ''general implied agreement not to compete 
with plaintiff'', nor ''an implied agreement not to com-
pete for the Hotel Utah job". That instruction was par-
ticularly vicious in opening two avenues of conjecture, 
without competent evidence (R. 124) : 
''If you find from the dealings of the parties 
generally, and independent of the negotiations for 
the Hotel Utah job, that an implied agreement 
not to compete existed between the plaintiff and 
the defendant, then you should find in favor of 
the plaintiff unless plaintiff waived that agree-
ment.'' 
It would be impossible to make out a·n implied agree-
ment generally when the matter was never discussed, 
and in 20 years defendant had been awarded only seven 
contracts, each by way of written acceptance of written 
bid; and the evidence showed that defendant did not deal 
with plaintiff on any different basis than any other 
elevator company. TheTe was no proof of any considera-
tion, nor any other essential elements of a contract. The 
court also opened an alternate avenue for the wildest 
sort of conjecture (R. 124) : 
"If you find that there was no implied general 
agreement, but that there was an implied agree-
ment not to compete for the Hotel Utah job, then 
you should find for the plaintiff unless it was 
waived by the plaintiff or unless the plaintiff in-
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duced the implied agreement by a misrepresenta-
tion as explained hereafter. '' 
The evidence required a finding that plaintiff recog-
nized the right of defendant to make a bid to Utah Hotel 
Company and the right of Utah Hotel Company to obtain 
a firm bid from defendant, for the plaintiff tried to talk 
Utah Hotel Company out of getting a bid from de-
fendant and plaintiff made no claim that defendant was 
precluded from giving a bid, and plaintiff expressly 
told Mr. Henker that it was all right for Pacific Elevator 
and Equipment Company to submit a bid to defendant, 
which would destroy the claim that there was in existence 
at that time any "implied agreement not to compete." 
Furthermore, the original bid of defendant to plaintiff, 
which was obtained by false representations was with-
drawn on September 8, 1950, there having been no accept-
ance. The bid submitted thereafter was junior to the 
bid submitted by defendant to Hotel Utah. The jury 
was told that it could find from the evidence an agree-
ment which never existed, and that if it "found" such 
an ''agreement'' the plaintiff was entitled to recover, 
falsely inferring that defendant violated some con-
tractual right of plaintiff when no such contractual right 
had ever existed or could have existed under the law. 
By the second paragraph of Instruction No. 7 the 
court charged ( R. 127) : 
"The defendant has the burden to prove that 
the· plaintiff acquiesced in the defendant's giving 
a competitive bid to the Hotel Utah, and that the 
plaintiff induced the defendant to agree not to 
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compete by a misrepresentation, if such an ~gree­
ment existed.'' 
A party never ha.s a burden to prove anything which 
his adversary has already proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In this case the plaintiff admitted making the 
false representations. The plaintiff also admitted telling 
Mr. Henker that it was all right for Pacific to give de-
fendant a bid; so that defendant had no burden whatso-
ever to prove the very things which the plaintiff con-
fessed. The court had no right to invite the jury to 
speculate as to whether Mr. Connole meant what he said 
when he told Pacific that it was all right to submit a bid 
to defendant, knowing that defendant wa.s going to use 
the bid from Pacific to arrive at a proper bid to submit 
to Utah Hotel Company. The court might just as well 
have told the jury that plaintiff admitted those things, 
but the jury could disregard the admissions of the plain-
tiff on the theory that defendant had the burden of 
proving them, and what the plaintiff unequivocally ad-
mitted or stipulated to be the facts would not count. 
Instruction No. 11 related to the award of damages. 
There was no evidence that plaintiff could have obtained 
an award of the contract. The court charged inter alia 
(R. 128) : 
"If you find for the plaintiff then you a.re to 
award plaintiff the damages that resulted from 
the defendant's breach of contract. In such an 
event the plaintiff would be entitled to the profit 
that plaintiff would have made on the contract 
with the Hotel Utah, and that amount cannot 
exceed $12,899.08." 
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There was no contract and no possible ''breach of 
contract.'' There was no proof of any damages. As 
pointed out under Point 6, there was no competent evi-
dence that plaintiff could have made a cent of profit. 
Mr. Connole first testified that he figured the job "low'' 
by computing only the items which would be the actual 
costs. When he sprang Exhibit SSS which had been 
concocted after this suit started, it was apparent that to 
arrive at the figure of $12,899.08 he had willfully omitted 
at least $15,000 of actual costs. 
The court further instructed (R. 128): 
''The verdict may also include the loss of 
advertising that would have gone to the plaintiff, 
if any, had the plaintiff had the original contract. 
Such loss would include the observations that 
passengers might be able to make of the sign that 
plaintiff could have and would have lawfully main-
tained on the elevator cabs. 
''The amount that plaintiff would be entitled 
to for the use of signs in the elevator cabs, and 
for not being able to point out the Hotel Utah as 
one of its installations, cannot exceed the amount 
of $1,000 per year, discounted for payment in ad-
cance ... '' 
The last quoted portions of Instruction No. 11 are 
objectionable by inferring, contrary to the evidence, that 
plaintiff would have been able to put its signs in the 
elevator cabs lawfully. The evidence is undisputed that 
Utah Hotel Company as owner of the property did not 
and would not consent to any nameplates in the 
thresholds of the cabs. If plaintiff, by some miracle, had 
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been able to obtain an award of the contract, and had 
put its nameplates in the cabs to falsely advertise itself 
as the manufacturer, Utah Hotel Company could and 
would have ripped them out of the cabs. There is no 
evidence that the nameplates would have remained in 
the cabs for even 24 hours, even if the plaintiff could 
have installed them without Utah Hotel Company know-
ing about it. 
There never was any permission to advertise, and 
plaintiff could not have been damaged. It would have 
been unlawful as an unfair trade practice for plaintiff 
to have advertised itself as the manufacturer of that 
which it did not and does not manufacture. A person 
cannot be heard to say he was damaged by being pre-
vented from doing an unlawful act, or even prevented 
from doing that which he had not obtained the right to 
do. The evidence of damage related to loss of privilege 
of placing the manufacturer's nameplates in the cabs. 
The plaintiff could not possibly qualify as a manufac-
turer. The instruction further assumes that defendant 
would be liable for the decision made by Hotel Utah. 
The court violated fundamental rules by refusing to 
give instructions on the theories of defendant as to the 
defenses asserted. Out of requests for instructions num-
bered 1 to 37 inclusive, the court refused to give any 
of that list except 1, 6, 15, 16, 20, 21, 35, 36 and 37 in 
\vhole or in part. This Honorable Court held in Webb v. 
Snow, 102 Utah 435, 132 P. 2d 114, that a party is entitled 
to have his theory submitted to the jury by appropriate 
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instructions, when there is evidence to sustain it. The 
trial court erred in its refusal to give each of the re-
quested instructions, inasmuch as correct statements of 
law are embodied in such requested instructions, and 
there was more than ample evidence to warrant such 
instructions. 
By request No. 2, the court was requested to charge 
that in order to have a contract implied by conduct, all 
of the elements of a valid contract must exist, including 
a meeting of the minds to do that which is lawful, and 
also consideration. (R. 157). The defendant was Inex-
orably right in request No. 4 (R. 159): 
"The fact that the parties have entered into 
a particular contract or agreement in the past, by 
express written terms, does not imply that the 
parties will continue to make contracts of such 
character in the future. In other words, where 
there is a written agreement between the parties 
on a particular date whereby one party contracts 
to do a particular job for the other party, that 
fact does not imply that a similar transaction will 
be entered into thereafter. Such written contract 
and the performance under it is not to be con-
strued as conduct which implies some other agree-
ment, in the absence of language in such instru-
ment which indicates that the parties contemplate 
performance in addition to that which is expressly 
stated in the written agreement." 
See Donovan v. McGurrin, 69 Utah 1, 251 P. 1067, 17 
C. J. S., Contracts, Implied Terms, pages 779-780, and 
Johnson v. Iglehart Bros., 95 F. 2d 4. Likewise, it was 
prejudicial error to fail to give request No. 5: 
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''You are instructed that it is the duty of the 
court to construe the written instruments. In this 
case, none of the written instruments nor the per-
formance required under any of said written in-
struments, show any intention on the part of the 
defendant to agree to refrain from submitting a 
bid to any other person. Furthermore, you are 
instructed that in a number of instances, the de-
fendant submitted written bids on the same job 
or project to plaintiff and to one or more other 
companies. 
"Neither the request of plaintiff to defendant, 
dated May 11, 1950, to submit a bid on a portion 
of the modernization of the passenger elevators 
at Hotel Utah, nor the proposal by defendant 
dated June 14, 1950, to the plaintiff, nor the 
written proposal made to plaintiff by defendant 
dated September 11, 1950, can be construed in 
any manner as an agreement on the part of de-
fendant to refrain from submitting to manage-
ment of Utah Hotel Company a bid on the entire 
modernization project.'' 
The court had a duty to construe the written instru-
ments, and it had no authority to delegate that function 
to the jury. The request of defendant was proper, for 
there could be no other construction of the written 
instruments. 
Defendant was entitled to have submitted request 
No.7: "The fact that defendant had submitted to plain-
tiff a proposal covering a portion of the modernization 
project, did not make it wrongful for defendant to submit 
to Utah Hotel Company upon invitation of Utah Hotel 
Company a proposal covering the entire modernization 
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project.'' The hotel had been a customer for over two 
years, and the hotel had a right to receive a firm bid 
from defendant, and a right not to receive a misleading 
or collusive bid. Likewise, defendant was entitled to 
have request No. 8 granted (R. 163), particularly in view 
of the prejudicial comments of the court on the evidence: 
"You are instructed that the mere fact that 
defendant had not previously bid as a prime con-
tractor in the State of Utah, did not require 
defendant to obtain the consent of the plaintiff 
or any other elevator company, in order to sub-
mit a bid to Utah Hotel Company as a proposed 
prime contractor. The term ''prime contractor'' 
means one who undertakes to perform the entire 
construction project, as distinguished from a 
''subcontractor'' who merely performs a portion 
of such project.'' 
By the court's ·refusal to give such instruction, the 
court inferred again that defendant had no right to exer-
cise its consttiutional right to enter into contract. 
By request No. 9 the defendant asked the court to 
charge the jury that every contract in restraint of trade 
or commerce is illegal if such contract prevents compe-
tition and tends toward monopoly. The court gave an 
instruction directly contrary to law. The substance of 
defendant's request was included in the motion for a 
directed verdict. Request No. 10 was, ''An agreement 
or promise not to bid for the award of a contract, having 
as its primary object the stifling of competition, is 
illegal.'' That request was taken from the Restatement 
of Law, Contracts, Sec. 517. There could be no dispute 
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about the fact that plaintiff sought to prevent competi-
tion. Defendant was entitled to directed verdict, and it 
was error for the court to refuse to follow the law. 
By request No. 11 the court "\vas asked to charge 
that if the plaintiff procured a quotation from defendant 
on the false representation that plaintiff would be the 
only bidder on the job, the jury should find against the 
plaintiff. A person cannot enforce a fraudulent claim. 
By request No. 12, defendant appropriately asked 
that the jury be instructed that if plaintiff failed to 
submit any further bid within a reasonable time, plain-
tiff "\vas not acting in good faith with the Utah Hotel 
Company, and plaintiff cannot complain about acceptance 
of the request of Utah Hotel Company to defendant to 
submit a bid on the over-all modernization project. (R. 
167). There can be no dispute about the insufficiency 
and unsatisfactory nature of plaintiff's bid to Utah Hotel 
Company. By request No. 13, defendant asked that the 
jury be instructed that defendant is not responsible for 
the failure of plaintiff to submit a bid to Utah Hotel 
Company which would be satisfactory to the hotel com-
pany. (R. 168). There was no reason for refusing such 
request. 
By request No. 14: "You are instructed that it was 
the right of the Utah Hotel Company to ask the defend-
ant or any other person to submit bids on the over-all 
construction project.'' Such request was proper in law 
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ana in fact. rrhe court ignored the Bill of Rights both 
from the standpoint of defendant as well as Utah Hotel 
Company's position. By request No. 17: ''The owner 
of a building is entitled to require the things done it 
desires done in the remodeling or construction conducted 
on the owner's premises, and the owner has a right to 
specify what is to be done and to reject any proposal 
which does not meet the owner's wishes.'' Said instruc-
tion was properly proposed in view of the contention of 
defendant that plaintiff failed to obtain the award of 
the contract because it would not do the things that the 
hotel wanted, in the past or at that time. The cour was 
arbitrary in refusing each of the requests. The court 
ignored the defenses which plaintiff had proved. 
By request No. 18, the defendant asked the court to 
instruct the jury as follows (R. 173): 
"In this case the plaintiff claims it was dam-
aged by the removal of name-plates from the 
elevator thresholds. You are instructed that the 
purpose of such name-plates is to advertise. The 
owner of a building has the absolute right to 
determine 'vhether or not any name-plates or any 
other device shall be made a part of the equip-
ment installed, and the owner has the right to 
either prohibit the placing of any advertising 
device on his premises or to remove the same 
at any time. 
''The plaintiff cannot recover damages for .the 
loss of advertising through removal of the name-
plates if such name-plates were removed by reason 
of the fact that the Utah Hotel Company did not 
want any such name-pia tes. '' 
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The instruction was correct, and it reflects the theory 
of defendant that Utah Hotel Company had the old name-
plates removed, and it did not allow any name-plates in 
the new cabs. Defendant could not possibly be liable in 
damages for the acts of the Utah Hotel Company or its 
decisions not to have name-plates. 
The defendant was entitled to have the court give 
its request No. 19 inasmuch as plaintiff was not a manu-
facturer, and the placing of name-plates denoting a 
manufacturer, when Kimball Elevator Company did not 
manufacture such equipment, would be an unfair trade-
practice by false advertising: 
"You are instructed that it is an unfair trade 
practice to place a false or misleading label on 
any manufactured article or equipment. In this 
connection you are charged that where a person 
merely installs equipment manufactured by some 
other person, the placing of a name-plate or other 
device upon such equipment in such a manner that 
it denotes the name of the manufacturer, and not 
the installer of such equipment, such labeling 
which falsely denotes the name of a manufacturer 
is an unfair trade practice. 
"You are further instructed that a person who 
is guilty of an unfair trade practice has no cause 
of action for the removal of any such device nor 
for preventing him from continuing such false or 
misleading labeling.'' 
The court in denying such request, deprived de-
fendant of a substantial defense. The denial amounted 
to saying that one who is prevented from falsely adver-
tising, has a cause of action against the person who had 
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no part in preventing it; for in this case the decision to 
have blank thresholds was made solely by Utah Hotel 
Company, as the owner. The court disregarded the rights 
of the owner, and inferred that Kimball Elevator Com-
pany had some special property rights on the premises 
of Hotel Utah. The refusal of the court to give reque~t 
No. 22, was also prejudicial ( R. 177) : 
''The Utah Hotel Company is not a party to 
this action. There is evidence in this case that 
the old elevator cabs were removed, and new 
elevator cabs were installed as a part of the 
modernization project. There is no evidence that 
the name-plates of the plaintiff which were in 
the old elevator cabs were installed as safety 
devices, and the evidence is that they were ad-
vertising devices. There is evidence that the old 
name-plates could not have been used in the new 
elevator cabs in any event, and that the manage-
ment of Utah Hotel Company refused to allow 
any name-plates on the thresholds of the new cabs. 
''You are instructed that the Utah Hotel Com-
pany was under no legal duty to allow any name-
plate or any other advertising device on the 
threshold of any elevator. You are further in-
structed that the defendant had no legal right to 
put a name-plate in such elevator cabs without 
the consent of the Utah Hotel Company. You are 
therefore instructed that the defendant is not in 
any manner liable for the alleged loss of adver-
tising to the plaintiff by reason of the decisions 
of the Utah Hotel Company.'' 
Obviously, an owner of property has a right to 
decide whether a person who wants to advertise shall 
have his advertising on the premises. The idea that 
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plaintiff could put its advertising on Hotel Utah premises 
"~hether the hotel liked it or not, is un-American. Plain-
tiff's o'vn witness, Max C. Carpenter stated that the 
hotel would not allow any such name-plates, and there 
is no evidence that the hotel was willing to allow any of 
plaintiff's name-plates to be installed, particularly in 
view of the fact that plaintiff was not a manufacturer 
of any of the essential equipment. By request No. 23, 
which the defendant "ras entitled to have the court give 
to the jury, it is stated that plain tiff is not enti tied to 
recover for either the removal of the old name-plates 
nor for not putting new plates in the new cabs, for the 
reason that there is no evidence that there was any agree-
ment between the hotel and plaintiff for plaintiff to have 
such name-plates in the new cabs, nor any evidence that 
plaintiff paid the hotel money or any other thing of 
value for name-plates in the new cabs. The instruction 
requested is strictly in accordance with the record. Plain-
tiff did not acquire any right to have name-plates in the 
new cabs, and the claim of loss, was utterly fictitious. 
By request No. 24, the defendant asked the jury to 
be instructed (R. 179) : 
''An agreement between parties whereby one 
party is to submit an additional bid to the owner 
with the purpose of inducing the owner to be-
lieve that there is competitive bidding and that 
the bid already submitted is a reasonable price 
for the proposed job, is a collusive agreement and 
there can be no recovery for any alleged breach 
of such an agreement. ' ' 
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Such an instruction was warranted by the state-
ments of Mr .. Connole that he wanted defendant to give 
the hotel a bid which would ''justify our price''. He 
knew that the hotel 'vanted an honest firm bid. While 
defendant denied that there was such a conversation as 
claimed by plaintiff, the fact is that the testimony of 
plaintiff would show that plaintiff sought the presenta-
tion of a collusive bid, and no recovery could be had on 
an agreement of such a character, even if there had been 
any consideration. There was no consideration and the 
pretended ''agreement'' would have been void anyway. 
Request No. 25 should have been given because it is 
quoted from Corbin on Contracts, Sec. 1468, which states 
that an agreement designed for the suppression of com-
petition is a matter of restraint of trade, and if the bid-
ding relates to a proposed contract with a private indi-
vidual it is a fraud upon such person and such agreement 
is unenforceable for it is against public policy to permit 
a fraud upon an individual or a corporation which seeks 
competitive bids. The evidence clearly shows that plain-
tiff was seeking to suppress competition, by deceit and 
by trying to discourage the hotel from getting a bid 
from defendant. 
Request No. 26 should have been given and it was 
prejudicial error to refuse it, for the hotel company had 
a constitutional right to get a bid from defendant, and 
plaintiff had no right to impede or restrict the bid in 
any manner (R. 181): 
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''You are instructed that the Utah Hotel Com-
pany as the owner of the property where the 
modernization of the elevators was contemplated, 
had the absolute right to request the defendant 
to submit a firm bid to the Utah Hotel Company 
and that the plaintiff company had no right to 
restrict or to place any limitation on the bid to 
be submitted by the defendant corporation to the 
Utah Hotel Company." 
The foregoing proposed instruction is so funda-
mental that a denial of it amounts to a refusal to recog-
nize the Bill of Rights. Likewise, request No. 27 is 
inexorably right as a statement of law (R. 182): 
"An implied contract is one which the law 
infers from the facts and circumstances of a case, 
but it will not be inferred in any case where an 
express contract would for any reason be invalid.'' 
The ''implied contract'' theory was designed to cir-
cumvent the federal and state statutes which interdict 
agreements to refrain from selling to a person or class 
of persons. Request No. 29 is also a correct statement 
of the law, which defendant was entitled to have the 
court give to the jury (R. 184) : 
''You are instructed that if you find from the 
evidence that Utah Hotel Company requested the 
defendant corporation to submit a bid in writing 
on the over-all job, and not a mere estimate, that 
there could not be any lawfully implied agreement 
between the plaintiff and defendant for the de-
fendant to refrain from submitting a firm bid to 
Utah Hotel Company; and that any attempt on 
the part of the plaintiff to prevent the Utah Hotel 
Company from getting a good faith bid would 
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have been fraudulent and in derrogation of the 
rights of Utah Hotel Company, and your verdict 
must be against the plaintiff and in favor of the 
defendant, no cause of action.'' 
Such an instruction would have been generous to 
plaintiff, since the court erred in not directing a verdict 
in favor of defendant. Plaintiff did not have any right 
to interfere "rith the property rights of Utah Hotel Com-
pany, by having any agreement with defendant to refrain 
from submitting a firm bid to the hotel. No such agree-
ment was ever thought of until the pre-trial conference, 
and there was no proof of it at the trial. 
Request No. 28 was inexorably right, for the court 
had no authority to turn over a group of miscellaneous 
irrelevant instruments to the jury to construe. It is the 
duty of the judge to construe written instruments, and 
that function cannot be delegated to the jury. (R. 183). 
' 'You are instructed that the preliminary 
negotiations which lead up to the submission of 
a bid, do not constitute either an express or im-
plied contract. Where the terms of a request for 
bid are clear and the terms of a bid submitted in 
response to such request are likewise clear, there 
is not to be read into either the request or into 
the bid something which is contrary to or at 
variance with what is expressly stated. You are 
further instructed that parties are presumed to 
say what they intend to say when they make an 
express written statement which is clear and 
definite. '' 
This request was warranted in view of the court's 
statement that the complaint 'vas that there was a breach 
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of a ''preliminary contract of negotiations.'' Further-
more, since the instruments were clear and definite, there 
was no occasion to imply some agreement whereby de-
fendant would be subservient to plaintiff. 
By request No. 32, defendant asked that the jury 
be instructed to disregard all comments of any witness 
referring to plaintiff as agent of defendant for the 
reason there was no evidence of such a relationship. By 
request No. 33, the defendant rightfully asked the court 
to instruct the jury sufficiently on consideration as a 
necessary element of a valid contract, and to caution 
the jury that the various instruments introduced in 
evidence could not constitute consideration for an "im-
plied agreement" (R. 188): 
"You are instructed that there must be con-
sideration for a contract. That is, a person who 
claims a contract must show that there is legal 
consideration to support the promise or the agree-
ment. You are instructed that the fact that the 
parties may have had prior dealings does not 
constitute consideration. In this case there were 
prior bids made by defendant to plaintiff, some 
of which were accepted and some of which were 
never accepted. In this connection, where the bid 
is to sell specified property for a definite price 
and that price is paid, that transaction is com-
pleted, and the fact that a definite contract so 
resulted is not consideration for some future 
transaction. 
"You are therefore instructed that mere nego-
tiations in the past in which plaintiff sought to 
obtain a bargain from defendant, or negotiations 
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"Thich resulted in actual sales, do not constitute 
consideration for any future agreement.'' 
The court allowed plaintiff to confuse the jury with 
a mass of incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial evi-
dence. To make matters worse, the court delegated to 
the jury the function of construing written instruments, 
to permit the jury to find an ''implied agreement not to 
compete with plaintiff'' from negotiations which had 
terminated and from numerous unaccepted offers which 
had expired. The court licensed the jury to ''find' ' con-
sideration when none could possibly exist. 
The court also erred in failing to give request No. 
34, for if plaintiff actually used some term which has 
no common meaning, plaintiff had the duty to make 
itself understood. The court was 'vrong in ruling that 
defendant had the burden of finding out what plaintiff 
meant. In any event no meeting of the minds could be 
presumed. 
Having committed prejudicial error by submitting 
the case to the jury when there was no evidence of any 
agreement, the court committed further error by preju-
dicial instructions which invited the jury to fasten 
liability on defendant when none existed. The court 
also ignored the stipulations of the parties and the ad-
missions of plaintiff. Not only did the court fail to give 
fair instructions, but the court practically blotted out 
most of the defenses, although plaintiff itself proved 
most of them. The court refused to present the de-
fendant's theories of defense. 
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There were adequate reasons for motion for a new 
trial. The court made rulings contrary to law, admitted 
incompetent evidence and excluded proper evidence, and 
then misdirected the jury and failed to give adequate 
or proper instructions. The affidavit of counsel for de-
fendant (R. 197-200), shows not only misconduct of Mr. 
Connole during the trial, but that Exhibits 22, 23, 24, 
26, 27 and 28 were missing when the case was submitted 
to the jury. Inability of counsel to find those exhibits 
was called to the attention of the clerk. Exhibits 26, 27 
and 28 were found after the jury returned its verdict, 
March 19, 1953. Exhibits 22, 23 and 24 are still missing. 
Those particular exhibits "\Vere produced at the trial by 
plaintiff upon demand of defendant. They were copies 
of letters from plaintiff to Murphy Elevator Company 
dated January 31, February 23, and April 22, 1948. Those 
letters refute statements of Mr. Connole that Kimball 
did not charge Murphy Elevator Company a commission. 
Exhibit 23 shows that plaintiff did not know how to 
figure the freight elevator modernization jobs at Hotel 
Utah in 1948. 
The defendant was and is entitled to have granted 
its motion for judgment in accordance with the motion 
for directed verdict. The court did not even grant the 
motion for new trial, although the case shrieks with 
prejudicial error. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff pleaded a collusive illegal agreement. Plain-
tiff neither pleaded nor proved any consideration. None 
of the written instruments even suggest any idea that 
defendant as seller or prospective seller, should refrain 
from selling to anyone or refrain from entering into 
contract with anyone. The court refused to give heed 
to the federal and state statutes which declare illegal 
and criminal, the very type of agreement asserted in 
this case. The court had no authority to grant plaintiff 
immunity from the law, nor did the court have any right 
to make a contract, nor to deny defendant the defenses 
it asserted, including the defense of illegality. 
The evidence demonstrated that plaintiff devised a 
scheme to get something for nothing, first by making a 
fictitious demand for a "commission" from defendant 
as successful bidder. For all practical purposes, plaintiff 
had ceased to be a bidder or a c~ndidate for the award 
of the modernization contract, by submission of an un-
satisfactory bid and then by failing and neglecting to 
submit a new bid which would conform to specifications 
required by Utah Hotel Company. The original quotation 
dated June 14, 1950, obtained by plaintiff from defendant 
by false representations, was never accepted, and it was 
witharawn by letter dated September 8, 1950, delivered 
September 11 or 12, 1950. A new bid from defendant 
to plaintiff dated September 11, 1950, was submitted by 
defendant to plaintiff after the defendant had submitted 
bids to Utah Hotel Company in response to requests of 
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Utah Hotel Company. The bid of defendant to Utah 
IIotel Company on the modernization of the passenger 
elevators was based in part on a bid given to defendant 
by Pacific Elevator and Equipment Company. Pacific, 
(plaintiff's principal), did not submit such bid to de-
fendant until plaintiff was fully informed nor until plain-
tiff told Pacific it was all right to give defendant a. 
quotation. The claim that there was an ''implied agree-
ment not to compete with plaintiff'' by the submission 
of an offer to plaintiff by defendant, is fictitious and 
sham; for there was no discussion about refraining from 
competition, and plaintiff was informed not only by Utah 
Hotel Company, but by the defendant and by Pacific, 
that the hotel company asked defendant to submit a bid 
on the over-all job. There was no legal nor factual basis 
for any pretended "implication". The claim that by 
submitting a bid to plaintiff on September 12, 1950, 
defendant "impliedly promised" not to submit a good 
faith bid to the hotel company, when plaintiff knew de-
fendant had already submitted a bid to Utah Hotel Com-
pany, is utterly devoid of candor. Utah Hotel Company 
had been the customer of defendant at that time for 
about 30 months. 
The plaintiff proved neither meeting of minds, con~ 
sideration, nor legal subject-matter for an agreement. 
Defendant was entitled to a directed verdict of no cause 
of action. Instead of throwing the plaintiff out of court 
for trying to perpetrate an unconscionable scheme to get 
something for nothing, the trial judge threw the law of 
contracts out of court. It became obvious that plaintiff 
175 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
could not show any contract, but only unaccepted offers 
and negotiations which had terminated, which could not 
possibly give birth to a contract. The court then an-
nounced that ''the contract breached was not a contract 
to install, but a preliminary contract of negotiations." 
Such a ''theory'' is utterly in defiance of all rules of 
contract, for negotiations do not constitute a contract. 
The court disregarded the constitutional rights of 
both defendant and Utah Hotel Company. The trial 
judge ignored the evidence which shows that plaintiff 
was not prevented from doing business with Utah Hotel 
Company by a wrongful act of defendant, for defendant 
was not guilty of any wrongful act. Only the plaintiff 
was guilty of wrongdoing. Utah Hotel Company had a 
legal right to refuse to do business with plaintiff, without 
reason at all, but it established two good reasons why 
it could not risk doing business with plaintiff: (1) Plain-
tiff had given unsatisfactory performance in the past 
without making corrections; and (2) plaintiff utterly 
failed to offer to do the job the way the hotel wanted it 
done or to include all of the items which had to be in-
cluded. There was no evidence that plaintiff could pos~ 
si~ly have been awarded either of the two contracts. 
Plaintiff did not even prove that it could have made 
any profit, even if by some miracle it could have be.en 
awarded the contract, for plaintiff resorted to incompe;. 
tent evidence of an estimate which omitted a number of 
essential items of cost which would have shown that the 
cost exceeded the contract price. Plaintiff was allowed 
recovery for the failure to have its name-plates on the 
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thresholds of the elevator cabs, when such name-plates 
would have been illegal and would have constituted an 
unfair trade practice since plaintiff would not have been 
the manufacturer. Furthermore, plaintiff could not show 
that it could have even obtained permission of Utah Hotel 
Company, and the evidence is that the hotel would not 
allow such name-plates. Plaintiff "struck out" on every 
claim it presented. It proved that it resorted to the 
judicial machinery in an effort to turn its ''own delicts 
into a triumph'' in a scheme to get something for nothing. 
Defendant and appellant respectfully submits that 
the judgment should be reversed and the cause should 
be remanded to the district co~rt, with directions to 
enter a judgment against the plaintiff of no cause of 
action, for the reason that the evidence shows that plain-
tiff has no valid claim and no right of recovery against 
defendant. Appellant prays for any and all other appro-
priate relief, including new trial if for any reason this 
Honorable Court should deny appellant judgment against 
respondent of no cause of action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL E. REIMANN, and 
HOWARD J. CANTUS, 
.Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
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